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RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURES BASED ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AN ANALYSIS UNDER ALLOCATION OF 
REGULATORY JURISDICTION AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
  
 
  
ABSTRACT: Are states entitled to take unilateral or collective trade measures in cases 
of extraterritorial human rights violations? Are states obligated to do so? The debate is 
often blurred by a multitude of legal, political, economic, and moral arguments that have, 
so far, produced many misunderstandings. On one hand, the human rights community 
alleges that the superiority of human rights resolves any conflict. On the other hand, the 
trade community fears the intrusion of human rights language and power within the trade 
regime, including multilateral regimes like the World Trade Organization. 
While exploring the above issue, this dissertation unfolds in three parts. First, using 
traditional legal analysis, I demonstrate that, in reality, states have not embraced any 
robust doctrine (in the general, trade and human rights branches) permitting states to 
apply restrictive trade measures as countermeasures against human rights violations 
abroad.  
Second, I use the framework of allocation of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ) and 
transaction costs (TCs) to explain why the rules across those doctrinal branches reach the 
same end point. This framework is based on law and economics literature on property 
rights, which is transposed and expanded to problems of international law. The two 
primary suggested categories of TCs involved in ARJ are sovereignty and cognitive 
costs. Sovereignty costs increase because of extraterritorial allocations, and cognitive 
costs increase because of the two different domains or communities (trade and human 
 
 
vii 
rights) involved in the issue. I then apply this framework to three case studies: Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the World Trade Organization Diamond Waiver, and the trade and 
labor rights “linkages.” These case studies indicate that international law has not 
embraced any robust doctrine concerning the extraterritorial links between trade and 
human rights because of the above TCs.  
Third, I argue that, because of the heightened sovereignty and cognitive costs of public 
international law, human rights advocacy in connection with international trade is 
actually gaining traction in other ways. This phenomenon has been generally described as 
transnational new governance (TNG) and involves initiatives such as voluntary codes of 
conduct, social certification, and labeling. These initiatives directly target the behavior of 
companies and, at the same time, use international conventions as their normative basis. 
TNG initiatives do not incur the same TCs (though they bear different types of costs). In 
addition, these initiatives may have the potential to change the calculation of state’s 
interests in the long run. 
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Ch1 Introduction 
I. ISSUE 
Are states entitled to take restrictive trade measures in cases of human rights 
violations occurring outside their territory? Are states obligated to do so? While 
exploring this issue, this dissertation develops in three main parts.  
First, by using traditional legal analysis, I posit that trade and human rights 
regimes in international law have not incorporated any vigorous doctrine permitting 
states to apply restrictive trade measures in response to human rights violations in other 
countries. The interesting question turns out to be why rules across these regimes reach 
the very same end point.  
Second, I review and adopt a law and economics (L&E) framework of allocation 
of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ) and transaction costs (TCs), which is systematically 
presented in Chapter 3.1 A fundamental idea in this framework is that international 
regimes, to different degrees, delimit the discretionary power of states through allocation 
of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ). As the name indicates, ARJ involves two elements: a 
dynamic of allocation, and regulatory jurisdiction. “Allocation” refers to the dynamic 
process of assigning valued assets (in this case, regulatory jurisdiction) among players 
(states), taking into account transaction costs (TCs). “Regulatory jurisdiction” refers to 
the right to make a state’s law applicable to certain conduct. Three case studies are 
                                                 
1 I employ a positive framework instead of making a normative claim or recommendation. See 
infra Chapter 3.I on positive and normative approach. 
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presented to sustain the proposition that the ARJ of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction 
regarding trade and human rights is permeated by escalated sovereignty and cognitive 
costs. Sovereignty costs increase because of extraterritorial allocations. Cognitive costs 
increase because of the two different domains or communities (trade and human rights) 
involved in the issue. 
Third, the ARJ and TCs methodology is also useful for explaining why human 
rights advocates are attempting to advance links between trade and human rights through 
transnational new governance (TNG) initiatives. One reason is that these initiatives do 
not incur the TCs found in the classic model of trade sanctions.2 Examples of these 
initiatives include voluntary codes of conduct, social certification, and labeling. They are 
also presented in four case studies: the United Nations Global Compact (voluntary code 
of conduct); SA 8000 (social certification); fairtrade (labeling), and the Kimberley 
Process of Certification Scheme. I propose that these initiatives may be precursors of a 
long-term change in the calculation of states’ interests. For further investigation, it is 
asked whether some recent developments in TNG initiatives, such as government 
procurement with social and the elaboration of ISO 26000, may indicate that this change 
is in progress. 
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
Since the late 1990s, a debate involving international trade and its impact on 
human rights has taken place in many institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the 
                                                 
2 See infra Chapter 4 on TNG. 
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World Trade Organization (WTO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
academia. Lang summarizes key moments of that debate as it has unfolded to date.3 
Lang recalls that the United Nations (UN) initiated a work programme and a 
series of reports were produced by UN human rights institutions that addressed the 
impact of the international trade system on the enjoyment of human rights.4 NGOs also 
entered the debate. Academia followed suit; numerous conferences and seminars were 
organized by, among others, the European Journal of International Law and the American 
Society of International Law.5 WTO officers participated as panelists or contributed with 
papers to some of those events. 
But if one expects those efforts would bring coherence to the relationship between 
trade and human rights, reaching common ground has proved difficult. Apparently, one 
historical reason for polarization instead of consensus is the distinct evolution of trade 
institutions and human rights institutions. On one hand, to talk about human rights in the 
trade arena could politicize the trade negotiations and jeopardize, instead of facilitate, the 
functioning of the trade regime. On the other hand, the international human rights 
institutions speak and advocate their own language of rights without further elaboration 
                                                 
3 Although he recognizes that the “social history of the trade and human rights debate is yet to be 
written.” See Andrew T. F. Lang, Re-thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15(2) TULANE J. INT’L AND 
COMPARATIVE L. 335, 336 (2007). 
4 The “nightmare” reports are the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the 
Promotion & Prot. Of Human Rights, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Preliminary Report, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (June 15, 2000) (prepared by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama); ECOSOC, 
Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full 
Enjoyment of Human Rights, Progress Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001)(prepared 
by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama); ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. On the Promotion & Prot. of Human 
Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Final Report, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14 (June 25, 2003)(prepared by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama). Id. fn.3. 
5 Lang, supra note 3, at 337-40. 
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on the trade side.6 Institutionally speaking, there is neither a Committee on Human Rights 
at the WTO nor a Committee of Trade at the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).7  
The debate is thorny and some argue that there should not even be a debate. An 
open trading system like the one advanced by the WTO produces higher rates of 
economic growth. This growth generates money to “fund” human rights that need 
resources to be implemented. This logical inference can be reasonably accepted if one 
assumes that human rights implementation depends, of course, on money and also that 
the trade regime, itself, is free of and does not contribute to human rights violations. 
Nonetheless, the literature also points to collisions. As Alan Sykes puts it, 
“everything we know points to a generally favorable relationship [between trade and 
human rights] . . . [then] the question [turns to be]: how to address occasional tension.”8  
Examples of this tension are found everywhere, as exploitation of labor conditions 
overseas by multinational corporations and trade of conflict diamonds are often cited. 
                                                 
6 See infra Chapter 3.V.B on the translation of this aspect into the language of transaction costs. 
7 It should be noted that both institutions and some of their respective officers have produced 
reports or analysis about the linkages, though not in an institutionalized framework. Indeed, as Petersmann 
acknowledges, “[g]iven the widespread bias among human rights lawyers vis-à-vis economics and WTO 
law, and the agnostic attitude of many trade specialists vis-à-vis human rights, it is an important task of 
academics to promote more dialogue and better understanding among these different communities of trade 
specialists and human rights advocates . . .” (original emphasis). See Ernst Ulrich-Petersmann, Time for a 
United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: 
Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 8, 35 (2002). Regarding WTO officers’ analysis in 
their individual capacity, see Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law, 33(5) J. 
WORLD TRADE 87 (1999). See also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13(4) 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002). In the area of intellectual property, see Robert D. Anderson & Hannu Wager, 
Human Rights, Development, and the WTO: the Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy, 
9(3) J. INT'L ECON. L. 707 (2006). 
8 Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 69, 73 (Frederick 
M. Abbott, Christine Breining-Kaufmann, and Thomas Cottier eds., University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
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Indeed, I suggest that this tension occurs most of the time with an extraterritorial factor; 
that is to say, the importing states and the state where the violation of human rights is 
taking place are not identical. 
In sum, the intersections of international trade and human rights will be on the 
agenda of governments, international organizations, NGOs, companies, and other 
stakeholders for years to come. For instance, the recent remarks of Pascal Lamy, Director 
General of the WTO, in the Public Forum of 2008 (Trading into the Future) point in that 
direction. Lamy acknowledges the responsibility of the multilateral trading system for 
human rights as one of the complex issues on which the public forum was expected to 
trigger a frank and open debate.9 And while there is much uncertainty as to how this 
linkage will develop in the multilateral trade regime, non-state initiatives dealing with the 
linkage has been increasing considerably. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
I dedicate considerable effort to reviewing current literature and proposing a 
novel analytical framework. Essentially, I adopt a combination of methods in the 
following order: 
• I use traditional legal analysis to conclude that general international law, trade 
law and human rights law do not embrace a robust doctrine allowing 
restrictive trade measures to deal with human rights violations abroad; 
• Using L&E analysis, I explain why norms of international law (in all of the 
examined regimes) reach this same end point; 
                                                 
9 See http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum08_e/public_forum08_e.htm. 
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• Still using L&E analysis, I explain why human rights advocates are directing 
their efforts to innovative forms of global governance initiatives that do not 
incur the same TCs that exist in the classic use of trade sanctions. 
IV. TERMINOLOGY 
I employ “regimes” in the sense found in international relations literature, as 
envisaged by Krasner. 10 When I refer to “members,” I mean WTO members. If I refer to 
members of other organizations, the respective acronym will precede “members” (e.g. 
UN members).  
Though footnotes and a list of acronyms will take care of particular terminology, I 
use the acronym ARJ to refer to allocation of regulatory jurisdiction. This is not a term of 
art, nor a common abbreviation found in existing literature. I use it, nevertheless, to avoid 
repetition of the lengthier expression. 
The immense quantity of declarations, treaties, agreements, amendments and 
similar references in the trade and human rights literature precluded me from using 
general references such as “Declaration” or “Agreement.” Thus, where no widely known 
acronym exists, I try to shorten names while giving some meaning to them. In any 
                                                 
10 “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” 
See generally Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen Krasner ed. 1983). Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules 
are specific prescriptions or proscriptions of action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective choice. Id. at 2. For the application of the concept as to “trade,” 
see Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime 
Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273, 276, 313 (Stephen Krasner ed. 1983). For the 
application of the concept as to “human rights,” see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 128 (2d 2003). 
7 
 
circumstance, the first reference of a shortened name will always be made in the full 
form. 
V. DISTRIBUTION OF CHAPTERS  
This dissertation has five chapters, distributed as follows: 
Chapter 1 is this introductory chapter that lays down the issue, the methodology 
and gives a general overview of the dissertation. It should be noted that I assume that the 
reader possesses familiarity with public international law and the specific regimes 
(general, trade and human rights). In this chapter I also delimit the scope of the research 
by noting that some parallel issues, such as effectiveness of trade sanctions and double-
game argument, are related to the issue but are not developed in this work. 
Chapter 2 encompasses the traditional legal analysis of restrictive trade sanctions 
taken in response to human rights violations abroad. I analyze several of the sources that 
are often quoted as legally justifying those measures. From general international law, I 
analyze, among others, customary international law (CIL), jus cogens, UN Security 
Council powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention, and 
responsibility to protect. From WTO law, I scrutinize the general and security exceptions 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the product-process method 
debate, and the general system of preferences. From international human rights law, I 
investigate conventions dealing with, among others, genocide, child labor, slave trade. In 
all of these sources, no solid pattern of lawful extraterritorial incursions on another state’s 
sovereignty is found. In reality, it can be argued that international law is hostile to the 
exercise of extraterritorial legal powers in any context and, therefore, the lawful 
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situations contemplating the use of restrictive trade measures addressing human rights 
violations abroad are very exceptional. 
Chapter 3 aims at explaining the consistency detected in Chapter 2. It begins by 
explaining in detail the L&E model that I employ (drawn from property rights theory in 
existing literature). In this model, the regulatory jurisdiction of states is akin to the 
concept of property (control over something). International law, and its different regimes, 
is presented fundamentally as a device allocating this property, or as I suggest, 
performing or transacting ARJ. These transactions occur as a function of TCs. 
Fundamentally, depending on how costly the transaction is, rights and obligations 
encompassed by a certain transaction (the international law norm) will be more clear, less 
clear, or left open for ex-post allocations. Two types of TCs are explored as essential in 
these types of allocations: sovereignty costs and cognitive costs. The hypothesis put 
forward in this chapter is that TCs increase in allocations dealing with trade sanctions. To 
demonstrate this proposition, the chapter applies the approach to three examples: the UN 
Security Council powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the Diamond Waiver 
decision of the WTO; and the trade and labor debate. 
Chapter 4 starts by describing some innovative forms of global governance that 
have been pursued by human rights advocates to tackle the same problem that trade 
sanctions allegedly handle. I explore four case studies concerning these initiatives. The 
first is a voluntary code, the UN Global Compact initiative; the second is the SA 8000, a 
form of social certification; the third is the fairtrade initiative, an example of labeling; the 
fourth is the KPCS, a hybrid of voluntary codes and certification. Two other recent 
developments are pinpointed as relevant for further research: government procurement 
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policies referring to human rights and labor rights standards and ISO 26000. Another 
inquiry is whether these developments have the potential to change the traditional cost 
structure of international law. Overall, however, the main point of the chapter is to show 
that these initiatives do not incur the same TCs that exist in the classic model of trade 
sanctions. These initiatives have their own costs, but those costs are not in the same form 
or have the same intensity as the sovereignty and cognitive costs.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the whole dissertation to conclude that: first, states have 
not embraced any robust doctrine permitting states to apply restrictive trade measures as 
countermeasures against human rights violations in other countries; second, L&E 
analysis shows sovereignty and cognitive costs are the likely cause of this lack of 
doctrine; and third, L&E analysis also helps explain why human rights advocates are 
attempting to advance the trade and human rights linkages under TNG initiatives. 
VI. DISCLAIMERS 
I envisaged this dissertation keeping in mind that the reader has basic knowledge 
of the relevant regimes. Recurrent terms found in general international law (e.g. CIL, jus 
cogens), the trade regime (e.g. chapeau, rounds, like-products), and in human rights 
regimes (e.g. obligation to protect, respect and fulfill) are assumed to be part of the 
vocabulary of the reader. This dissertation is therefore not an inventory of general 
international law, the WTO regime, or human rights regime, but a presentation of 
10 
 
complex questions related to the examined issue.11 Nonetheless, as necessary, footnotes 
will take care of key points and specific vocabulary in need of clarification. 
In addition, the “trade sanctions” subject evokes many parallel issues that are not 
treated in this dissertation. For instance, the question of effectiveness of sanctions and 
double-game arguments are not considered. The points that follow are noted as 
references, though they are not developed to the deserved extent. 
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE SANCTIONS 
I do not touch questions of effectiveness regarding restrictive trade measures that 
address violations of human rights. Those questions might include: are the concerned 
people better off when trade measures are applied? What are the costs imposed by 
economic sanctions on individuals who may have little to do with the perpetuation of the 
violations? Do targeted states change their behavior when affected by those measures? 
There is substantial disagreement on those questions, with assessments pointing in both 
directions.12 
                                                 
11 Available resources on each specific regime cover their respective area with much more 
detailing. It would be fruitless to reproduce them here. 
12 For an earlier assessment, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
RECONSIDERED 92-105 (2d ed. 1990) (reckoning that although it is not true that sanctions “never work,” 
they are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend upon compelling the target country 
to take actions it stoutly resists). For a recent assessment in the specific context of Europe, see Yaraslau 
Kryvoi, Why European Union Trade Sanctions Do Not Work, 17 MINNESOTA J. INT’L L. 209 (2008). See 
also Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights 30 (John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 
394, 2008) (noting that “pressure on authoritarian states reliably results in transitions to democracy. 
Although this proposition seems intuitive plausible, the evidence is even weaker than it is for the first 
proposition. The experience with Iraq provides a cautionary tale. Economic sanctions on Iraq during the 
1990s did not weaken the authoritarian system; and the recent war in Iraq has not delivered a democracy”) 
(emphasis added), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105209. But see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human 
Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593 (2005) 
(analyzing the issue in the context of preferential trade agreements (PTAs); assessing that PTAs have come 
to play a significant role in governing state compliance with human rights. Especially when PTAs supply 
hard standards that tie material benefits of integration to compliance with human rights principles, PTAs 
are more effective than softer human rights agreements in changing repressive behaviors). 
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B. THE DOUBLE-GAME ARGUMENT 
I do not build, moreover, on criticisms about the mismatch of “internal” human 
rights policies of countries imposing sanctions and the human rights policies they are said 
to protect abroad. Some could argue, for instance, that the usual imposers of unilateral 
sanctions play a double game.13  
The United States has been recently criticized in the light of its own policy 
regarding detention of prisoners, torture,14 and lack of ratification of International Labor 
Organization (ILO) conventions.15 Similarly, one could highlight the inconsistencies of 
the European Union (EU) foreign policy to demand ratification of human and labor rights 
                                                 
13 An interesting episode concerning the United States, China and Singapore occurred during the 
Clinton administration. As Jackson describes it, the United States began giving Most-Favored Nation 
(MFN) treatment to Chinese goods in 1980. This treatment was relatively non-controversial until 1989, 
when the Chinese government suppressed pro-democracy demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square. 
President Clinton was pressured for considering not extending MFN treatment to China in light of the 
episode. The Prime Minister of Singapore was quoted as suggesting that if the United States was to 
withdraw the MFN treatment to China, “the Chinese may one day threaten to withhold MFN status from 
the United States unless it does more to improve living conditions in Detroit, Harlem, and South Central 
Los Angeles.” JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, 
MATERIAL, AND TEXT, 1028-32 (4th ed. 2002). This type of double-game reactions appear, undoubtedly, 
not only in the context of trade sanctions. I had the opportunity to attend a workshop in the University of 
Chicago concerning the definition of an agenda of research in relation to financial globalization and human 
rights. During the workshop, participants discussed whether it would be interesting to pressure the United 
States government to advance strict rules on sovereignty wealth funds (e.g., SWF investments in U.S. 
bonds should be monitored to allow money coming only from countries that condemn torture in theory and 
practice). The proposal, however, sparked at least some interesting reactions from professors indicating the 
incongruence between such policy and recent episodes of the United States administration. Workshop on 
Financial Globalization and Human Rights: Defining the Research Agenda (Ginsburg, Ochoa, and Keenan) 
University of Chicago Law School, February 16, 2008. 
14 It is far from the objective here to provide guidance on these debates, but for a summarization of 
arguments in the torture context, see Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate 
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COL. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 
811 (2005). 
15 As to the lack of ratification of ILO conventions, as of December of 2008, it should be noted 
that the United States has not ratified six out of eight “core labour standards” (CLS) conventions. The 
United States has ratified only Convention 182, regarding worst forms of child labor, and the Convention 
105, regarding abolition of forced labor.. The status of ratification of ILO conventions can be checked at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. 
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conventions from beneficiaries of certain trade schemes while many EU members have 
not ratified those conventions themselves.16  
Though these points appear to be valid and require attention, they are not my 
focus. It would be interesting to observe whether the double-game argument could be 
analyzed as amounting to some sort of TC, although they are not specifically taken into 
account as such in this dissertation. 
C. NO SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT, NO PRO-TRADE, AND NO PRO-HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
As a final disclaimer, if the reader feels that I am taking any government stand by 
mentioning Brazil or the United States with more frequency to illustrate some point, this 
perception is probably misleading. References to those countries merely reflect some 
knowledge about the legal systems with which I am most familiar. However, my aim is to 
present the issue with consideration to no particular government position. 
The same observation is true regarding any perception that my quest is to advance 
a biased “pro-trade” or “pro-human rights” agenda. My comments on the adopted 
positive methodology are expected to support my claim of scientific research and 
neutrality, to the extent such aspirations are ever fully attainable.17 
 
                                                 
16 See infra Chaper 2.III.B.5 on GSP schemes. 
17 See infra Chapter 3.I. 
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Ch2 The Traditional Legal Analysis in 
International Law 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue in this chapter is whether trade measures addressing human rights 
violations abroad are lawful. Using traditional legal analysis, I examine the three main 
regimes related to the above issue: general international law, the WTO regime, and 
human rights regimes. 
In general international law, I analyze the claims that CIL, jus cogens, UN 
Security Council (UN-SC) powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, humanitarian 
intervention, and responsibility to protect, among others, would justify those measures. In 
the WTO law, I focus on the same question in relation to GATT general exceptions 
(article XX) and security exceptions (article XXI). In human rights law, I dedicate 
attention to some of the conventions often brought to the debate (e.g. genocide, torture, 
and child labor, among others). 
In general, a remarkable consistency emerges: none of the regimes reveal a 
vigorous doctrine permitting states to apply restrictive trade measures as countermeasures 
against human rights violations in other countries. But before getting to this conclusion, 
this chapter begins by clarifying the concept of extraterritoriality and regulatory 
jurisdiction that will be used throughout the dissertation. 
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I. JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
A. THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Jurisdiction is a term with multiple connotations. The terminology found in 
prominent public international law books is dissonant. Oppenheim’s praised work on 
international law highlights that jurisdiction, as pertaining to states,18 may take various 
forms: 
a state may regulate conduct by legislation; or it may, through its courts, regulate 
those differences which come before them, whether arising out of the civil or 
criminal law; or it may regulate conduct by taking executive or administrative 
actions which impinges more directly on the course of events, as by enforcing its 
laws or the decisions of the courts.19  
 
Oppenheim, nonetheless, does not advance a specific terminology for those types 
of jurisdiction. Shaw, in turn, enumerates legislative, judicial, and executive as categories 
of jurisdiction that seem to match that classification. For Shaw, the first category of 
jurisdiction refers to the ability of a state to make its law applicable to persons and things 
within its territory and, sometimes, abroad. Judicial and executive jurisdictions, in turn, 
correspond, respectively, to the power of a state to subject persons or things to its courts 
and to the capacity of a state to enforce its law.20 Brownlie, furthermore, recalls that 
jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty and refers to the legislative, judicial, and 
administrative competences associated with those manifestations of jurisdiction.21 
                                                 
18 I say “pertaining to states,” because I am not analyzing jurisdiction as pertaining, for instance, to 
an international court. 
19 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 136 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 
1999). 
20 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 464, 572-578 (5th ed. 2003). 
21 IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (6th ed. 2003). Harris also uses the term 
“enforcement jurisdiction” in regard to the executive and judicial jurisdictions and points out that 
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It should be noted that the branch or the origin of the organ that is exercising the 
jurisdiction is not the determinative factor to indicate the type of jurisdiction being 
exercised. The Restatement Third of Foreign Relations illustrates this point clearly, while 
distinguishing, again, among three types of jurisdiction: prescriptive, judicial and 
enforcement. Prescriptive jurisdiction is the state’s power  
to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the 
interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, 
by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court.22  
 
I am concerned with precisely that sense of jurisdiction: prescriptive. 
Nevertheless, I adopt regulatory jurisdiction as my main terminology because jurisdiction 
to prescribe pertains to a common law nomenclature. Legislative jurisdiction, in turn, 
seems to misguide the reader exclusively to the legislative branch of government. 
 In most circumstances, a state adopts regulatory jurisdiction regarding just the 
conduct occurring inside its territory. This point is made clear by authoritative doctrine. 
Frederick A. Mann, for instance, reviewing twenty years of international doctrine of 
jurisdiction (1964-1984), puts forward that 
[l]aws extend so far as, but no further than the sovereignty of the State which 
puts them into force nor does any legislator normally intend to enact laws which 
apply to or cover persons, facts, events or conduct outside the limits of his State’s 
sovereignty. This is a principle or, perhaps, one should say, an observation of 
universal application (emphasis added).23 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction may be concurrent with other states’ jurisdiction or may be exclusive. See D. J. HARRIS, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 264 (1998). 
22 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §401 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement Third]. I 
use the Restatement Third here because it provides a useful taxonomy of types of jurisdiction. But see infra 
Section II.A.2 on criticism of the Restatement Third as a source of international law. 
23 Frederick Alexander Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty 
Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 20 (1984 III). 
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In other circumstances, the regulatory jurisdiction reaches extraterritorial limits, 
such as when states prescribe law that reaches conduct occurring outside their physical 
territory.24 As Brownlie says, the starting point is that, at least as a presumption, 
jurisdiction is territorial, but this territoriality principle has been refined in the light of the 
experience and the law, so that the field is unsettled.25 
With this differentiation in mind, I emphasize that the problem of regulatory 
jurisdiction in this dissertation is not to be associated with – though they are related to – 
jurisdictional issues that increasingly appear before national courts. True, domestic courts 
play a fundamental role. Much of the law relating to jurisdiction has been developed 
through the decisions of national courts applying the laws of their own states, as 
Oppenheim and Mann point out.26 In that context, courts may have to answer whether or 
not they have jurisdiction over a case and develop the criteria for jurisdiction: tests of 
minimum contacts, effects, comity considerations, forum non conveniens, personal 
                                                 
24 Traditionally, rules of jurisdiction can be grouped on territoriality, nationality, or effects criteria. 
I do not enter into descriptions of each of these rules here. The choice of law literature is illustrative of 
these types of rules, normally by analyzing rules from a point of view of domestic law. The Restatement 
Third exemplifies many of those rules. For instance, the United States would have jurisdiction to prescribe 
law with respect to: “conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes places within its territory [a territorial 
rule]”, “the activities, interests, status, or relations of its national outside . . . its territory [a nationality 
rule]”, or “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory 
[an effects rule]”. Restatement Third, at §402. See other examples in Don Wallace, Jr., Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, 15 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1099 (1983). See also Harold G. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in 
Customary International Law in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64, 78-9 
(Meessen ed. 1996) (suggesting that the idea that sovereign authority is limited by territorial boundaries is 
far from dead, but considering that it is a question of degree, since its abuse can be intrusive and “what may 
sound like a truism is actually not deprived of important implications”). 
25 Brownlie, supra note 21, at 297. 
26 Oppenheim, supra note 19, at 457. Mann contends that “jurisdiction in international law has 
nothing to do with the question of municipal [domestic] law whether certain State organs have jurisdiction 
in a given case, whether, for instance, a Court has jurisdiction to entertain certain proceedings, or whether 
an Inspector of Taxes has jurisdiction to set aside an assessment. See Frederick Alexander Mann, The 
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 9 (1964 I). 
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jurisdiction (or jurisdiction rationae personae), subject-matter jurisdiction (or jurisdiction 
rationae materiae), among others, are part of that legal conundrum.27 
Here, I deal with regulatory jurisdiction in relation to states and international law. 
I assume a view that international law affects state’s jurisdiction, a point made by 
(public) international lawyers.28  
Finally, another sort of problem that is often thought of in terms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction concerns the responsibility of states when governments, or their agents, act 
abroad. This question may arise, among others, in the situation of military occupation, 
control over the territory, and arrest and detentions cases. I do not touch these issues, but 
they are noted here for reference purposes.29 
B. REGULATORY JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY  
As noted, the notion of extraterritoriality refers to situations where one state 
addresses behavior occurring outside of its own territory. Slaughter and Zaring describe 
three shifts reflecting deep international economic and political forces as being peculiar 
to the proliferation of extraterritorial laws in the twentieth century. First, the rise of the 
regulatory state shifted the extraterritoriality debate from the mere application of private 
                                                 
27 The debate, furthermore, is one leg of the discipline “conflicts of law” (in common law) or 
“private international law” (in civil law). It involves the analysis of overlapping jurisdictions among 
domestic and foreign courts and also among domestic courts within the same State (such as in federal 
systems like the United States or Brazil). See also Hannah Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 
46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251 (2005-2006) (referring to the debate about the role of national courts in addressing 
global harms, which focused on the application by domestic courts of international law - for instance, in 
civil actions brought in U.S. courts to enforce human rights law). 
28 Oppenheim, supra note 19, at 456. A landmark case regarding this aspect of regulatory 
jurisdiction was decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) as early as 1927: the Lotus 
case. See infra Section II.A.1 on Lotus. 
29 For those interested in that problem, a useful start point is Damira Kamchibekova, State 
Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87 (2007) 
(revisiting the paradigmatic cases found in the European context and in general international law). 
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law to the imposition of public power by states; second, the United States arose as a 
superpower that made extensive use of legal means to achieve economic ends; third, 
globalization intensified global production and interdependence, not only in terms of 
vulnerability, but also in terms of interconnectedness.30  
An example to contextualize extraterritoriality dealing with international trade 
and human rights regimes is useful. For instance, assume that state “A” gives market 
access to imports of product “P” coming from state “B.”31 At some point, state “A” 
imposes a ban in the importation of product “P,” reasoning that product “P” is produced 
with forced labor within the territory of state “B.” The typical questions raised about the 
example are: what is the law regulating these facts? Can state “A” impose trade sanctions 
(restrict access to its market) against state “B,” the territorial space where human rights 
violations are taking place?  
This example of extraterritorial jurisdiction seems to be distinct from what is 
perceived as “intraterritorial” jurisdiction. For instance, consider now the situation in 
which state “A” bans the importation of product “P,” alleging the harmfulness of product 
“P” to “A”’s own population. The typical questions raised in international law are: what 
is the applicable law? What are the thresholds by which state “A” can restrict access to its 
market? 
However, in practice, the distinction between extraterritoriality and 
intraterritoriality can be blurred. Compelling literature suggests that the extraterritorial 
                                                 
30 Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Extraterritoriality in a Globalized World 2 (1998), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=39380. 
31 I am not saying that tariffs are not being charged on product “P.” I just suggest that state “B” 
can export to state “A” and, most likely, duties are being charged by the customs authorities of state “A.” 
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nature of some categories of trade related problems are, in fact, intraterritorial problems. 
This has been discussed particularly in the trade and environmental linkages that find 
analogy in the trade and human rights intersections. 
Other matters can be said to be less controversial in this debate. The mere 
existence of effects and impacts abroad is not sufficient to characterize extraterritoriality 
as unlawful exercise of regulatory jurisdiction. In a world of global production and 
interconnectedness, almost any domestic regulation, normally understood as 
intraterritorial in nature, will have some sort of effect or impact abroad.  
It is appropriate to recall two recent matters to illustrate this point. The first one 
regards contaminated milk in China and the second one concerns a new EU chemical 
regime named REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals) that is 
expected to be adopted by the European Commission in 2009. In the first case, 
contaminated powder milk killed several children and sickened thousand others in China 
in September 2008. The international media gave broad coverage of the contamination 
and many importing states implemented bans on milk and dairy products coming from 
China. Without entering the discussion of the requirements of trade measures involved in 
food safety matters, one can barely deny that these bans protect the regulating state’s 
population instead of protecting the Chinese population. In the second case, although the 
details of the European regulation have not been made public, it seems that it is a 
stringent regulation banning or restricting substances of “very high concern,” such as 
those that cause cancer. Again, an argument can be made that this regulation protects the 
European members’ population. 
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In both cases, extraterritorial effects will be felt abroad. Respectively, the dairy 
exporters in China will, most likely, experience decreased sales. The exporters of “very 
high concern” products found in the REACH lists may bear, similarly, decreasing sales. 
Put simply, the mere presence of effects abroad cannot be an appropriate basis to 
distinguish between lawful extraterritorial and intraterritorial measures.  
Thus, what seems more appropriate at this point is not to look for a conception of 
extraterritoriality to assess whether a measure is of that nature or not. It is necessary to 
investigate when, absent a definition of what constitutes valid exercises of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, international law has brought sense out of the “extraterritoriality” 
phenomena, and given it life, relevance, and meaning. This means that I will look for the 
circumstances in which the international law prescribes the extraterritorial phenomenon 
as either lawful or unlawful. 
As Jalles acutely describes, 
[the question of extraterritorial trade measures] is not more than the natural 
consequences of the abuse of the extraterritorial criteria used in the upmost 
limits. It should be recognized, in fact, that the imagination of the political man 
in the service of a certain policy is much stronger and determinative than one 
could imagine; the jurists, in turn, have launched themselves in theories more or 
less sophisticated about phenomenon that were in their origin, of an essential 
political nature [ . . .].32 
A final observation about the extraterritorial and intraterritorial terminology: first, 
the trade literature makes use of other terms to grasp a possible differentiation. 
Charnovitz, for instance, while discussing the use of trade measures to protect the morals 
of persons in or outside their own countries, uses respectively “inwardly-directed” and 
                                                 
32 Isabel Jalles, Extraterritorialiedade e Comércio Internacional: um Exercício de Direito 
Americano [Extraterritoriality and International Trade: an Exercise of American Law] 45 (1988) (Port.). 
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“outwardly-directed” measures (or just inward and outward measures). Charnovitz also 
acknowledges that Robert Hudec used the term “externally-directed” and, that in the 
GATT 1947 jurisprudence, references to extrajurisdictional and extraterritorial measures 
are found.33 Notwithstanding these alternatives terminologies, I employ extraterritoriality 
as the default one. 
The next sections proceed to examine whether trade sanctions are justified under 
general international law, trade law, and human rights law. Some of the often cited 
sources to justify the examined trade measures are found in general international law 
(CIL, jus cogens, UN-SC powers), trade law (GATT-WTO exceptions), and human rights 
(human rights conventions). Each of these sources is examined separately. 
II. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW  
A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CIL 
Bartels acknowledges that the lawfulness of the examined trade measures is 
grounded in CIL.34 Specifically, since all states have a legitimate interest in promoting 
human rights, Bartels posits that this type of extraterritorial entitlement is justified.35 
Along his arguments, allusions to the exercise of this regulatory jurisdiction are made to 
confirm state practice.  
                                                 
33 Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689, 695 (1997-
1998). 
34 Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 36 J. 
WORLD TR. 353, 365-86 (2002). 
35 Id. at 353, 371 n.82, 374 (recognizing, however, that such understanding is not a prevailing 
one). 
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There are, indeed, less controversial cases about the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: states can regulate the conduct of their nationals abroad (because of a 
national linkage) and states exercise this power over extraterritorial acts designed to 
injure its governments or its integrity.  
But there are also harder cases. Does CIL really provide a clear entitlement on 
this matter? The discussion begins with the paradigmatic case of Lotus.36 This is one of 
the few cases in general international law in which regulatory jurisdiction and 
extraterritoriality were clearly addressed. 
1. The Lotus Case 
In short, the facts of the Lotus concern the collision occurred in 1926 between the 
S.S. Lotus, a French vessel, and the S.S. Boz-Kourt, a Turkish vessel.37 The Boz-Kourt 
was cut in two and, as a result, eight Turkish nationals who were on board perished.38 
Some days after landing in (the former) Constantinople, the captains of the French 
(Lieutenant Demons) and the Turkish (Mr. Hassan Bey) vessels were arrested. Joint 
criminal charges were instituted against them and the case is much about the French 
reaction against the imprisonment of its national, Lieutenant Demons. After diplomatic 
efforts from France, both parties agreed to submit the case to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ).39 
                                                 
36 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 [hereinafter Lotus]. “S.S.” stands for 
steam ships. See ROBERT MCKENNA, THE DICTIONARY OF NAUTICAL LITERACY (2003). 
37 Id. at 12 (the vessels collided in high seas in a region called Cape Sigri). 
38 Id. at 10. 
39 Id. at 11. The League of Nations (1922-1946) and the PCIJ are respectively the predecessors of 
the United Nations and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For the PCIJ history, see http://www.icj-
cij.org/pcij/index.php?p1=9. 
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The issue that came out in this case was whether Turkey’s exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction was in violation of any norm or principle of international law. In the words of 
the PCIJ, “[t]he Court is asked to state whether or not the principles of international law 
prevent Turkey from instituting criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons under 
Turkish law.”40 The Court eventually decided for Turkey, reasoning that the Lotus 
produced “effect” on the Turkish vessel, which is deemed to be Turkish territory because 
of its flag. Thus, Turkey could exercise its criminal jurisdiction.41 
The relevant part of this case, for my purposes, concerns the PCIJ assertion that  
the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that 
- failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its 
power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is 
certainly territorial; except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention. It does not, however, follow that 
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own 
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place 
abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. 
. . Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not 
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, 
property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide 
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; 
as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it 
regards as best and most suitable (emphasis added).42 
                                                 
40 Id. at 15. 
41 Id. at 25 (“[i]t follows that what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if 
it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies. If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the 
high seas produces its effects on a vessel flying another flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must 
be applied as if the territories of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be 
drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects 
of the offence have taken place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its 
territory and prosecuting, accordingly, the delinquent.”) (emphasis added). 
42 Id. at 18-19. 
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Much has been written about the above passage.43 The case is famous for 
establishing the “effects” doctrine. It seems, in addition, that the case can be interpreted 
in two manners. First, Lotus would have confirmed discretion in the exercise of 
extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction by states that can be limited by prohibitive rules .44 
Or, on the contrary, Lotus would have confirmed limits on the exercise of regulatory 
jurisdiction by States that can be expanded by permissive rules. 
The more compelling arguments are perhaps found in the second interpretation. 
As Meier points, it does not follow that states are free to interfere with each other’s 
internal affairs whenever harmful local effects might justify such interference.45 Mann 
argues that leaving up to states to delimitate their jurisdiction, instead of international 
law, would be an unfortunate and retrograde theory.46 Pauwelyn, similarly, contends that 
it is difficult to accept the principle of “what is not prohibited is allowed” as the default 
rule of general international law.47 Finally, as Mann also adverts, the Lotus decision has 
been overruled, the passage itself has been pointed out as having the status of obiter 
dictum,48 and there is no certainty that it was contemplating the doctrine of jurisdiction in 
                                                 
43 Schutter points out that both the interpretation of this decision and its contemporary relevance 
are debated. Olivier De Schutter, Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention 
on Human Rights, n.20 (Cellule de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Droits de l’Homme, Working Paper N. 
4, 2005), http://cridho.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/en/publications/working_papers.php. 
44 Oppenheim infers that international law establishes permissible limits unless because of 
prohibitive rules. See Oppenheim, supra note 19, at n.2 456. 
45 Maier, supra note 24, at 67, 69. 
46 Mann, supra note 26, at 35. 
47 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW 
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-61 (Cambridge, 2003). 
48 Obiter dictum (or “in dicta”) is a Latin expression used in common law systems and means “a 
judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in 
the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 2004). 
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general or only the criminal law aspect of the specific case.49 I submit that Lotus is not a 
strong paradigmatic case to establish a general authority for states to impose 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
2. The Restatement Third 
Another source purportedly recognizing extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in 
terms of CIL is the Restatement Third.50 Generally, as Cleveland reminds, the 
Restatement Third reflects a rule of CIL recognizing that states ordinarily have 
jurisdiction to interfere in the conduct of other sovereigns when the conduct has a nexus 
with, or substantial effects in, the state’s own territory.51 
Especially on human rights, a commentary to the Restatement Third posits that 
[v]iolations of the rules stated in this section [customary international law of 
human rights] are violations of obligations to all other states and any state may 
invoke the ordinary remedies available to a state when its rights under customary 
law are violated.52 
Though no definition of “ordinary remedies available” is provided, one point 
deserving attention is about the weight of the Restatement Third as a formal source of 
international law. The Restatement Third consists of international law as it is interpreted 
by the members of the American Law Institute (ALI) in the United States. No one doubts 
its importance as a document produced by fine experts of international law, but the 
                                                 
49 The decision has been overruled by the Brussels Convention of May 10, 1952 (International 
Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships) and the Convention on the High Seas of April 29, 
1958. See Mann, supra note 26, n.46 at 34-35. 
50 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights – Past, Present and Future, 
6(4) J. INT’L ECO. L. 797, 814-15 (2003). By acknowledging a comment to the Restatement Third, Vázquez 
recalls that when a state responds to violations of obligation owed to all states (erga omnes), by adopting 
unilateral countermeasures, these measures are also justified. Id. n.9 at 800. 
51 Sarah H Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: a Theory of 
Compatibility, 5(1) J. INT’ ECON. L. 133, 160, n.112 160 (2002) (quoting § 404 of the Restatement Third). 
52 Restatement Third, supra note 22, § 702, Comment, (o) (emphasis added). 
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Restatement Third is about how practitioners in the United States interpret the current 
affair of international law.53 Naturally, because it reflects the United States practice on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Restatement Third seems to allow great discretion in the 
exercise of this type of regulatory jurisdiction.  
But as a candidate of a source of international law, the Restatement Third is, at 
best, a subsidiary source and must be counterbalanced.54 Moreover, perhaps the 
organization that seems to have more authority to “restate” international law is the 
International Law Commission (ILC).55 What the ILC has to tell about it is investigated 
in the next section, as part of the jus cogens and state responsibility debate. 
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND JUS COGENS 
Jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, or peremptory norms, is a growing and 
relevant topic of international law.56 Earlier in 1937, Verdross called attention to 
                                                 
53 See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 234-35 
(2000) (recalling that “[t]hese Restatements are adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute, a 
private organization not affiliated with the United States Government, whose membership consists of 
judges, legal academicians, and lawyers involved in private practice and in government . . . it is ‘in no 
sense an official document of the United States’ . . . [n]onetheless, despite this independence and non-
official status, it is inevitable that a Restatement dealing with international law will in general reflect the 
broad position take by the United States rather than, say, inconsistent or polar positions taken by other, 
perhaps hostile states.”). They acknowledge, for instance, that Professor Louis Henkin was the chief 
reporter for the Restatement Third. Id. at 235. 
54 For instance, one could argue that the Restatement Third qualifies as “teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.” See ICJ Statute art. 38(d). Only in this sense, and if read together with other equally highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, the Restatement Third could qualify as a subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law. 
55 See Fragmentation Of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification And 
Expansion of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006), at 256 [hereinafter ILC Report on Fragmentation] (proposing that the ILC 
as an avenue of “restatement” of general international law in forms other than codification and progressive 
development - not as a substitute but as a supplement to the latter). 
56 I am using these three terms interchangeably, though some authors differentiate among them. 
See M. Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. 
INT’L L. 211 (1997) (explaining that, in contrast to jus cogens rules, erga omnes rules may arise either as 
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“forbidden treaties” in international law.57 Verdross identified, among others, jus cogens 
as a general principle prohibiting states from concluding treaties contra bonos mores.58  
In the mid-1960s, as George Abi-Saab advances, certain norms of the then current 
international law appear to possess jus cogens character, with opinions diverging on its 
content, source, and means of determination, and application of these norms.59 Shortly 
after, the jus cogens concept was enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT), as a limitation on the content of treaties.60 Article 53 of the VCLT 
provides that  
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.61 
                                                                                                                                                 
customary rules or through treaties; a jus cogens or erga omnes rule could apply to only a limited number 
of States; although jus cogens rules are necessarily erga omnes rules, erga omnes rules could exist which 
were not of a jus cogens character). See also Pauwelyn, supra note 47, at 61 (acknowledging Crawford’s 
view that erga omnes obligations are virtually coexistensive with peremptory obligations, which in turn 
arises under norms of jus cogens). 
57 Alfred Von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571, 572 
(1937). See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law 82(6) COLUMBIA L. 
REV. 1110, 1131 (1982) (discussing an interesting episode about the prohibition on slave trade: “as late as 
the final edition of Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, published in 1955, the author still found it ‘difficult to say’ 
whether a customary international law contains a prohibition against the international traffic in slaves . . . 
but not long thereafter, the International Law Commission, commenting upon the jus cogens provision of 
the new Vienna Convention on Treaties, found not only that customary international law prohibited 
international slave trade but that this prohibition was ‘one of the most obvious and best settled rules of jus 
cogens’”). 
58 Id. at 572. Verdross also illustrated this idea by affirming that international law requires states 
not to disturb each other in the use of the high seas and an international treaty between parties tending to 
exclude other states from the use of high seas would be against a compulsory principle of general 
international law. Id. 
59 The quotation of Abi-Saab appears in ANDREAS PAULUS, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony 
and Fragmentation - An Attempt at a Re-appraisal, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 297, 301 (2005). 
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
VCLT]. 
61 See also VCLT art. 64. 
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The related concept of obligation erga omnes was then acknowledged as obiter 
dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case.62  
1. Barcelona Traction 
The case, which concerned mainly a question of diplomatic protection,63 dealt in 
dictum with one of the most commented, quoted, and debated passages in public 
international law: 
[] In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations 
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-
à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of al1 States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.64 
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from 
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles 
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection 
from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of 
protection have entered into the body of general international law . . . others are 
conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal 
character.65 
                                                 
62 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment I.C.J. 
Reports 1970[hereinafter Barcelona Traction], ¶¶ 33-4. 
63 Schutter, supra note 43, at 31-32 (summarizing the case. The claim arose out of the adjudication 
in bankruptcy by a Spanish Court of the Barcelona Traction, a company incorporated in Canada, but owned 
mostly by Belgians. Belgium had initially instituted proceedings before the ICJ in 1958, by which it sought 
reparation for the damaged suffered by Barcelona Traction as a result of acts allegedly committed by 
organs of Spain in violation of international law. Three years later, Belgium announced the discontinuance 
of the proceedings in order for the parties to settle the dispute out of the ICJ. The ICJ removed the case 
from its list in 1961. After settlement failures, the case was then reinstated by Belgium (the “second phase” 
judgment) with modifications. Belgium sought reparations for damages suffered by Belgian nationals who 
were allegedly the owners of a substantial number of shares of the company. Spain filed four preliminary 
objections. By a judgment delivered in 1970, at the end of the second phase, the ICJ upheld one of the 
preliminary objections of Spain, namely that Belgium did not have legal standing to bring the action, 
without pronouncing on any other aspect of the case). 
64 Barcelona Traction, supra note 62, ¶ 33 (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at ¶ 34 (emphasis added). 
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Contemporarily, Ragazzi explored in great depth the concept of erga omnes in the 
ICJ jurisprudence. I will refer to his work as a point of departure.66 As Ragazzi 
elaborates, the dictum in Barcelona Traction identified two characteristics of these 
obligations: (1) “universality,” in the sense that these obligations are binding on all states 
without exceptions, and (2) “solidarity,” in the sense that every state is deemed to have a 
legal interest in their protection.67 The point of my interest is about the consequences 
following from the second characteristic (solidarity). 68 
In the case of a violation of a jus cogens norm, does the legal interest of every 
state in the protection of jus cogens norms translates into states’ right (or obligations) to 
unilaterally prescribe law with extraterritorial reach? If yes, what sorts of rights or 
obligations? Do they include a right or a duty specifically concerning restrictive trade 
measures? 
And as to those questions, as Simma recognizes, “viewed realistically, the world 
of obligations erga omnes is still in the world of “ought” rather than of “is.”69 Brownlie’s 
equally well-known comments in 1988 assessed that the regime of obligations and 
                                                 
66 MAURICIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (1997). 
67 Id. at 17. 
68 Though universality may also raise theoretical problems, since it appears difficult to reconcile 
this element with the structure of a horizontal international society where law making is consensual. Id. 
69 Bruno Simma, Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or 
Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes?, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 125 (Delbrück ed., 1993). 
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corollaries of erga omnes as “very mysterious indeed”70 and, fifteen years later, re-
assessed it as a concept “being explored.”71 As Andreas Paulus concludes,  
the sweeping effects of jus cogens are still not matched by the clarity of its 
contents. Its impact on concrete cases has remained limited. Its main function 
appears to provide superior values to an inter-State system, to demonstrate that 
States are not entitled to abuse their law-making power to justify the violation of 
the most basic international norms, and to re-orient international law from purely 
State towards community interests. But without a procedure for ascertaining its 
content and applying it to concrete cases, jus cogens will continue to be more of a 
mission statement than a practicable legal instrument.72 
An example may help to illustrate the above points. There is wide support today 
for the proposition that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Genocide Convention 
are rights and obligations erga omnes.73 The immediate, and uncontroversial, 
consequence that follows is that it binds all subjects of international law without any need 
for the states to adhere to conventions. This is the “universal” character of the prohibition 
of genocide flowing from its jus cogens nature. It also follows from the jus cogens nature 
that states cannot “contract” a treaty with “genocide obligations.” But the jurisdiction to 
punish and the obligations to enforce seemed to be different questions, even in respect to 
genocide. As Ragazzi reminded, the obligations that follow from that prohibition, such as 
prevention and jurisdiction to punish, were very problematic to spell out.74 
                                                 
70 Ian Brownlie, To What Extent Are the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still 
Viable?, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 66 (Weiler & Cassese eds. 1988). 
71 Brownlie, supra note 21, at 490. 
72 Paulus, supra note 59, at 330. 
73 Ragazzi, supra note 66, at 94 (recalling that during the codification of the law of treaties, the 
prohibition of genocide was in fact the most often cited examples of peremptory rule in the field of 
international human rights). 
74 Ragazzi, supra note 66, at 95-6. That is to say, the question whether all states, irrespective of 
any links with the territory in which the offence occurred, may punish an individual responsible for 
(extraterritorial) acts of genocide. Ragazzi acknowledges that while there was no universal jurisdiction to 
punish under the Convention, certain judgments delivered by courts of different states provide support for 
the proposition that universal jurisdiction to punish genocide is widely accepted as a principle of customary 
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The discussion is similar in the criminal field. The jus cogens nature of the 
prohibition of genocide did not necessarily translate into states’ rights or obligations to 
punish. Though this conclusion may sound (morally) absurd, it reveals the state of the 
law until recently. And I say until recently because new developments concerning 
jurisdiction to punish came later with the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and its universal jurisdiction to punish genocide.  
But generally speaking, it is not clear what other types of rights and obligations 
states have, such as prescribing restrictive trade measures, because jus cogens norms are 
being violated abroad. 
2. The Draft Article on State Responsibility of the ILC 
Has the ILC Draft Article on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (DASR), provided anything differently when erga omnes violations occur? 75 As an 
outcome of the ILC work, the DASR reflects the “codification” or the “progressive 
development” of international law.  
                                                                                                                                                 
law. He quoted the Restatement Third as the supportive reference. Id. n.16 at 95. See also Judge Oda’s 
declaration in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serb. & Mont.)), Preliminary Objections, 
I.C.J. Reports 1996 [hereinafter Genocide Case], well illustrating this distinction: “an absolutely binding 
norm prohibiting genocide, it binds all subjects of international law even without any conventional 
obligation. To that effect, and only to that effect, the concrete norm is of universal applicability (a norm 
erga omnes) . . . The position is different, however, when it comes to the implementation or enforcement of 
the norm of genocide prohibition.” Id. at 97. 
75 See Draft Articles on States Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd Session (2001) [hereinafter DASR]. Since 1949, 
at its first session, the ILC selected state responsibility as one of the topics for codification without, 
however, including it in the list of topics to which it gave priority. At its twenty-first session, in 1969, the 
ILC examined the first report of the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago. It took 32 two years for the work to 
be adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the UN General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session. For all the relevant 
documentation, see http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9_6.htm. 
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Under the DASR, a state “A” is entitled, as an “injured state,” to invoke the 
responsibility of another state in two situations.76 The first one is when the obligation 
breached is owed to state “A” individually.77 The second situation is when the obligation 
breached is owed to a group of states, including state “A,” or the international community 
as a whole.78 Moreover, the DASR deals specifically with serious breaches of obligations 
under peremptory norms of general international law79 and has a full chapter on 
countermeasures.80  
As such, these provisions are a perfect match for the measures of this dissertation: 
restrictive trade measures (countermeasures) based on extraterritorial human rights 
violations (serious breach of an obligation under peremptory norms of international law). 
The question, similarly to what I asked in the previous sections, would be: does the 
DASR entitle states to unilaterally adopt extraterritorial measures of any sort? 
Probably not. As Christian Tams thoroughly analyzes, the DASR deliberately 
leaves open the question of countermeasures, or self-help, in response to erga omnes 
violations.81 A previous version of one of the DASR articles, for instance, had expressly 
recognized a right of all states to take countermeasures in response to serious breaches of 
                                                 
76 DASR art. 49-54. 
77 DASR art. 42(a). 
78 DASR art. 42, caput, (b). In this case, the breach of the obligation must either specially affect 
state “A” or “is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the 
obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation.” DASR art. 42(b)(i)-(ii). 
79 DASR Part Two, Chapter III (arts. 40-41). 
80 DASR Part Three, Chapter II (arts. 49-54). 
81 CHRISTIAN TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (2005). 
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obligations erga omnes.82 Along the sessions of the ILC, however, disagreement on such 
a right was noted by the General Rapporteur and the final clause on this matter (article 
54) was changed. After analyzing the content of more than fifteen government’s 
communications, Tams says, nonetheless, that the disagreements were overstated.83 In 
fact, Tams concludes that though article 54 was undoubtedly controversial, it was by no 
means generally rejected. He acknowledges that the final modification of the DASR text 
was caused rather by the need for a quick finalization, then by a demand of the majority 
of the states. However, the commentaries of the ILC asserts that 
[a]s this review demonstrates, the current state of international law on 
countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest is uncertain. State 
practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States. At present, there 
appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States referred to in article 48 
to take countermeasures in the collective interest. Consequently, it is not 
appropriate to include in the present articles a provision concerning the question 
whether other States, identified in article 48, are permitted to take 
countermeasures in order to induce a responsible State to comply with its 
obligations. Instead, chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the 
position and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of 
international law.84  
As to these further developments, the DASR was included in the provisional 
agenda of the UN-GA for 2010.85 But as it is now, as pointed above, the DASR is, at 
best, another example in which extraterritorial legal powers is not clearly established. 
                                                 
82 DASR art. 54: “[This is the current version] This chapter does not prejudice the right of any 
State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful 
measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured 
State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”). 
83 Tams, supra note 81, at 242-43. 
84 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 
in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, at 139 ¶¶ 6-7 [hereinafter ILC 
Commentaries on DASR] (emphasis added). 
85 See Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the report of the Sixth Committee, 
A/RES/62/61 (Jan. 8, 2008), ¶ 4 (deciding to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth Session 
[2010] the item entitled “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts” and to further examine, 
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If CIL and the DASR (even in the case of jus cogens) seem not to be robust 
enough to establish extraterritorial allocations, are there any situations in which 
extraterritoriality is allowed? The answer in general international law comes from the 
system of collective security of the UN, a classic topic of public international law.86  
C. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII 
Pursuant to article 39 of the UN Charter, the UN-SC has the power to order 
enforcement action against a state whose conduct represents a threat to peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression. Article 39 is read together with articles 41 and 42, which 
respectively refer to economic measures and military action.  
Article 41 is of interest here since it clearly establishes that “the UN-SC may 
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions . . . such measures . . . may include complete or partial interruption 
                                                                                                                                                 
within the framework of a working group of the Sixth Committee, the question of a convention on 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts or other appropriate action on the basis of the 
articles). 
86 As known, article 2.4 of the UN Charter establishes the prohibition on the use of force: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.” But there are cases of self-defense: UN Charter, art. 51: “Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security [. . .].” Moreover, the UN-SC has powers to adopt binding decisions, under 
the so-called Chapter VII (articles 39-51). It is fairly settled that the UN-GA’ power is at the level of 
recommendations, since articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter refer to UN-GA as “recommendations.” 
Similarly, Chapter VI states that the UN-SC may “recommend” appropriate to remedy a situation that does 
not yet threaten international peace but which is likely to endanger or disturb international peace. Dugart 
suggest that Chapter VI is the “bark,” while Chapter VII is the “bite.” See JOHN DUGARD, SANCTIONS 
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE IN SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID 113, 
113-116 (Mark Orkin ed. 1989). See also ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 39-40 (2004). 
35 
 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”87 
As Higgins describes, 
[w]hile there remains a general reluctance to impose the measures envisaged 
under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, the rate of use of economic measures has 
undoubtedly increased since the end of the Cold War. 1945 to 1990 saw just the 
arms embargo against South Africa of 1977, and the comprehensive economic 
and diplomatic sanctions mounted against Rhodesia from 1966-1979. Recently 
we have seen wide-ranging sanctions against Iraq from 1990; an arms prohibition 
on the totality of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, an arms embargo against 
Somalia from 1992, broad economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro 
from 1992, an arms embargo against Liberia in 1993, selectively tailored 
sanctions against Libya from 1992, economic measures directed against Haiti in 
1993, and the UNITA held areas of Angola in the same year.88 
Thus, the UN-SC can resort to mandatory sanctions as an enforcement tool to 
restore peace.89 The understanding today is that the UN members will have not only the 
right, but the duty to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in pursuance of the mandatory 
economic embargo. This is not only a right, but an obligation, and these resolutions may 
have trade implications, such as trade bans and arms embargoes.  
Surely, there are a myriad of issues related to the exercise of the Chapter VII 
power (the permanent members’ veto power being the most notorious). But what interests 
me here is that these measures can encompass trade measures in response to 
extraterritorial human rights violations. History has plenty of examples, and the regime of 
                                                 
87 UN Charter, art. 41. See also art. 42: “Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members 
of the United Nations.” 
88 Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and Security: Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 445, 455 
(1995)(emphasis added). 
89 Decisions adopted under articles 41 and 42 are legally binding. 
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sanctions towards the Apartheid system in South Africa is a much acknowledged one.90 
Another important case, bearing close relation with the WTO regime and human rights, is 
the trade ban imposed on the so-called “conflict diamonds” or “blood diamonds.”91  
In sum, Chapter VII provides perhaps one of the few examples through which 
international law provides clear rights to state exercise of extraterritorial authority by 
means of economic restrictive measures directed to situations occurring abroad. 
D. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Another potential type of extraterritorial authority in general international law 
comes from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This case is somewhat different 
from the UN-SC powers discussed above, because the situation concerns the use of 
unilateral force for humanitarian purposes, not the use of economic tools, such as 
restrictive trade measures as coercive tools. But as extraterritoriality is an important 
element of this doctrine, I shall analyze the doctrine. 
It seems sufficient to acknowledge landmark discussions about the state of the law 
concerning the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia that occurred in March 1999. The legality 
of that action has been vastly debated.92 In one hand, Brownlie asserts that the position in 
                                                 
90 See Dugard, supra note 86, at 113 (explaining that whether South Africa has violated 
international law and the Charter of the UN by applying the policy of Apartheid is no longer a subject of 
dispute. Remembering that the international community, acting through the United Nations, has repeatedly 
rejected the argument of the South African government that its racial policies were a matter of exclusive 
domestic concern). 
91 See infra Chapter 3.VII.B on blood diamonds. 
92 As Brownlie contextualizes, two models have appeared in the history: by the end of the 
nineteenth century, through a vague doctrine, the majority of publicists admitted a right of humanitarian 
intervention. A state which had abused its sovereignty by brutal and excessively treatment of those within 
his power was regarded as having made itself liable to action. That doctrine was a cover for imperialism. 
The second model emerges with the League of the Nations and has a recent landmark with the NATO 
bombing in Yugoslavia commencing on March 1999. See Brownlie, supra note 21, at 710. See also UN 
Charter art. 53(1)(“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
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1999 was that there was little or no authority and little or no state practice to support the 
right of individual states to use force on humanitarian grounds in international law.93 In 
sum, reliance on right of individual intervention is placed upon a number of ambiguous 
episodes presaging a change in CIL which either ignore the conditions for the formation 
of new principles of CIL or propose that the element opinion juris be relaxed.94  
As Cassese summarizes 
[a]dmittedly, strategic, geopolitical or ideological motivations may have also 
contributed to prompting NATO to threaten and then take military action against 
the FRY. From the angle of law, what primarily counts, however, are the logical 
grounds adduced by NATO countries to justify their resort to force. Their main 
justification has been that the authorities of FRY had carried out massacres and 
other gross breaches of human rights as well as mass expulsions of thousands of 
their citizens belonging to a particular ethnic group, and that this humanitarian 
catastrophe would most likely destabilize neighboring countries . . . any person 
of common sense is justified in asking . . . faced with such an enormous human-
tragedy and given the inaction of the UN-Security Council . . . should one sit idly 
and watch[?]. . . my answer is that from an ethical viewpoint resort to armed 
forces was justified. Nevertheless, as a legal scholar I cannot avoid in the same 
breath that this moral action is contrary to current international law.95 
                                                                                                                                                 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements [such as NATO] or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council [. . .]). It is worthy reminding that the on April 29, 1999, the former Republic of Yugoslavia - FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro) instituted proceedings against NATO members, because of the bombardment of 
its territory, in connection with the Kosovo crisis prevailing at the time. The FRY filed actually ten separate 
applications against NATO members and the ICJ delivered eight separate, but virtually identical judgments. 
These cases are known as the Legality of Use of Force cases. See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. 
v. Belg.), Preliminary Objections, 2004 ICJ REP. 279 (Dec. 2005). See Yehuda Z. Blum, Was Yugoslavia 
Member of the United Nations in the Years 1992-2000? 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 800, 805-06 (2007) 
(summarizing the cases and indicating that, because Serbia and Montenegro was not a member of the UN, 
the Court unanimously found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Yugoslavia). 
93 Moreover, Brownlie asserts that the Ministerial Declaration produced by the meeting of Foreign 
Ministers of the Group of 77 held three months later after the NATO is frequently disregarded. The key 
passage of the Declaration is that the Minister “rejected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention, 
which has no basis in the UN Charter or international law. The quotation is the paragraph 69 of the 
Declaration. See Brownlie, supra note 21, at 712. 
94 Id. at 712. See also Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) (affirming that “only a thin red line separate NATO’s action in Kosovo from 
international illegality”). 
95 Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25 (1999). The 
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Though as said, humanitarian intervention has probably less to deal with 
restrictive trade measures, the case shows again that extraterritoriality concerns are hardly 
the case or the general rule, even in problems of humanitarian intervention. Finally, a 
related topic to humanitarian intervention should be noted: the doctrine of responsibility 
to protect.96 
1. Responsibility to Protect 
The “responsibility to protect” doctrine appeared in connection with a broader 
reform proposal for the UN that was grounded in the idea of a “larger freedom.”97 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Latin expression can be translated as “rights cannot grow out of injustice” or “illegal acts cannot produce 
legal results or rights.” See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: the 
Continuing Importance of State Autonomy in Politics, Values and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW THE 
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR LOUIS HENKIN 443 (Charney et al. eds., 1997). See contra 
Jonathan I. Charney, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 834 (1999). 
96 Another related point is about the duty of act arising from natural catastrophes. It does not, 
however, require much analysis. Whether the duty exists or not, the main discussion of this dissertation 
refers to situations where a state applies restrictive trade measures because of violation of human rights 
occurring in another country. In the natural catastrophe hypothesis, violation is occurring, by definition, 
because of natural events. It is unlikely that individual states would address the problem by means of 
restrictive trade measures. Yet, it should be noted that an interesting question may arise: assuming that the 
obligation exist (a duty to act in natural catastrophes), what happens if a state denies the acceptance of 
international aid, alleging the non-intervention principle? Could the states willing to act apply trade 
restrictions to force the affected states to accept international aid? I pose this question from a purely 
theoretical perspective and I could not find literature addressing the issue (perhaps because the situation is 
very peculiar and implausible). 
97 As Feinstein and Slaughter contextualize: “In the wake of Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo, a halting process of revising old rules [of collective security] to meet today's threats has begun. In 
the fall of 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan repeated a challenge he first made to UN members in 1999, 
urging the Security Council to discuss ‘the best way to respond to threats of genocide or other comparable 
massive violations of human rights.’ Although the Security Council has yet to heed Annan's call, the 
Canadian government did, appointing former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Annan's 
Special Adviser Mohamed Sahnoun to head a distinguished global commission of diplomats, politicians, 
scholars, and nongovernmental activists. In December 2001, the commission issued a report, titled ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect,’ that took on nothing less than the redefinition of sovereignty itself. The Evans-
Sahnoun Commission argued that the controversy over using force for humanitarian purposes stemmed 
from a ‘critical gap’ between the unavoidable reality of mass human suffering and the existing rules and 
mechanisms for managing world order. To fill this gap, the commission identified an emerging 
international obligation -- the ‘responsibility to protect’ -- which requires states to intervene in the affairs of 
other states to avert or stop humanitarian crises.” See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to 
Prevent, FOR. AFFAIRS (Jan/Feb 2004). Drawing from this assessment, the authors then propose a corollary 
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concept was later incorporated in a General Assembly (UN-GA) resolution as the 
outcome of the 2005 UN World Summit.98  
Responsibility to protect is perhaps a statement touching the same question of 
rights and obligations of potential unilateral intervention grounded on humanitarian 
causes. The 2005 UN World Summit report posits that 
[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.99  
The statement clearly identifies the responsibility of states to protect its own 
population. It also appears to try to shift some responsibility to the international 
community. However, it does not seem to establish any individual duty (or right) of states 
to act unilaterally (putting aside the legal nature of the resolution as a source of 
international law itself). In fact, the paragraph following the above quotation posits that  
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
                                                                                                                                                 
principle in the field of global security: a collective “duty to prevent” nations run by rulers without internal 
checks on their power from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Id. See also Report of the 
Secretary-General: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/l (2005), ¶¶ 25-152 [hereinafter UN SG Larger Freedom Report] (discussing three freedoms: 
freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity; discussing the challenges of the 
international community in the light of the concepts of development, the Millennium Development Goals, 
environmental sustainability, terrorism, human rights, and weapons of mass destruction, among others. The 
former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, is credited as mainstreaming the concept under the UN). 
98 GA Res 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (2005), ¶¶ 138-40 [hereinafter UN-
GA Resolution on the 2005 World Summit]. 
99 UN-GA Resolution on the 2005 World Summit (2005), at ¶ 138. 
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populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.100 
 As one commentator summarizes, “in essence, all the eggs of responsibility to 
protect have been thrown [again] into the Security basket, a basket that has proven to be 
full of holes in the past . . . [and] the articulation of a candidate norm [such as the 
responsibility to protect] is but an incomplete success.”101  
E. THE BROADER PICTURE IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The following table summarizes the above analysis. The only situation in which is 
clearly established that states have a right (and a duty) to impose restrictive trade 
measures (addressing human rights and other concerns) are those in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Aside from this case, I suggest that CIL (the Lotus case 
and the DASR) do not clearly establish such right. Similarly, the paradigms of 
humanitarian intervention and responsibility are not robust enough to justify 
extraterritorial authority.  
Source Authority 
CIL (Lotus Case, Restatement) Weak 
CIL (DASR) Weak 
Chapter VII Resolutions Strong 
 
Humanitarian Intervention Weak 
Responsibility to Protect Weak 
Table 1 – Legal Analysis under General international law 
III. THE WTO REGIME 
Let me now continue with the inquiry about the lawfulness of the examined trade 
measures in light of the WTO regime. This part divides the investigation in terms of the 
                                                 
100 Id. at ¶ 139. 
101 Juita Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to 
Protect, 2(1) J. INT’L L. & INT’L RELATIONS 121, 136-37 (2006). 
41 
 
“human rights” and the “extraterritorial element.” I will demonstrate that both concepts - 
human rights and extraterritoriality - are not directly found in this regime, except for very 
few exceptions. 
Among the WTO covered agreements,102 much of the literature has focused on the 
general (Art. XX of the GATT) and the security exceptions (Art. XXI of the GATT) as 
the bases of analysis. The relevant part of the general exceptions reads: 
[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
[. . .] 
 (e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
[. . .] 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption; 
As public morals, protection of life, and prison labor are expressly protected in 
article XX, these exceptions have been pointed out as possible avenue for linkages with 
human rights. 
                                                 
102 The WTO covered agreements: 
The WTO Agreement – Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO 
Annex 1A –Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods  
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994)(read together with GATT 1947) 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
[. . .] 
Annex 1B - General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
Annex 1C - Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS);  
Annex 2 - Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU);  
Annex 3 - Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM); 
Annex 4 - Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
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The security exceptions of Article XXI of the GATT, in turn, allow members to 
justify trade restrictive measures in terms of security interests. The relevant parts of the 
clause provide that: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
. . .  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests  
(i) relating to fissionable materials . . .  
(ii) relating to the traffic of arms . . .  
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.103 
 
The clause has two provisions relevant to our discussion: first, article XXI(b)(iii), 
dealing with a security exception, and second, article XXI(c), referring to the UN 
Charter. Similarly to the general exceptions, article XXI has been pointed out as a 
possible linkage for human rights concerns. 
A. “HUMAN RIGHTS” IN THE NORMATIVE FLOOR  
This could be, in fact, a very short section: the WTO covered agreements and 
jurisprudence do not contain any express references to “human rights.” That is to say, the 
WTO normative floor does not use human rights language in any of the covered 
agreements. Likewise, the WTO adjudicative bodies have not expressed any of their 
decisions in terms of human rights language. 
The question then shifts to the level of interpretation: what kind of trade measures 
addressing human rights concerns could be supported or inferred by the covered 
agreements. I am not looking for the “extraterritoriality” element, but only to the “human 
                                                 
103 GATT art. XXI (emphasis added). 
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rights” element in the WTO. A possible route of analysis is to review the efforts that 
academics and human rights bodies have taken in suggesting interpretations of WTO law 
in light of human rights law. 
 1. Human Rights as a Public Moral 
Charnovitz published a detailed study of trade policy concerning the moral 
exception (article XX(a) of the GATT).104 The author scrutinized the legislative history 
of the article, concluding that, overall, the negotiating history from 1945-1948 does not 
provide a clear answer to “what” and “whose” morality is covered by the provision.105  
A case addressing “public morals” (and the unique case so far in the WTO), was 
later adjudicated in 2004 involving cross border supply of gambling services (a matter 
covered by the GATS) between Antigua and Barbuda and the United States.106 Article 
XIV (a) of GATS, similarly to article XX(a) of GATT, allows restrictive trade measures 
to be justified if they were “necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order.”107 The Appellate Body (AB) upheld the panel findings that the “the term ‘public 
morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a 
                                                 
104 See in general, Charnovitz, supra note 33. 
105 The negotiation history of GATT investigated by Charnovitz comprises the negotiations of the 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment. Id. at 703. He also goes in depth on the prior treaties with 
moral exceptions, although, as he recognizes “this pre-1946 history is not part of the official preparatory 
work for the GATT, [but] provides context for understanding the rationale for article XX(a).” Id. at 717. 
106 Antigua and Barbuda challenged United States legislation that limited the cross-border supply 
of gambling and betting services as violations of GATS provisions. In its defense, the United States 
evoked, inter alia, article XIV(a) of GATS (the analogous “moral” provision of article XX of GATT). 
While article XX(a) of GATT reads “necessary to protect public morals.” 
107 GATS art. XIV(a)(emphasis added). 
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community or nation.”108 Moreover, public order “may be invoked only where a genuine 
and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.”109 
An argument can be made that, as human rights are standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or fundamental interests of society, 
the human rights concept can be accommodated (by interpretation) in such exception.110 
Though, such interpretation has never materialized in a actual case, it is submitted here 
that this is a (weak) possibility, and that “human rights” can be interpreted as falling 
within this exception.  
2. Human Rights and Protection of Human Life and Health 
Article XX(b) provides the exception for the protection of, among others, human 
life and health. This is another exception that has been frequently pointed out as fitting 
human rights language. 
For instance, Caroline Dommen argues that in the case of the health programme 
of Brazil challenged under the TRIPS agreement by the United States in the later 1990s, 
                                                 
108 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted April 20, 2005[hereinafter US-Gambling], at 
¶¶ 298-99. 
109 See GATS article XIV(a), n.5. It seems that the AB deferred to members to determine what 
falls within the scope of “public morals” and/or “public order,” though the AB did not differentiate between 
the two terms. 
110 See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (1999) (presenting an earlier version of his writings for the inclusion of 
international labor standards in WTO through public morals exception). See also Jeremy C. Marwell, Trade 
And Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception after Gambling, 81 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REV. 802, 
815 (2006) (pointing out that difficulty of defining “public morals” is evident from both policy and textual 
perspectives. Amongst the WTO membership, “public morals” could mean anything from religious views 
on drinking alcohol or eating certain foods to cultural attitudes toward pornography, free expression, 
human rights, labor norms, women’s rights, or general cultural judgments about education or social 
welfare. Concluding that given that this is highly subjective, geographically localized, and diverse across 
political boundaries, states should be able, pursuant to certain evidentiary requirements, to define public 
morals based solely on their internal circumstances.) 
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Brazil could have invoked a provision similar to article XX(b) in the TRIPS agreement111 
for the protection of life.112 Howse concurs with this possibility, since the idea of human 
security, embodied by the WTO normative floor, is acknowledged by the AB: WTO law 
must be interpreted and applied in light of the notion that the “preservation of human life 
and health” is a value that “is vital and important in the highest degree.”113  
As the ability of those provisions to support human rights action has never been 
tested, it is submitted here that, in theory, human rights can be subsumed through this 
exception, though yet as a “weak” possibility. 
3. Human Rights and Prison Labor 
The prison labor exception has never been tested in the trade system in any 
context. The preparatory work indicates that the main concern of the drafters of the 
GATT was potential unfair competition coming from prisoners’ work (as prison labor 
products can be exported at very low prices).  
Some commentators indicate that the function of this exception is to permit 
“ban[ning] the importation of goods that have been produced by prisoners.”114 Others 
                                                 
111 TRIPS, art. 27(2): “members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health [].”(emphasis added). 
112 See Caroline Dommen, Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Treasure Chest 
of Support for Developing Countries ‘Concerns in the WTO’, in 5 Bridges Between Trade and Sustainable 
Development Monthly (January-April 2001)(discussing how the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights could serve as a “treasure chest” of support for developing countries concerns). 
See also Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the WTO – Actors, Processes and Possible 
Strategies, 24(1) HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2002). 
113 Robert Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, Beyond the Divide: the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization in 30 Dialogues on Globalization 10 (2007) (referring to 
the EC - Asbestos case judged by the AB). 
114 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 615 (2005). 
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recall the potential use of this exception to accommodate human rights concerns, 
especially if the prison labor exception is expanded to encompass forced labor or modern 
forms of slavery. Again, I will assume that this interpretation is possible, though the 
preparatory work of the text indicates a different purpose of the clause. Therefore, this is 
another case of a “weak” interpretation. 
4. Human Rights as a Security Exception 
One last exception that has been raised as suitable for human rights interpretation 
is the security exception of Article XXI. Recall that the exception contains two sub-
paragraphs relevant to our discussion: first, article XXI(b)(iii) dealing with “any action 
which [a member] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;”115 and art. XXI(c), 
referring to measures taken in pursuance of the obligation taken under the UN Charter.  
 As to article XXI(b)(iii), in theory, the only requisite of the clause is the 
existence of a connection between the measure, a security interest, and the existence of an 
emergency in international relations.116 In this sense, a member can justify a restrictive 
                                                 
115 Emphasis added. 
116 The discretion of the members in relation to article XXI(b)(iii) is well described in the GATT 
SECRETARIAT, GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 557-60 (6th ed. 1995)(In 
sum, in 1949, the US imposed export control over Czechoslovakian products. Czechoslovakia requested 
information under Article XIII: 3 on the export licensing system. The US replied that under “[a]rticle XXI . 
. . a contracting party shall not be required to give information it considers contrary to its essential security 
interests.” In 1961, Ghana imposed a boycott on Portuguese goods and justified it under Article XXI(b)(iii). 
The Ghana communication highlighted the discretion of each Contracting Party as the “sole judge” of what 
is necessary in its essential security interests and “that a country’s security interests might be threatened by 
a potential as well as an actual danger.” In 1962, the US imposed an embargo on trade with Cuba. The 
Cuban government notified the Contracting Parties about the US measure in the inventory of non-tariff 
measure. The US invoked article XXI as justification for its action. In 1970, the Arab League boycott 
against Israel and the accession of the United Arab Republic to the GATT was at stake (the UAR was 
formerly the union of Egypt and Syria). The UAR reminded the working party on accession about “the 
extraordinary circumstances to which the Middle East area had been exposed” and the “state of the war … 
of a major political issue,” concluding on the unreasonableness of asking the UAR to “do business with a 
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trade measure based on a security exception (and the human rights element can come “in 
the package”). In practice, two episodes with the above pattern appeared in the WTO 
system but - perhaps because of the political factors involved - were never adjudicated: 
Helms-Burton117 and Massachusetts-Burma.118  
                                                                                                                                                 
firm . . . [of] an enemy country.” In November 1975, evoking the need to maintain a minimum domestic 
production capacity in vital industries, the Swedish government introduced a global import quota for 
certain footwear. Sweden mentioned the decrease in domestic production as a critical threat to emergency 
defense situations as an integral part of the country’s security policy. Followed by discussion at the GATT 
council and delegations, the quota system was terminated in July 1977. In April 1982, the European 
Community, Canada and Australia suspended indefinitely Argentinean exports into their territory. The 
banning measure was justified in the light of the situation addressed in the UN-SC Resolution 502, 
concerning the Falklands and Malvinas. Argentina alleged violation of various provision of GATT and 
sought the interpretation of legal aspects of Article XXI. As a result, later in November 1982, paragraph 
7(iii) was included in the Ministerial Declaration providing that “. . . the Contracting Parties undertake, 
individually and jointly: . . . to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a non-
economic character, not consistent with the [GATT].” Another significant episode involving article XXI 
made its way on May 7, 1985, when the United States notified the Contracting Parties of an US Executive 
Order prohibiting all imports of goods and services of Nicaragua origin. Similarly to the Argentinean case, 
Nicaragua alleged that the US violated GATT provisions and that “this was not a matter of national security 
but one of coercion.” Nicaragua argued that the measure could not be applied in an arbitrary fashion: “there 
had to be some correspondence between the measures adopted and the situation giving rise to such 
adoption.” Although a panel was established to hear the case, the term of the reference of the panel 
expressly prohibit it to rule on the legality of the US invocation of article XXI. The panel report was never 
adopted and the embargo on Nicaragua was lifted in 1990. 
117 The Helms-Burton Act was passed in the United States in 1996, after Cuba shot down two 
planes flown by anti-Castro members domiciled in the United States. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996)[hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]. The Helms-
Burton Act restricted access to the United States markets by imposing the prohibition of the allocation of 
any of the sugar quota to a country that is a net importer of sugar unless that country certifies that it does 
not import Cuban sugar that could indirectly find its way to the United States; and the denial of transit by 
vessels of states through ports in the US that carry goods or passengers to or from Cuba. The Act 
acknowledges the “continuing violations of fundamental human rights” as a factor that served to isolate the 
Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere. See Helms-
Burton Act at §6021(4). The Act recognizes that situations in which systematic violations of human rights 
occur may constitute a ‘‘threat to peace,’’ justifying international action under Article 39 of the UN 
Charter. The act cites the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, as ones in 
which sanctions were imposed as a response to violations of human rights. Id. at §6021(24). The European 
Community claimed to have its trade benefits infringed by Helms-Burton. A panel was established in that 
year by the request of the European Community against the United States and, following diplomatic 
negotiations, the European Community requested the panel to suspend the proceedings. See WT/DS38/5 
(April, 25 1997). 
118 In June 1996, the State of Massachusetts adopted a law restricting the procurement by public 
authorities of that state of goods or service from a person, whether a United States citizen or a foreign 
national, doing business with Myanmar (formerly Burma). See An Act Regulating State Contracts with 
Companies Doing Business with or in Burma (Myanmar), Annotated Laws of Massachussets ch. 7 § 22G-
22M (Lexis 1998)[hereinafter The Massachusetts-Burma Act]. The Massachusetts-Burma Act itself did not 
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  As Jackson and Lowenfeld analyze (in relation to Helms-Burton), 
[to give] a broad interpretation [of the security exception] could undermine the 
whole WTO treaty and impair the security and stability of the world trading 
system for which the WTO has been created. . . on the other hand, national 
security is obviously extremely important to all nations, and for an international 
organization to disregard the importance of this subject and to easily override 
national concerns and policy conclusions relating to it, could lead powerful 
trading nations to ignore or disregard the rules of such organization.119 
In sum, members have a great deal of discretion to justify many extraterritorial 
measures in terms of security. The literature has acknowledged this possibility in order to 
accommodate human rights.120  
Article XXI(c), however, does not seem to add much. Article 103 of the UN 
Charter establishes that, in case of conflict of obligations, obligations under the UN 
Charter shall prevail over obligations in any other agreement. Arguably, Article XXI(c) 
                                                                                                                                                 
employ human rights language as the basis for it, except for some indications on its legislative history. 
Because “doing business with Myanmar” was broadly defined in that act. On September 9, 1998, The 
European Community requested the establishment of a WTO panel, arguing that the Massachusetts-Burma 
Act nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the European Community On the same day and in a 
combined action, Japan, which joined for consultation with the United States and the European 
Community, requested the establishment of a panel. See United States - Measure Affecting Government 
Procurement: Request for Establishment of a Panel by Japan, WTO, WT/DS95/3 (Sep. 9, 1998). In 
accordance with a request from both plaintiffs, a single panel was established. The panel, though, 
suspended its work in February of the following year because the United States Supreme Court invalidated 
the Act under United States domestic law. On February 10, 1999, the European Community and Japan 
asked for the suspension of the case in a Communication to the Chairman of the Panel. 
119 John H. Jackson & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Helms-Burton, the US, and the WTO, ASIL Insights 
(March 1997), http://www.asil.org/insights/insight7.htm. An example of a too broad interpretation is 
expressed with irony by Jackson and Lowenfeld: “[a]fter all, any product can be linked to national security: 
Premier Khrushchev, mocking U.S. export controls, once suggested an embargo on buttons, because they 
can be used to hold up soldiers' trousers. It has seriously been argued that a shoe industry deserved 
protection from imports because an army must have shoes.” Id. 
120 Cleveland posits that the article would be a “potentially attractive” one, though she recognizes 
that it is a somewhat “awkward basis” for human rights sanctions, as that article primarily concerns a 
security exception. See Cleveland, supra note 51, at 133, 186. See Vázquez, supra note 50, at 797. Vázquez 
seems to agree with Cleveland that the security exception of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 may be the 
best option for general sanctions and the safety valve for the most egregious human rights violations. Id. at 
830. 
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merely reproduces the type of situation in which the UN acts for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
5. Preliminary Remarks 
This section summarizes the above points. Recall that I looked for the “human 
rights” element in the WTO normative floor and jurisprudence, but I found no literal 
reference to human rights there. Nevertheless, by interpreting WTO law, it is, in theory, 
possible to pursue human-rights interpretations of the WTO provisions. But even human 
rights bodies, such as the OHCHR, acknowledge this possibility with some reluctance. 
The OHCHR says that, in relation to some of article XX exceptions,  
[b]ecause the definition of “public morals”, “public order” and “human life or 
health” is so broad, because they have yet to be defined precisely in WTO case 
law, and because human rights arguments have never been raised so that their 
scope can be clarified in this regard, there is no direct and conclusive evidence 
for human rights usage of these terms. There are, however, a number of strong 
arguments to be made in favour of the conclusion that member States’ 
international human rights obligations towards their own populations could fall 
within the compass of the “public morals”, “public order” and “human life or 
health” exceptions.121 
As to Article XXI, provided that the human right element is within a security 
issue, there is also a possibility of using the exception to justify that action. All of those 
options, however, seem to represent weak choices. In sum: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: USING GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (2005)[hereinafter 
OHCHR Report on Human Rights and Trade], at 8. 
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Provision Human Rights “Element” 
Public Morals and Public Order122 Possible (weak) 
Protection of Human Life or Health123 Possible (weak) 
Prison Labor124 Possible (weak) 
Security Exception125 Possible (weak) 
Table 2 –Human Rights in the WTO Normative Floor 
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE NORMATIVE FLOOR 
I now move to an investigation of extraterritoriality in the WTO normative floor. 
Similar to the human rights element that I investigated before, there is no literal 
expression of such concept in the WTO covered agreements. However, some clauses can 
be interpreted as comprising extraterritorial authority, such as the prison labor (article 
XX(e)) and the security exception (article XXI). In addition, the doctrine and 
jurisprudence also has tackled a possible interpretation of this element in other clauses. 
1. Prison Labor and Article XXI 
Extraterritoriality can be logically inferred from the prison labor exception. As 
Charnovitz puts it, article XX(e) of GATT would seem to be “‘outwardly-directed’ in that 
it would allow governments to condition the entry of imports on the production method 
used in another country.”126 
Arguably, extraterritoriality can be also inferred from article XXI. This is because 
measures taken for the protection of essential security interests can be taken due to “other 
emergency of international relations” or “in pursuance of its obligations under the United 
                                                 
122 GATT art. XX(a), GATS art. XIV(a) and TRIPS art. 27.2. 
123 GATT art. XX(b), GATS art. XIV(b), and TRIPS art. 27.2. 
124 GATT art. XX(e). 
125 GATT art. XXI. 
126 In dicta, the panel in US-Tuna II seems to have recognized the nature of that clause, by saying 
that “[article XX(e) is an example of an exception] with respect to things located, or actions occurring, 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.” See US-Tuna II at ¶5.16 (emphasis 
added), See infra Section III.B.4 on the case. 
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Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.” By definition, 
these are situations occurring outside the jurisdiction of the member taking the measure. 
Therefore, I submit that extraterritoriality element is found in both article XX(e) and 
XXI, as logical inferences of those clauses.  
2. Public Morals 
As to whether article XX(a) could encompass extrajurisdictional (outwardly-
directed) measures, Charnovitz notes that a more likely scenario is that “a panel would . . 
. find that article XX(a) will not validate an import ban to force higher morality onto the 
exporting country.”127 The OHCHR also deemed this exception as very unlikely to cover 
extraterritorial measures.128 It is submitted that the public morals exception does not 
allow the exercise of extraterritorial authority. 
3. Protection of Life (and animal life - Tuna and Shrimp) 
As Howse and Regan indicate, even individuals not acquainted with the trading 
system are likely to have heard about the Tuna-Dolphin and the Shrimp-Turtle cases.129 
In a nutshell, these cases were adjudicated in the GATT and the WTO dispute settlement 
system and concerned United States measures (environmental legislation) that restricted 
the imports of tuna and shrimp coming from a variety of states.130 One of the main things 
that these cases provoked was a controversial debate about extraterritoriality.  
                                                 
127 Charnovitz, supra note 33, at 723. It should be noted that extraterritoriality was an issue in the 
US-Gambling case, which interpreted the equivalent provision of public morals found in GATS. 
128 OHCHR Report on Human Rights and Trade (2005), supra note 121, at 8 (mentioning 
“towards its own population”). 
129 Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – an Illusionary Basis for 
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 250 (2000). 
130 Aside from the distinguishable pairs of harvested/endangered sea creatures on those cases 
(Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle), the cases bear many similarities. The United States adopted legislation 
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Some initial clarifications are necessary. First, the cases discussed 
extraterritoriality in environmental cases, not “human rights” cases, in terms of articles 
XX(b) and XX(g) (respectively, the protection of animal life and the conservation of 
natural resources). Second, there are actually two Tuna cases with contradictory 
outcomes. Third, the Tuna cases were never adopted; and to be unadopted means that the 
report did not bind even the litigants of the dispute. Finally, the Shrimp case, as the latest 
outcome of this discussion, can be actually interpreted to have circumvented the 
extraterritoriality issue. 
Let me begin with US - Tuna I.131 Having found that United States legislation, 
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act – (MMPA), violated Article XI of the 
GATT, the panel proceeded to analyze whether the MMPA could be justified under 
Article XX(b) (necessary to protect animal life) or XX(g) (relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources). By recalling the preparatory work of the GATT-1947, the 
panel held that the United States could not apply its environmental provisions 
                                                                                                                                                 
banning imports because, in the first case, the harvesting of tuna harmed dolphins and, in the second case, 
because the harvesting of shrimps harmed turtles. 
131 Panel Report, United States – Restriction on the Import of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sep 3, 
1991), unadopted. In that case, Mexico alleged that the US ban on importation of tuna violated GATT 
provisions. The trade measure at issue was the MMPA, which regulated, inter alia, the harvesting of tuna 
by United States fisherman. The MMPA required that, in order to reduce the killing of dolphin incidental to 
the harvesting of fish, certain techniques should be used. A maximum cap of incidental taking of dolphins 
per year by United States vessels was established. US-Tuna I, at ¶5.1. The MMPA required that the United 
States government ban the importation of commercial fish or products caught with commercial fishing 
technology that results in the incidental killings or serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of the United 
States standards. As a condition of access to the United States market of yellow fin tuna, each country had 
to prove that its overall regulatory regime was comparable to that of the United States.131 In accordance 
with the facts presented, dolphins were frequently killed in the course of tuna-fishing operations in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) due to the use of a large net, suspended from floats, that is used to 
encircle surface and sub-surface fish (purse-seine nets). These nets are intentionally deployed to encircle 
dolphins. Tuna is harvested in that way because of the particular nature of the association between dolphins 
and tuna observed only in the ETP. US-Tuna I, at ¶ 5.43. An important step of the panel analysis was the 
determination of the character of the US law either as an “internal regulation”– the US thesis, or a 
“quantitative restriction” - the Mexican thesis. This is a point I make about PPMs (see infra). 
53 
 
extraterritorially to protect animal life and health or to conserve exhaustible natural 
resources.132 
Later on, after the United States modified the MMPA, the European Community 
challenged the modified statute as a violation of Article XI of GATT.133 Again, the 
extrajurisdictional issue appeared in connection with the interpretation of articles XX(g) 
and XX(b).134 The panel in US - Tuna II, however, seems to have disagreed with the US – 
                                                 
132 As to article XX(b), the panel decided to analyze the issue in the light of the drafting history of 
article XX(b). The panel concluded that “the concerns of the drafters of article XX(b) focused on the use of 
sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the 
importing country.” (emphasis added). US-Tuna I, at ¶ 5.26. As to article XX(g), the panel did not resort to 
its drafting history but to a logic inference that Article XX(g) was intended “to permit contracting parties to 
take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on production or consumption within 
their jurisdiction.” US-Tuna I, at ¶ 5.31. 
133 After US – Tuna I, two events occurred in 1992. In June, the United States, Mexico, and ten 
other countries negotiated an international agreement under the auspices of the preexisting Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IAFFC). The signatories agreed to reduce dolphin mortality below 5000 by 
1999. However, In October, the US Congress amended the MMPA and the dispute was revived as Tuna-
Dolphin II in 1994. See Panel Report, United States – Restriction on the Import of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 
(Jun. 16, 1994), unadopted. Again, the panel was called to determine if the US measures fell under Article 
III or XI analysis. The PPM discussion was again an issue in the case. 
134 As to Article XX(g), the panel observed that the text of article XX(g) suggested a three-step 
analysis: whether the measure (i) fell within the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources; 
(ii) was “related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, (iii) passes the conditions of the 
chapeau of article XX. During the first step of the analysis, the panel observed that the “text of Article 
XX(g) does not spell out any limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resources to be 
conserved.” This analysis was also previously used in GATT history with no distinction made between fish 
caught within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting party. US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.15. The 
measure passed the first step of the test. US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.20. However, the US measure failed the second 
step of the analysis. Thus, the panel never reached the third step. The panel observed that “relating to” 
means “primarily aimed.” As to article XX(b), the panel tracked a similar approach. The three-step analysis 
involved whether the measure (i) was a policy to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; (ii) was 
“necessary;” (iii) passes the chapeau requirements. US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.29. As with the article XX(g) 
analysis, the panel stressed that the text of article XX(b) does not address “any limitation on the location of 
the living things to be protected.” Also that historic documentation did not clearly support any specific 
contention of the parties “to the location of the living thing to be protected under Article XX(b).” US-Tuna 
II, at ¶ 5.31. However, if Article XX(b) were interpreted to allow contract parties to impose trade 
embargoes so as to force other countries to change their policies, the objective of the GATT would be 
seriously impaired (US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.38). Thus, the measure failed the second step of Article XX(b) tests. 
In essence, the panel in US - Tuna II initially addressed the amendments to the United States legislation in a 
very similar way to the issues raised in US - Tuna I. Although not citing the unadopted report as an 
authority, the Tuna II panel agreed with the reasoning of US-Tuna I that the United States measures were 
not to be scrutinized as “internal measure” under Article III of the GATT. 
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Tuna I panel, finding that the history of the GATT was “not to indicate in an absolute 
manner” the prohibition of measures related to “things or actions” outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.135 Similarly, the panel stressed that the text 
of article XX(b) does not address “any limitation on the location of the living things to be 
protected.” The panel also stated that the GATT preparatory work did not clearly support 
any specific contention of the parties as “to the location of the living thing to be protected 
under Article XX(b).”136 
The case that follows, US-Shrimps, does not help much on the extraterritoriality 
issue.137 The issue seems to be less relevant in that decision because the AB did not have 
to go through the extrajurisdictional aspect of Article XX. The AB merely upheld the 
panel’s findings that based on scientific evidence, “turtles are highly migratory animals,” 
and that “there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine 
populations involved and the United States for purposes of article XX(g).”138 The AB, 
indeed, explicitly admitted that “[w]e do not pass upon the question of whether there is an 
implied jurisdictional limitation in article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that 
                                                 
135 US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.16. 
136 US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.31. 
137 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted Nov. 6, 2008. In a nutshell, a panel was established in 1997 to analyze 
the complainants of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand against a United States legislation demanding 
vessels harvesting shrimps to use a certain type of device (Turtle Excluder Devices – TED) aimed at 
reducing the mortality of sea turtles. US –Shrimp contains many relevant issues. One of them was whether 
turtles could be considered “exhaustible natural resources” for the purposes of article XX(g). As to that 
point, the AB mentioned that the term “exhaustible natural resources” was “actually crafted more than 50 
years ago.” Id. at ¶ 129. Based on principles of “evolutionary” and “effectiveness” in treaty interpretation, 
the AB ruled that “measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may 
fall within Article XX(g).” (emphasis in original). Id. at ¶ 130-31. 
138 US-Shrimp, at ¶133. This has been a highly controversial interpretation. 
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limitation.”139 In sum, as the unique report touching extrajurisdictional issues in WTO 
history, US-Shrimp is inconclusive either to admit or reject extrajurisdictional measures. 
Interestingly, because of this interpretation, even the OHCHR asserts that the 
justification of extraterritorial human rights measures in the WTO is a hard case. The 
OHCHR reports concludes that  
it does seem clear from the Appellate Body’s reasoning (here and elsewhere) 
that, if the exception is being used for reasons occurring outside the jurisdiction 
of that country, for instance to enforce labour standards in another State, it will be 
far harder to justify than a situation where a State is invoking a general exception 
in order, for example, to protect the human rights of its own population.140 
 For all these arguments, I suggest that the protection of human life, as found in 
article XX(b) of the GATT, cannot be used to justify trade measures intended to affect 
extraterritorial protection of human life. 
4. Extraterritoriality and PPMs 
The previous section explored the exception clauses of the GATT (mainly articles 
XX and XXI of the GATT) in light of extraterritoriality. There is, however, a prior and 
related question of whether the measures thought to be extraterritorial are, in fact, internal 
regulations.141 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 OHCHR Report on Human Rights and Trade, supra note 121, at 8 (emphasis added). See also 
Vázquez, supra note 50, at 818. 
141 Howse and Regan, for instance, affirm that process-based restrictions do not directly regulate 
any behavior occurring outside the border. Such measures are not extraterritorial because (i) process-based 
measures may have policy rationales that do not depend on any expectation of influencing foreign conduct 
(e.g. the protection of the environment or even a state preference not to be associated with what the 
regulating state regards as wickedness) and (ii) even if those measure have that sort of intention, no norm 
exists that makes such attempts illegitimate. In sum, all that the importing state is doing is prescribing an 
environmentally friendly method of fishing as a condition for products to come into the country (the 
condition also applies to its own fishermen’s fishing processes). Howse & Regan, supra note 129, at 274-
75. 
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If some measures are considered internal regulation, they are analyzed under 
article III of the GATT (the national treatment clause).142 Essentially, this clause requires 
imported products to be treated no less favorably than “like products” of national origin. 
In addition, pursuant to an interpretation of the ad note to article III, measures subject to 
article III are not subject to article XI.143  
The discussion had been epitomized under the so-called process-production 
method (PPM) debate. It begins with a distinction developed in the trade literature 
between “product-related processes and production methods” (PR-PPM) and “non-
product related processes and production methods” (NPR-PPM). PR-PPM refers to 
measures that distinguish between processes and production methods that affect the 
characteristics of products; NPR-PPMs, on the other hand, entail measures that prescribe 
processes and production methods that do not, or at least only negligibly, affect the 
characteristics of the products.144 
                                                 
142 Pieter Themaat identifies non-discrimination clauses in the sense of national treatment as early 
as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the context of the hanseatic leagues. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS n.2 at 397 (2d ed. 
1997). In trade, the clause is another basic principle of non-discrimination. This time, however, not in 
relation to a potential horizontal discrimination (state “A” discriminates between state “B” and “C,” such as 
in the MFN), but in relation to a vertical relationship: nationals and foreign products or persons. In the 
wording of Article IIII of the GATT, the NT clause obligates members to accord treatment no less 
favorable than that accorded to “like products” of national origin. Take again as an example, Members “A”, 
“B” and product “P.” Member “A” will accord national treatment to product “P” imported from member 
“B,” if, in relation to “P,” member “A” applies treatment no less favorable than that applied to the national 
like product “P.” The jurisprudence of the GATT-WTO developed a whole set of tests to determine what is 
a “like-product” is and the general idea is that products that are in competition with each other are “like-
products.” The clause aims at preventing domestic policies, such as taxation and regulatory practices, from 
discriminating against imports. In the context of trade in services, see also GATS art. XVII. 
143 See GATT ad art. III. 
144 VAN DEN BOSSCHE ET AL., UNILATERAL MEASURES ADDRESSING NON-TRADE CONCERNS, at 
xxxvii-xxxviii (2007), http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/kamerbrieven-bijlagen/2007/09/u0417dgisceboek-
wt.pdf. See also WALTER GOODE, DICTIONARY OF POLICY TRADE TERMS 282 (2003). The acronym PPM is 
sometimes used loosely in the literature, most of the time, the controversies involving PPMs are about 
NPR-PPMs. 
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For instance, while a measure prohibiting the use of certain antibiotics in shrimp 
farming would be a PR-PPM, a measure requiring that fishing vessels use turtle-friendly 
methods, as in US-Shrimp, would be an NPR-PPM.145 In the first case (PR-PPMs), the 
final product is affected, because shrimp not treated with antibiotics are “antibiotic free,” 
while shrimp treated with antibiotics can carry residue of the medicines. In the second 
case (NPR-PPMs), regardless of whether shrimps were harvested with turtle-friendly 
nets, the final product would be the same. 
If a measure discriminates between products on the basis of a PR-PPM, Article III 
applies and all the tests developed in the GATT-WTO jurisprudence to determine if the 
imported product and the national origin are “like products” and treated “no less 
favorably” come into play. This jurisprudence reveals, for instance, that the likeness test 
is a case-by-case analysis in which “like-products” are products that are in a competitive 
relationship.146 
The main controversy, however, is whether NPR-PPMs are covered by Article III. 
As Trachtman summarizes,  
                                                 
145 This is just a point to distinguish PR-PPMs from NPR-PPMs. I am not discussing their legality 
or which covered agreement applies to the dispute. For instance, in the case of the prohibition of imported 
shrimp farmed with certain antibiotics, the SPS agreement, dealing with food safety, is likely the most 
relevant. 
146 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, at ¶¶ 98-99 (Mar. 12, 2001)(explaining that a 
determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and 
extent of a competitive relationship between and among products. “In saying this, we are mindful that there 
is a spectrum of degrees of ‘competitiveness’ or ‘substitutability’ of products in the marketplace, and that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, in the abstract, to indicate precisely where on this spectrum the word ‘like’ in 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 falls. We are not saying that all products which are in some competitive 
relationship are ‘like products’ under Article III:4.” See also the different interpretation of like-products 
among the subparagraphs of Article III in the electronic GATT Analytical Index, 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_03_e.htm#fntext314. 
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WTO jurisprudence has not yet clarified whether Article III “applies” to or 
covers process-based regulatory distinctions. If Article III does not cover 
process-based regulations [NPR-PPM], then . . . these regulations will be viewed 
as border import restrictions (a ban of relevant products), controlled by Article 
XI. If Article III covers process-based regulations, the Appellate Body’s 
application of a competition-based test in Asbestos suggests that in many cases, 
different PPMs would be insufficient to make products “un-like.” The test under 
Article III would then prohibit treating like products differently on the basis of 
process-based considerations.147 
Why is this discussion relevant to restrictive trade measures concerning human 
rights violations occurring abroad? For a significant reason: a trade measure can take the 
form of a “human rights NPR-PPM.” For instance, in the labor context, let us assume that 
foreign products “Pchild” were processed using child labor. Let us also assume that 
domestic products crafted through adult labor exist: “Padult.”  
Pchild and Padult, “as products, are the same product “P.” Therefore, if an importing 
state wants to adopt a measure to block Pchild because of the process by which it was 
produced, this is a type of NPR-PPM. Thus, if Article III covers NPR-PPM, the 
competition-based test mentioned above applies. Moreover, because Pchild and Padult are 
likely to be in competition, this leads to the conclusion that Pchild and Padult could not be 
treated differently. 
This is the reason that Trachtman puts forwards that “the product/process 
distinction may often serve as a proxy to control the extraterritorial application of 
national measures in which extra-territorial application is perhaps exceptionally permitted 
under the circumstances set forth in Article XX.”148 That is to say, a restrictive trade 
measure addressing the way a product was processed abroad would probably violate the 
                                                 
147 Joel Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10(3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 631, 635 
(2007). 
148 Id. at 635. 
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national treatment obligation. Article XX would then apply as an ultimate test to justify 
such type of measure. 
5. Extraterritoriality in the GSP case 
Finally, the question of extraterritoriality and human rights appears in the WTO 
regime in relation to the General System of Preferences (GSP), regulated by the Enabling 
Clause.149 The GSP dynamic is somewhat different from the other trade measures, since 
GSP are systems of trade incentives. These schemes offer additional tariff reductions on 
imports, a benefit for export countries, if GSP candidates comply with certain demands. 
Because these demands were often seen as being of extraterritorial reach, these schemes 
are worthy of analysis. 
Overall, GSP schemes were historically understood to operate under the free 
discretion of the granters. Those granters could add conditions, suspend and cancel 
preferences at their will. GSP schemes were understood to be out of the GATT “fangs.” 
Granters effectively used GSP as a carrot-stick mechanism, offering preferential 
treatment (carrot) and withdrawing those preferences if states did not comply (stick) with 
the conditions set by granters; for instance, compliance with human rights treaties.150 
                                                 
149 GSP schemes are preferential tariff agreements that were developed with the creation of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Through these schemes, 
developed countries can voluntarily offer preferential tariff treatment to developing countries, without 
violating the MFN obligation. As exceptions to the MFN clause, GSP schemes were integrated in the 
GATT-1947 by the Contracting Parties through a waiver known as the “Enabling Clause.” See Decision on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203[hereinafter Enabling Clause]. 
This waiver, as a decision of the Contracting Parties, was then incorporated into the WTO and is, thus, 
legally binding. See GATT 1994 art 1(b)(iv). 
150 Cleveland points out the termination or suspension of GSP status of Burma by the United 
States, EC and Canada in 1989, 1996 and 1997 as general trade sanctions in response to that government’s 
use of forced labor. See also the list of 13 countries (pre-1993), 6 countries (1993) and 1 country (2000) 
targeted by the United States with removal or suspension from GSP for failure to comply with 
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Nevertheless, grantors’ discretion to set conditions through the GSP schemes was 
challenged in 2002 in the EC-Tariff Preference case.151 In the end, as Bartels comments, 
it was unnecessary for the AB to determine whether the GSP scheme offered by the EC 
(called “Drugs Arrangement”) meet possible constraints imposed by the Enabling Clause. 
The GSP scheme was found in violation of the Enabling Clause because of administrative 
procedures in the European regulation (i.e., the scheme was offered only to a closed list 
of beneficiaries).152  
After the EC-Tariff Preference case, the European Union changed the GSP 
regulation. In the new regulation (called GSP+),153 conditions with strong extraterritorial 
reach are blatant. For instance, to be eligible for GSP+, potential candidates have to ratify 
a number of labor and human rights treaties.154 
                                                                                                                                                 
internationally recognized human rights. Cleveland, supra note 51, at n.38, 135, 142. If the withdrawal of 
preferences was either a tool for protectionism or a political maneuver under the flag of human rights it is 
not a question addressed here. But for an account of this issue, see Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions 
in US Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism”?, 15(1) HUM. RTS Q. 1, 21-22 (1993)(concluding that 
“virtually all available analyses of the actual approach to implementation [of workers’ rights in the targeted 
countries] have concluded that political factors are generally the overriding consideration in determining 
the outcome of cases. Thus, one review of the Reagan administration's decisions to terminate GSP . . . 
status for Nicaragua, Romania, Ethiopia, Chile, and Paraguay concluded that human rights factors had been 
of only minor importance in the decisions taken” while “’strategic, or national security considerations’ 
were determinant.”) 
151 To summarize a long and complicated case that involves burden of proof issues, India 
challenged a GSP arrangement offered by the EU called “Drug Arrangement.” India’s main argument was 
that the arrangement was not in accordance with the Enabling Clause requirements that preferences under 
the Enabling Clause must be “generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory.” See Enabling Clause, ¶ 
2(a), n.3. Moreover, GSPs should be “designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.” See Enabling Clause, ¶ 3(c). 
152 As a “closed list,” a clear violation of the non-discriminatory requirement set by the Enabling 
Clause happened. See EC-Tariff Preferences, at ¶ 187-88. 
153 In the GSP+, the EC grants tariff benefits to developing countries that are committed, among 
other things, to human rights protection provided that they ratify and effectively implement the conventions 
listed in Part A of the EC Regulation, which refers to nine human rights and six labor rights conventions. 
See Council Regulation 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 [2005] OJ L169/1. 
154 But perhaps reactions to the GSP+ scheme have not grabbed too much attention because GSP 
schemes, from an economic point of view, have been losing their utility. This later point is supported by 
 
 
61 
 
In sum, it seems plausible to imagine that the Enabling Clause defines additional 
limits on the exercise of extraterritorial authority. But because GPS schemes are not 
mandatory, granters may merely decide to cancel the schemes because, for instance, the 
beneficiaries challenge the GSP demands as imposing unlawful extraterritorial 
conditions. It is thus important to realize the fragility of the Enabling Clause as really 
imposing prohibitions on the type of conditions. 
As Zagel suggests, trade incentives do not infringe on another state’s sovereignty 
and cannot be considered an interference with internal affairs. In addition, trade 
incentives do have positive aspects, and they can better target the population’s needs than 
trade sanctions.155 
6. Preliminary Remarks 
As to the extraterritorial element in the WTO normative floor, the prison labor 
and the security exceptions are the only strong language to accommodate it. In all other 
cases, the text of the agreements and the interpretation of related cases provide weak 
support for extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
relevant economic literature. See Gene Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The 
Law and Economics of GSP, 4(1) WORLD TRADE REV. 41 (2005)(contending that the justification for GSP 
schemes in the first instance – to promote growth and development – is unlikely to be served terribly well 
by existing GSP policy). Bartels also scrutinized the GSP+ scheme and contended that because of similar 
substantive criteria chosen by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries, among other factors, the scheme would 
be in violation of WTO law. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+Arrangement, 10(4) 
J. INT’L ECO. L. 869 (2007). See also Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General 
System of Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of 
Rights, 39(5) J. WORLD TRADE 977 (2005). 
155 Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting 
Convergence 2(2) IDLO Voices Of Development Jurists Paper Series 1, 34 (2005)(citing Bruno Simma’s 
assessment on this point). 
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Provision “Extraterritoriality” Element 
National Treatment Weak 
Public Morals and Public Order Weak 
Protection of Life and Health Weak 
Prison Labour Possible (Strong) 
Security Possible (Strong) 
GSP Not related 
Table 3 – Extraterritoriality in the WTO normative floor 
C. ADDITIONAL TESTS IMPOSED BY THE WTO NORMATIVE FLOOR 
In addition to all the analysis already developed in terms of the “human rights” 
and “extraterritoriality” elements in the WTO regime, it should be noted that additional 
requirements for measures to be justified under Article XX are found in the normative 
floor. Two of them are the “necessity test” and the chapeau of article XX. 
1. Necessity Test 
The “necessity” test appears under the wording of the exceptions for the 
protection of public morals and the protection of human life.156 The “necessity” test has 
been expressed, with variations, as the following question: “is there some other measure 
less inconsistent with GATT that achieves the objective sought by the WTO member in 
question that is reasonably available to such member?”157  
                                                 
156 In addition, it is fairly settled that the term “necessary” means the same thing in subparagraph 
(a), (b), and (d). Moreover, it is settled that “necessity” is stronger than the term “relating,” as found in 
subparagraph (e). The AB in US-Gasoline acknowledged the distinct meaning of terms used in Article XX 
exceptions. The AB found that it does “not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to 
require . . . the same kind or degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and 
the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized.” The AB stressed that Article XX uses 
different terms in respect of different categories: “necessary” appears in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); 
whereas “essential”, “relating to", “for the protection of,” “in pursuance of,” “involving” appear in others. 
See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 26, 1996), at 17. 
157 US - Section 337, a GATT case, seems to be the base for the formation of the test. See GATT 
Panel Report US – Section 337, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, adopted November 7, 
1989, BISD 36S/345, ¶ 5.26. 
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After many developments of the test in the GATT-WTO jurisprudence, what the 
current necessity test seems to constitute involves the balancing of the following 
elements: (i) the absence of “less inconsistent” measures that achieves the objective 
sought” by the WTO member in question; and (ii) the availability and reasonability of 
those measures to such member.158 The point to be remembered here is that, if restrictive 
trade measures addressing human rights violations occurring abroad are to be justified 
under articles XX(a) or XX(b), those measures will have to pass the scrutiny of the 
necessity test. 
2. Chapeau Test 
Finally, as the last component of article XX analysis, had a measure survived the 
specific requirements of its subparagraphs, the scrutiny of the chapeau comes into play. 
The chapeau requires that a measure not be applied in a manner that would constitute a 
means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” The chapeau 
analysis is not about the specific content of the measure, but rather the manner in which 
that measure is applied. The purpose of this ultimate level of analysis is to prevent abuse 
in the exercise of Article XX.159 Again, the point to make here is that if restrictive trade 
                                                 
158 Less inconsistent measures that achieve the objective sought would require the analysis of the 
relative importance of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure, the contribution of the 
measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it, and the restrictive impact of the measure on 
international commerce. Reasonable availablity would require a comparison between the challenged 
measure and possible alternatives. 
159 The burden of demonstrating compliance with the chapeau rests on the party invoking the 
exception. See US–Shrimp, at ¶ 150, US–Shrimp Article 21.5, at ¶ 118. 
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measures addressing human rights violations occurring abroad are to be justified under 
the chapeau, those measures will have to pass this test.160  
 
D. THE BROADER PICTURE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES IN THE WTO 
In relation to restrictive trade measures addressing human rights violations abroad, 
this section investigated the lawfulness of those measures under the WTO regime. This 
section unbundled the analysis in the “human rights” and the “extraterritoriality” 
elements. The overall picture shows that there are two potential options for justifying 
those measures: the prison labor and the security exceptions. I employ potential in the 
sense that at least the extraterritorial element in those cases do not appear to represent an 
issue. It should be noted that GSP schemes, to the extent that they are not mandatory, also 
permit grantors discretion to establish extraterritorial conditions, whether or not related to 
human rights, on beneficiaries. 
 In all other identified alternatives, because of less clarity and no cogent 
interpretation of the clauses indicating otherwise, they seem to represent weak 
alternatives. 
                                                 
160 An interesting aspect of the chapeau interpretation on “arbitrary and unjustifiable” is found in 
the US-Shrimp, at ¶ 177. The AB noted that the certification process provided by the MMPA was shaped 
without the participation of the exporting members. The AB ruled that a lack of serious effort to negotiate 
with the objective of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements for the achievement of a certain 
policy goal as a ground to an unjustifiable measure. See US–Shrimp, at ¶¶ 171-72. The AB expressed a 
clear repudiation of “unilateralism” in the application of a measure underscoring its “unjustifiability.” As 
expected, this was a controversial holding. 
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“Provision” HR Extraterritoriality  Additional Tests Authority  
National Treatment --- Weak Competition Weak 
Public Morals  Possible 
(weak) 
Weak Necessity and 
Chapeau tests 
Weak 
Human Life and Health Possible 
(weak) 
Weak Necessity and 
Chapeau tests 
Weak 
Prison Labour Possible 
(weak) 
Possible (strong) --- Possible 
Security Possible 
(weak) 
Possible (strong) --- Possible 
GSP Schemes Possible 
(weak) 
Possible (strong) --- Possible 
Table 4 – Legal Analysis under the WTO normative floor 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
As the last step of this chapter, I now analyze the extraterritoriality and trade 
elements of human rights regimes. It should be noted that, because there is an overlap 
between the general system and human rights regimes, some points will be once more 
acknowledged. Obviously, there is no need to develop any analysis of the human rights 
element in this regime; it is its raison d’être. I begin by recalling some necessary 
distinctions of the types of obligations found in human rights doctrinal analysis. 
A. A NOTE ON THE TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
Traditionally, in human rights doctrine, a first generation of rights prescribes 
conduct that governments should not do (negative rights). A second generation prescribes 
conduct that governments should take (positive rights). A third generation of rights, as 
Ruppel summarizes,  
has been distinguished from the other two categories of human rights in that its 
realisation is predicated not only upon both the affirmative and negative duties of 
the state, but also upon the behaviour of each individual. Rights in this category 
include self-determination as well as a host of normative expressions whose 
status as human rights is controversial at present. These include the right to 
66 
 
development, the right to peace, the right to a healthy environment, and the right 
to intergenerational equity.161 
A well-known criticism of the generation categories is that it is hard to imagine 
that civil and political rights demand only abstention of governments and that economic, 
social and cultural rights demand only positive actions.162 Political rights can only be 
attained when governments positively carry out some sort of task by creating the 
institutional mechanisms to enforce those rights, for instance. Conversely, economic, 
social, and cultural rights may include a negative component by requiring state 
abstention.163  
These issues may create confusion since for each human right there may be not a 
single, but a set of state obligations of a positive or negative nature. As a consequence, 
                                                 
161 Oliver C. Ruppel, Third-Generation Human Rights and the protection of environment, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NAMIBIA 101, 103 (Bösl & Horn eds. 2008). 
162 The “three-generation” language is a term attributed to Karel Vasak, a Czech jurist, who used it 
in the late 1970s while explaining the evolution of human rights in the context of the French Revolution. 
See FLÁVIA PIOVESAN, DIREITOS HUMANOS E O DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL INTERNACIONAL [HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 28 (1997)(Port.). See also Stephen P. Marks, 
Emerging Human Rights: a New Generation for the 1980s? 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 439-52 
(1981)(explaining that in the 1980s six areas were under consideration of a third generation of rights: 
environment, development, peace, common heritage, communication and humanitarian assistance; pointing 
out, as well, that the idea of proliferation of rights is dangerous, the term “generation” was already outdated 
by that time, and the rights of the new generations are too vague to be justiciable). Another criticism of 
generations refers to the fact that the categorization would break apart the “indivisibility” of human rights. 
The indivisibility of human rights recognizes that all human rights share basic characteristics. The Vienna 
Declaration, particularly, prescribes that the international community must treat human rights globally in a 
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. See Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action: Note By The Secretariat, World Conference on Human Rights, Part I, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. 
163 One example is the right to education which, in accordance with one interpretation, includes 
the freedom to teach and to establish schools, which is more than the positive duty of the state to establish 
schools. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) arts. 13-14. See 
also E. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights 9 NETHS. YBK. INT. L. 69, 80 (1978). In human rights, as Steiner summarizes, 
“[d]ifferent rights may point to different types of state duties. All depends on the nature of the right, on the 
problems it was meant to overcome or to prevent. Some types of state duties [] are more prominent in the 
ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], some in CEDAW [Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women], some in the [ICESCR].” See HENRY STEINER 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 186 (2008). 
67 
 
rather than the positive-negative dichotomy, it may be useful to remember that states 
obligations under international human rights law are categorized under three headings: 
obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.164  
Obligation to respect requires states, and thereby all its organs and agents, to 
abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity of the individual or infringes on 
her or his freedom.165 The obligation to protect requires from the State and its agents the 
measures necessary to prevent other individuals or groups from violating the integrity, 
freedom of action, or other human rights of the individual.166 The obligation to fulfill 
requires the State to take the measures necessary to ensure for each person within its 
jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of those needs, which are recognized in 
the human rights instruments and cannot be secured by personal efforts.167  
Surely, a connection exists between the three-level obligation and the negative-
positive dichotomy. The obligation to respect is a type of negative obligation, while the 
obligation to protect and fulfill are more positively-oriented.  
Having this terminology and concepts now been clarified, the main proposition 
here is whether obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill defines anything in terms 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction concerning restrictive trade measures. 
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
                                                 
164 An earlier elaboration of the three levels of obligations has been attributed to Asbjorn Eide. See 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report on the Right to 
Food as a Human Right, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987), ¶¶ 66-70, 112-14 [hereinafter 
The UN Food Report]. A more refined division in five categories is found in Steiner et al. (2008), at 186-
190. 
165 Id, at ¶ 66. 
166 Id. at ¶ 67. 
167 Id. at ¶ 68. 
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Human rights advocates frequently cite the superior status of human rights to 
justify broad exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The superiority of the UN Charter 
obligations found in article 103 and the prescriptions of articles 55 and 56 are provisions 
often invoked to support this view. Specifically, this authority would arise when these 
articles are read together: 
[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55 [including the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion].168 
As to the superior value of human rights, it has been noted that, aside from jus 
cogens norms, no hierarchy among specialized regimes are found in international law. 
And even when jus cogens violations are the case, it was shown that extraterritorial 
authority is not clear established (unless, it is the case of UN-SC resolutions under 
Chapter VII). Thus, the prescription to “take joint and separate action” in co-operation 
with the UN can be hardly read as also authorizing extrajurisdictional authority. 
But do human rights instruments establish anything different than that? A starting 
point is to notice the usage of a common terminology among many of the human rights 
instruments. This common language suggests that the contracting parties’ obligations are 
oriented “within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.”  
The ICCPR, for instance, establishes that 
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant [. . .].169 
                                                 
168 UN Charter art. 56. As to the text in brackets, see UN Charter art. 55(c). 
169 ICCPR art. 2.1. 
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The Torture Convention posits that 
[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.170 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) provides that the contracting 
parties 
[s]hall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedom defined 
in Section I of this Convention.171 
The ICESCR, although not employing “jurisdictional” language, prescribes that  
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.172  
Moreover, a comment about the discharge of parties’ obligations under the 
ICESCR clarifies that “whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must 
also take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned.”173 
Let me additionally consider some points about child labor, a frequent example 
used throughout the dissertation. The Convention concerning the Prohibition and 
                                                 
170 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, art. 2.1 (emphasis added)[hereinafter Torture 
Convention]. See also references to “under its jurisdiction” in arts. 5.1.1, 5.2, 11, 12, 13, and 16. But see, 
article 2.1: “This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which 
does or may contain provisions of wider application” and article 5.3, “[t]his Convention does not exclude 
any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.”(emphasis added). 
171 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 
1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], art. 1. See also American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR], art. 1 (“States Parties to this 
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction”)(emphasis added). 
172 ICESCR art 2.1. 
173 General Comment 3, the nature of States parties’ obligations (Art. 2, par.1), CESCR, UN Doc. 
E/1991/23 (Dec 14, 1990), ¶¶ 10, 13. 
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Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO C182) 
provides that “[e]ach Member which ratifies this Convention shall take immediate and 
effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child 
labor as a matter of urgency.”174 The convention does not replicate the jurisdictional 
language. But the ILO recommendation specifying the action programme contains a 
provision that can be interpreted as a recommendation towards the application of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under “other measures aimed at the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour,” that document recommends the 
contracting parties to  
provid[e] for the prosecution in their own country of the Member's nationals who 
commit offences under its national provisions for the prohibition and immediate 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour even when these offences are 
committed in another country.175 
 Arguably, the concern in the clause is about criminalizing conducts of nationals 
abroad, a typical exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. But apart from that, as one 
commentator suggests, the convention “may simply require countries to make it illegal 
for their citizens, or persons operating within their territory, to use child labour.”176 And 
again, if one assumes that the prohibition of the use of child labor has reached jus cogens 
status, the analysis that I developed before shows that no specific authority of 
extraterritorial application emanates from the jus cogens status of the norms. 
                                                 
174 Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (entered into force Nov 19, 2000)[hereinafter ILO C182], art. 1. 
175 Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour (June 17, 1999)[hereinafter ILO Recommendation 190], ¶ 15(d). 
176 Vázquez, supra note 50, at 821. 
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In sum, it appears more plausible that the obligations found in human rights 
instruments (to protect, to respect and to fulfill) channel action within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the contracting parties. Some exceptions authorize the prescription of 
legislation with extraterritorial coverage. Cleveland notes, for instance, that some 
instruments provide as such.177 The 1957 Slavery Convention obligates the contracting 
parties to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and 
necessary legislative and other measures to bring about . . . the complete 
abolition or abandonment of the following institutions [forced labour and other 
slave-like practices], where they still exist [].178 
Another example mentioned by her is the Genocide Convention.179 That 
Convention would expressly recognize a type of extraterritorial jurisdiction because it 
recognizes legal remedies against other states.180 
C. TRADE IN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
Though human rights conventions hardly address trade issues, it is possible to 
find that subject in some of them. For instance, the Supplementary Convention on 
Slavery dedicates an entire session to “the Slave Trade.”181 
                                                 
177 Cleveland, supra note 51, at 153. 
178 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, 7 September 1956, 266 UNTS (entered into force 30 April 1957)[hereinafter 
Supplementary Convention on Slavery]. 
179 Cleveland, supra note 51, at 153. Cleveland also mentions the Apartheid Convention as another 
example. 
180 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 
UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951)[hereinafter Genocide Convention], art. IX: “Disputes 
between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.” See also Genocide 
Convention art. V: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective 
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in 
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated 
in article III.” 
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That convention provides that the “States Parties shall take all effective measures 
to prevent ships and aircraft authorized to fly their flags from conveying slaves;”182 it also 
mentions that the “States Parties shall take all effective measures to ensure that their 
ports, airfields and coasts are not used for the conveyance of slaves.”183 
One can also infer from the ILO C182 trade situations. For instance, the definition 
of the worst forms of child labor comprises the sale and trafficking of children, and the 
use, procuring or offering of a child for, inter alia, prostitution or illicit activities.184 
However, in contrast to the Slavery Convention, the ILO C182 does not enumerate the 
types of trade measures that the contracting parties should take. The trade issue has to do 
with what the definition of the worst forms of child labor is. 
Apart from those cases, in which the “product” itself raises human rights concerns 
(such as slaves or children), a comprehensive study indicating where to find trade 
measures in human rights treaties is yet to be done and would be an interesting avenue of 
research. This dissertation merely recognizes this avenue of research. 
D. THE BROADER PICTURE IN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
In human rights instruments, state obligations to protect, respect and fulfill are 
limited to the territorial limits of each state. Extraterritoriality is exceptional and, though 
rare, it is possible to find human rights instruments dealing with trade measures. 
                                                                                                                                                 
181 See Supplementary Convention on Slavery Section II. Slave trade “means and includes all acts 
involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts 
involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale 
or exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and, in general, every act of trade 
or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.” See Supplementary Convention on Slavery 
Section IV art. 7(c). 
182 See Supplementary Convention on Slavery art. 2(a). 
183 See Supplementary Convention on Slavery art. 2(b). 
184 ILO C182 art. 3(a)-(c). 
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Source Extraterritorial Element Trade Element Authority 
ICCPR, ICESCR, ECHR  Weak Weak Weak 
Torture Convention (Single-
Issue) 
Possible (in terms of criminalizing 
conduct of nationals abroad) 
Weak Weak 
Child-Labour, C182 (Single-
Issue) 
Possible (in terms of criminalizing 
conduct of nationals abroad) 
Not specific Weak 
1957 Slavery Convention 
(Single-Issue) 
Possible (in terms of criminalizing 
conduct of nationals abroad) 
Possible (strong) Possible 
Genocide (Single-Issue) Possible (in terms of criminalizing 
conduct of nationals abroad) 
Not specific Weak 
Table 5 –Legal Analysis under Human Right Regimes 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter investigated the current state of international law regarding the 
legality of the examined trade measures. Interestingly, the legal and doctrinal analyse of 
general international law, WTO trade law, and human rights law reveal a common 
pattern: international law has not embraced any robust doctrine permitting states to apply 
restrictive trade measures because of human rights violations in other countries. 
In the general international law, exceptions included measures taken in pursuance 
of UN-SC resolutions in accordance with Chapter VII. This assessment demystifies 
common ideas about what CIL and jus cogens prescribe and it demystifies the reach of 
similar elaborations found in humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect). In 
the WTO regime, the possibilities of justification of trade measures are more likely to be 
found in the prison labor and the security exceptions of the GATT and corresponding 
clauses in other covered agreements. In human rights regimes, though it was not 
comprehensively explored, slavery was acknowledged as an example justifying 
restrictive trade measures; because of the “trade” obligations specifically contained in the 
relevant treaty, rather than the fact of belonging to the human rights family of convention. 
These are again exceptional prescriptions since the human rights instruments impose 
obligations on states in relation to individuals in their own territory. The question 
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demanding attention is why such a consistency is found across different regimes. This is 
the question addressed in terms of L&E methodology in the next chapter. 
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Ch3 The Traditional Legal Analysis Explained in 
Terms of Allocation of Regulatory 
Jurisdiction and Transaction Costs 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue in this chapter is why one simply does not find, beyond some very rare 
exceptions, that any of the relevant bodies of international law (general, trade and human 
rights) embrace any robust doctrine of restrictive trade measures addressing 
extraterritorial human rights violations. 
To answer the why question, this chapter draws on positive L&E methodology. 
This methodology is based on property rights theory transposed onto international law 
problems. In this approach, international law is fundamentally thought of as a device of 
allocation of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ) that is dependent on transaction costs (TCs). 
The two relevant costs identified herein as relevant ones are sovereignty costs (related to 
the “extraterritorial” question) and cognitive costs (related to, among other things, the 
communication barriers between trade and human rights communities). 
This chapter engages in three case studies to illustrate the ARJ and TCs 
methodology: (i) the UN-SC powers under Chapter VII, (ii) the Diamond Waiver of the 
WTO, (iii) and the trade and labor rights linkage. In all of the cases, I try to orient the 
reader to observe the heightened TCs involved, though the cases may initially mislead the 
reader to think otherwise. 
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I. JUSTIFICATION OF L&E AS A METHODOLOGY AND THE POSITIVE 
APPROACH 
Overall, L&E represents a search for a more scientific understanding about the 
consistency trend detected in the previous chapter: the different regimes of international 
law (general, trade, and human rights) do not buttress restrictive trade measures against 
human rights violations.185  
As noted, my aim is now to re-describe the examined issue using L&E theory, 
while explaining the necessary distinctions and limitations. I believe that this 
methodology offers a very useful framework of analysis and illuminates why rules look 
like they do in terms of a specific variable, TCs. I begin by highlighting that my 
methodology is developed in terms of a positive approach, as opposed to a normative 
one. 
                                                 
185 By scientific, I just refer to a process of observation, elaboration of a hypothesis, clarifications 
of assumptions and concepts, explanation of the framework used, and testing of the hypotheses for 
conclusions. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 463 (2006)(answering the criticism of their book “The Limits of International Law;” 
highlighting a major “generational change” underway where the scholarship pays great attention to the 
social science virtues: methodological self-consciousness, empiricism, and theoretical rigor. In this process, 
after observation, one (i) make assumptions explicit; (ii) address the limitations and criticisms of his/her 
assumptions, (iii) separate positive and normative arguments; (iv) frame claims as testable hypotheses, (v) 
address alternative hypotheses; (vi) choose case studies and other evidence carefully. Id. at 463. See also 
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998). I assume that finding a theoretical framework 
in a legal dissertation is not a rare dilemma among academics of different countries. In fact, I think that this 
dilemma is accentuated in legal dissertations because the idea of a “scientific” legal analysis is rejected by 
many. Put simply, one reason for the rejection of law as science comes from the (true) perception that a 
legal system is value-laden. The (wrong, I would claim) conclusion is that, as science requires universal 
application of certain assumptions and for the simple impossibility that legal decisions are universally 
applicable, law is not science. Ulen, ironically, has already observed the absence of a Nobel Prize in Law as 
a characteristic of the legal field. Thomas Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, 
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 4 U. ILL. L.R. 875 (2002). Ulen points out, nevertheless, that 
as the amount and breadth of legal empiric research increases, a core set of theoretical beliefs will emerge 
in the law, and that increased empiricism in the law is vital the future of the law as science. Id. 
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Positive and normative economics is a common distinction in the economics field. 
Polinsky puts it very simply, saying that economic analysis is used to both try to explain 
the legal system as it is and to recommend changes that might improve it; the first 
function is positive (or descriptive) economics and the second normative (or 
prescriptive).186 
An example proves useful. Trachtman and Dunoff, while discussing the L&E of 
humanitarian law violations in internal conflicts, suggest that the positive analyst would 
decline to judge whether international law ought to hold individuals criminally liable for 
human rights atrocities committed in internal conflict. In turn, the normative analyst 
typically offers reforms designed to maximize “social welfare”. The first takes no 
position on the lex ferenda. The second engages in lex ferenda.187 
In my case, rather than telling the reader whether restrictive trade measures 
addressing human rights violations abroad “should be” lawful or not, my concern is to 
point out “what is going on” in terms of L&E language. Thus, I adopt a positive 
approach. Surely, as Trachtman and Dunoff highlight, the distinction between positive 
and normative is not clear cut; a positive description is often implicitly normative to the 
extent that it identifies a mismatch between articulated goals and policy or institutional 
                                                 
186 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS xvii (Aspen 3d ed. 
2003). For the classic discussion, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). See 
also, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 24-26 (Aspen 6th ed. 2002)(explaining that the 
positive role of economic analysis of law is the attempt to explain legal rules and outcomes as they are 
rather than to change them to make them better; recalling that, often, the true ground of legal decisions are 
concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Legal education consists 
primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds, many of which may turn 
out to have an economic character). 
187 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law 
Violations in Internal Conflict, 93(2) AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1999). Lex ferenda is a Latin expression 
meaning “what the law ought to be", as opposed to lex lata, meaning what the “law is.” 
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choice.188 This observation seems applicable to my work and I expect, therefore, that my 
description serves to inform future institutional choices (though I do not indicate any 
preferred route in this direction).  
In sum, my approach is positive and, as expressed by Oliver Williamson, “rather 
than being preoccupied with the imperative ‘[t]his is the law here’ [or this is what the law 
should be], my question is ‘what’s going on here.’”189 
As a final remark concerning L&E, it should be remembered this field of study 
has been an expanding one as applied to the understanding of domestic law subjects 
(mostly in common law jurisdictions). The application of L&E theories on international 
law has been less effusive.190 
                                                 
188 Id. at 397. 
189 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 25 (1996)(discussing 
methodological concerns of his dissertation involving a interdisciplinary work at Carnegie Hall dealing 
with the alliance of law, economics and organization theories). Williamson describes his effort as an 
“interdisciplinary combination of law, economics, and organization in which economics is the first among 
equals.”Id. at 3. Because of his hierarchical choice, I do not subscribe to that part of his statement. 
190 A look on the content of leading books in L&E, such as those from Posner or Polinsky, reveals 
the application of L&E theories mainly to domestic law situations. The case studies provided by Posner 
focus on common law subjects (such as property, contract rights and remedies, family law and sex law, tort 
law, criminal law), plus public regulation of the market; law of business organization and financial markets; 
law and the distribution of income and wealth; the legal process; and the constitution and the federal 
system. See Posner, supra note 186, at vii. Scattered analysis of international law problems are found on his 
work, nonetheless. Posner dedicates a subsection to “Treaties and Other International Agreements” in the 
Contracts chapter and a subsection to “Dumping and the Free Trade Question” in the “Antitrust Law” 
chapter. Id. at 136, 314. By the same token, in his introductory book, Polinsky provides eleven applications 
of L&E: nuisance; breach of contract (twice); automobile accidents (twice); risk bearing and insurance; law 
enforcement using imprisonment; competitive markets; pollution control; product liability; principal-agent 
liability; and suit, settlement and trial. See Polinsky, supra note 186. 
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In that context, Joel Trachtman, Jeffrey Dunoff, Andrew Guzman, and Alan 
Sykes have been leading authors, among others, to transpose the domestic perspective of 
L&E to the international field.191 
The basic idea to be developed has the following three steps: (1) regimes, such as 
general international law, the WTO, and human rights, are mechanisms of ARJ; (2) ARJ 
depends on (or is a function of) transaction costs (TCs); and (3) with increased TCs, if 
allocations occur, international law is unclear, uncertain, or, as it will be named, “muddy” 
in its allocations of rights. 
In the domestic setting of L&E, however, this dynamic is explained not in terms 
of ARJ, but in terms of the property rights of individuals. Thus, my first effort is to 
introduce and transpose this model of L&E as applied to international law. 
II. L&E METHODOLOGY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ALLOCATION OF 
REGULATORY JURISDICTION 
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC L&E 
Property rights, or entitlements, are evoked in the L&E literature to mean the full 
range of legal entitlements of individuals.192 For instance, as proposed in the classic 
article by Calabresi and Melamed, the idea of entitlement is not only the common 
                                                 
191 As this chapter draws from many of Trachtman’s papers, I will refer to them along other 
footnotes. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law: An Invitation 
and a Caveat (April 1998), http://ssrn.com/abstract=73688 (corroborating the vision that “curiously . . . the 
law and economics revolution has, with few exceptions . . . bypassed international law; presenting an 
Appendix containing relevant literature found until 1998). See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New 
Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2001-2002)(discussing a new paradigm on choice-of-law questions not 
only in courts but also on international regulatory issues). ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW WORKS (2008). Alan O. Sykes, the Economics of Public International Law (John M. Olin L. & Econ., 
Working Paper N. 216, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=564383. 
192 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 191, at n.59 17. 
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perception of owning something, but also the entitlement to make noise, to pollute, to 
breathe clean air, and to have children, among others.193  
Before property rights appear, individuals behaving egoistically could lead to the 
so-called “tragedy of the commons” in the exploitation of a common area. The tragedy is 
described in the landmark article by Hardin in 1968: 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to 
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work 
reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease 
keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the 
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the 
long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent 
logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each 
herdsman seeks to maximize his gain . . . the rational herdsman concludes that the 
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And 
another; and another . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every 
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a 
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (emphasis added). 194 
 
 
This metaphor provides the basic explanation for the rise of property regimes. In 
the commons, each person realizes only the benefits but not the costs of adding additional 
sheep, so each herdsman adds too many sheep to the commons. Property rights assign, to 
the same person, the allocation of benefits and costs in decision-making. If one divides 
the commons into separate tracts (property), each tract owner perceives both the benefits 
                                                 
193 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972). 
194 The article was originally published as Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
Science 1243, 1244 (Dec 13, 1968). Hardin’s issue involved population growth to which he acknowledges 
“no technical solution”. Id. at 1243. There are many reproductions of the “Tragedy”. See in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY 176-77 (Dau-Schmidt & Ulen eds., 1998). 
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and the costs of adding sheep to his or her tract.195 In these types of collective action 
problems, the L&E literature offers analytical tools to understand the different types of 
allocation of rights. 
In the domestic setting, this means understanding how property rights have been 
allocated (positive approach), or recommending (normative approach) a way to 
efficiently allocate those rights. Transactions on property will occur and, eventually, 
disputes about property rights will arise. In other words, the process of reallocating 
property can occur in at least two ways: voluntarily (market) and through adjudicative 
proceedings (courts).196  
                                                 
195 Hardin does not advance which kind of property should arise: public, private, common or any 
sort but simply that an allocation or property will occur. “We might sell them off as private property. We 
might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the 
basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some 
agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, 
administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable.” 
Hardin (1968), at 1243. See also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (Cambridge 1990)(commenting upon important points related to 
Hardin’s work. First, Hardin was not the first to notice the tragedy; Aristotle - in the Politics, Hobbes’s 
parable of man in state of nature, and Gordon’s classic in economics - the Economic Theory of a Common-
Property Research: the Fishery, 1954 -, to list a few, expounded similar reasoning. But the kind of problem 
found in the tragedy of the commons have expanded since of much of the world is dependent on resources 
that are subject to the possibility of a tragedy). As Ostrom postulates, “the tragedy of the commons, the 
prisoner’s dilemma, and the logic of collective actions are closely related concepts in the models that have 
defined the accepted way of viewing many problems that individuals face when attempting to achieve 
collective benefits . . . [furthermore] these three models and their many variants are diverse representations 
of a broader and still-evolving theory of collective action.” Id. at 6-7. The idea of “commons” in Ostrom is 
explored under the concept of common-pool resource (CPR), which is also an alternative terminology 
found in the literature. Id. at 29-57. 
196 Reallocation may also occur by force, but in that case the injured party can resort to courts to 
reestablish (or not) the original allocation. In addition, peculiar to the domestic context, there are situations 
of inalienability that frustrates allocations. As Calabresi and Melamed explain, an entitlement is inalienable 
“to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” See Calabresi 
& Melamed, supra note 193, at 1092. Inalienability in property rights takes place when: (i) transaction 
creates significant externalities (cost to third parties; for instance a rule that forbids someone close to 
bankruptcy to transfer its assets); (ii) the external costs are non monetazible (“moralism”); and (iii) 
situations of paternalism (contracts can be invalidated if signed under influence; minors are protected by 
law). Id. at 1111-15. 
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With this initial understanding of property rights and allocation, the next section 
advances the transposition of these concepts to the international context. 
B. TRANSPOSING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS CONCEPT TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The transposition process of L&E from the domestic to the international settings 
requires some parsing. I begin by employing Trachtman’s analogy of four concepts, as 
suggested below:197  
Domestic L&E International L&E 
Individuals States 
Tragedy of the Commons Anarchical System / Res nullius 
Individual’s preferences States’ preferences 
Property rights Regulatory Jurisdiction 
Table 6 - Pairing of Concepts 
The first possible pairing in this transposition is to compare individuals with 
states. Individuals or groups of individuals are the central actors, but not the exclusive 
ones, in domestic L&E analysis; states are similarly the central, and also not exclusively, 
actors in international L&E.  
Second, like the tragedy of the commons among individuals, states found 
themselves in a primitive order. Maybe it is even better to say that instead of order, 
                                                 
197 See See Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L. L 
1, 11-15 (2001-2002). It should be noted that Trachtman’s overall framework seems to draw from a blend 
of research in both economics and political science, drawing from the acknowledged work of Oliver 
Williamson and Douglass North elsewhere in his writings. Id. n.17-18 at 9, n.204 at 79. 
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anarchy reigned.198 That is akin to the idea of “commons,” or a res nullius regime 
manifested in the international society.199 
Third, to the same extent that individuals have their own preferences, states also 
have preferences in the form of policy decisions. An individual may value education or a 
house by the seashore as the most important asset to the same extent that a state may 
value the protection of environment or the expansion of its territory as cornerstone 
policies. 
Fourth, just as individuals have property rights (control over something; the right 
of individual to control physical assets), states also have their property rights. Largely, 
this idea of control over something (property) can be paired with the concept of 
regulatory jurisdiction. As Trachtman puts it, property and jurisdiction “involve legally-
constructed packages of control of things of value.”200 I illustrate this analogy with the 
following figure: 
                                                 
198 Here, I do not use the term anarchy in the technical sense of international relations theory, but 
in the common sense of disorder. In international law, as Fidler explains, “anarchy is the opposite of 
hierarchy – a political context in which the actors centralize power and create superior and inferior sources 
of authority. Conceptually speaking, politics within a State are hierarchical, but politics among States are 
anarchical.” David Fidler, A Theory of Open-Source Anarchy, 15(1) INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 
259, 262 (2008). 
199 Res nullius is the Latin expression meaning “the property of no one.” See BALLENTINE'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d ed., 1969). In the world commons, states could exercise regulatory jurisdiction with very 
little limitations. Surely, I mean limitations set by treaties and CIL because they were very primitive at this 
point of history. What limitations in domestic statutes or constitutions existed is another question. 
200 Trachtman, supra note 197, at 11. Cf. D’Amato, supra note 57, at 1113 (employing the 
“entitlement” language of Calabresi and Melamed in the human rights context). 
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Figure 1 – Property Rights and Jurisdiction 
C. TRANSACTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TRANSACTIONS OF REGULATORY 
JURISDICTION 
Recall that the idea of res nullius corresponds to the notion of nobody’s property 
and it was previously employed in the property rights context. Also bear in mind that in 
the domestic setting, L&E acknowledges the transition from the commons to the property 
rights society.201 Similarly, international society evolved from the commons to a regime 
of property rights set by international law.  
The “commons” in international law is the world itself. When man was found in 
the state of nature, they had little impact on the world and could survive without 
international law. Once states (the political unit) were established, their individual action 
(adding “sheep” to the common) begun to threaten the world and international law 
became necessary.202  
                                                 
201 As Trachtman puts it: “as property of this type [increasing value to the legislating state of the 
application of its jurisdiction] becomes more valuable, given that it is otherwise subject to appropriation, 
we would expect the rise of property rights: in this context, ‘property rights’ or ‘entitlements’ would be 
expected to be comprised of international or federal laws or legal principles allocating prescriptive 
jurisdiction.” See Trachtman, supra note 197, at 14. 
202 I am in debt to Professor Dau-Schmidt for helping in the elaboration of this analogy. See also 
Trachtman explanation in terms of externalities: “When states regulate, they cause and encounter 
regulatory externalities: costs are imposed on outsiders without commensurate benefit or without 
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At this point, it is not relevant to understand which factors inform each 
international law transaction. Agreeing with Dunoff and Trachtman, I assume that like 
any society, international society is a “place where individual actors or groups of actors 
encounter one another and sometimes have occasion to cooperate [and transact].”203 
Surely, the types of transactions in the domestic and international settings are different. 
Dunoff and Trachtman point out that the “assets traded in this international ‘market’ are 
not goods or services per se, but assets peculiar to states: components of power.”204  
And it is important to observe that these transactions take place in many forms: (i) 
states can voluntarily “trade” their jurisdictional power (e.g. by a treaty); (ii) CIL, 
functionally speaking, produces the same effect on the regulatory jurisdiction; and (iii) 
international courts’ decisions can also affect regulatory jurisdiction of states when it 
clarifies the meaning of international law. Ultimately, international law (treaty, CIL, 
judicial decisions, etc.) is law that allocates regulatory jurisdiction, as the next section 
establishes. 
III. ALLOCATION OF REGULATORY JURISDICTION (ARJ) 
In this section, I argue that international law – as contained in its many regimes - 
is a device of ARJ. Recall that in the trade regime, the national treatment clause 
                                                                                                                                                 
legitimation by their consent or another basis. The outsiders may wish to come to an accommodation 
regarding these costs, but in theory the parties will only agree if the accommodation enhances their 
aggregate welfare. . . While all regulatory externalities will not be worth internalizing, due to transaction 
costs, the existence of regulatory externalities suggests the evaluation of the utility of transactions in 
regulatory authority. . . The point here is that states may wish to engage in transactions regarding both types 
of externality.” Joel Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10(3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 631, 644-45 
(2007). 
203 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 191, at 10. 
204 Id. at 10. 
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prescribes that an importing state should treat imported goods no less favorably than it 
treats domestic like-products. The importing state, which is subject to the international 
trade regime, relinquishes part of its autonomy to treat imported goods. Other regimes 
produce similar effects. State parties to the core ILO conventions (or the ILO core labor 
regime) are restrained by the obligations imposed by this regime. They relinquished their 
regulatory authority to permit forced or compulsory labor in their territory; in fact, they 
are actually compelled to take positive actions to eliminate it. Likewise, if one thinks 
about international environmental law, the regime concerning the protection of the ozone 
layer, with its many revisions, prescribes legally binding obligations phasing out the use 
of halogenated hydrocarbons that have been shown to play a role in ozone depletion. The 
parties of that regime handed over, once more, their discretion to, for instance, permit the 
use of those types of substance.  
Overall, the authority of states to regulate and prescribe law is the property being 
restrained by those regimes. This is akin to asserting that regulatory jurisdiction is being 
restrained. The idea is actually broad: international law can prevent a state to regulate in a 
certain way or require a state to regulate in a certain way. 
In the end, the international law system can be understood as a multilevel system 
(horizontal and vertical) of allocation of regulatory jurisdiction.205 The terms horizontal 
and vertical allocations denote, respectively, allocation among states and allocation 
between international organizations (global or regional) and states.  
                                                 
205 See Joel P. Trachtman, The World Trading System, The International Legal System and 
Multilevel Choice, 12(4) EUR. L. J. 469 (2006). See also Trachtman, supra note 202, at 634-38 (providing 
three illustrations of ARJ problems in trade – not only concerning extraterritoriality). 
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Interestingly, if one thinks of regimes and international law as a mechanism of 
restraint, the idea that regulatory jurisdiction is being allocated may not be intuitively 
grasped. It seems that, one could argue, restraints are just “limitations” on power, not 
“allocations” of power. But one way to envision that allocation is occurring is to think 
that before states agreed to these regimes, states had discretion to exercise their 
regulatory authority at their will (without considering, at this point, limitations on this 
exercise coming from general international law). Once bound by regimes obligations, this 
authority is somewhat transferred (many times not totally, but partially). Another way to 
see that allocation occurs is by thinking that breaches of obligations would barely 
produce any effect on the violator before regimes existed. The violating state would not 
be held accountable and no enforcement mechanism existed to compel compliance 
(putting aside the issue of how much enforcement really exists in international law). 
When regimes are created, to different degrees, states may be held liable, exposed to 
criticism, and, depending on the regime at issue, subject to authorized countermeasures. 
Regimes, thus, perform allocation of authority. 
As Trachtman posits,  
it can be argued that all WTO cases are concerned with allocation or regulatory 
authority, just as all applications of international law are concerned with the 
questions of whether the respondent state retained or transferred authority to 
effect the measures at issue.206 
Finally, the broad set of norms and regimes governing the international system 
not only affect the formal allocation of authority, as Howse and Nicolaidis observe.207 
                                                 
206 Trachtman, supra note 202, at 633. 
207 Howse & Nicolaids, Democracy Without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics 
in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, 
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Ultimately, regimes affect how power is legitimized politically and how, and by whom, it 
is exercised. Under this reading, international law functions as guiding norms for political 
processes rather than institutional structures.208 Though consequences of that observation 
are not explored here in terms of political science doctrine (legitimacy, democratic 
deficit, etc.), this has been a growing issue raised in the literature. 
1. The ARJ function of General International Law 
In general, for international law, the point to note is that not only conventions, but 
also CIL, perform ARJ. Functionally speaking, the obligations created by CIL are meant 
to constrain and restrain regulatory jurisdiction, thus performing ARJ. 
Some confusion may be created because an open-ended question is which norms 
of international have attained CIL status.209 Although no precise response to this question 
is found in the literature, once a norm is characterized as CIL, it produces the legal effect 
(constraining and restraining) on the regulatory jurisdiction of states. 
2. The ARJ function of the WTO 
                                                                                                                                                 
SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 165 (Broude & Shany eds. 2008)(discussing these concepts in the context 
of European integration). 
208 Id. at 165. 
209 The traditional doctrine of CIL is that is made up of state practice and opinio juris. These two 
elements are respectively known as the objective and subjective elements of the definition. The first is 
about looking on actual practice and behavior of states. The second is the requirement that the particular 
norm is observed out of a sense of legal obligation. See Brownlie (2003), at 6-10. As Ochoa summarizes, 
the criticisms about this definition are classic and well-known: (i) it is a circular definition; (ii) the practice 
(objective) element brings up questions of how much time and widespread consistency is necessary to 
create CIL; (iii) in human rights, especially, a contradiction as to the formation of CIL is blatant: states, 
including regular violators of human rights, are monopoly holders of the formal authority to create CIL. See 
Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT. L. 119 (2007). See 
also her differentiation of the terms usage, practice, custom, international custom, customary law, and CIL. 
Id. 125-28. 
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Overall, WTO rules will perform some allocation. Obligations in international law 
can be grouped in rules of negative and positive obligations.210 
2.1. Negative Rules 
Let me begin with examples of negative rules: the NT clause (article I of the 
GATT) and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (article XI of the GATT).211 It is 
probably useful to think about the allocation function of these clauses by simply 
imagining a world where no NT and article XI exist.212 
Concerning the NT clause, the immediate consequence of its disappearance would 
give states unfettered discretion to treat imported goods the way they wanted. As odd as it 
may sound today, a domestic statute in state “A” prescribing that imported goods “P” 
coming from state “B” would be surcharged with a 100% tax as compared to the like 
domestic good, would not be legally objectionable in terms of public or international 
                                                 
210 While referring to classic authors of public international law (e.g. Kelsen), Pauwelyn 
distinguishes four functions of most norms of international law regarding states: 
(1) They impose an obligation on states to do something (positive, command); 
(2) They impose an obligation on states not to do something (negative, prohibition); 
(3) They grant a right to states not to do something (exemption) 
(4) They grant a right to states to do something (permission). 
On the basis of norms of types (1) and (2), other states derive rights. On the basis of norms of 
types (3) and (4), that is, those granting a right to states, other states derive obligations. See Pauwelyn, 
supra note 47, at 153-58. In addition, norms of international law may empower organs, institutions or 
individuals or regulate other norms (secondary norms, e.g. Hart). Id. See also Trachtman, supra note 205, at 
469-70 (suggesting that rules of positive integration impose obligations on states to regulate in a certain 
way – type “1” above, and rules of negative integration impose restraints, limitations on states regulatory 
power - type “2” above). 
211 Article XI of GATT targets, with a very broad prohibition, the use of instruments like quotas. 
Its relevant part states that: “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party . . . .”GATT, art. XI.1. There are exceptions in the clause itself, such as in sub-paragraph 
2 (export prohibitions to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other essential products), and along other 
parts of the agreement, such as Article XII (restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments). 
212 Maybe it would be better to say to imagine the world as it was before the World War II in 
terms of multilateral trade obligations. 
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trade law (surely, I am not considering whether the hypothetical state enacting such law 
could have already prevented such discrimination by means of constitutional or domestic 
law). A similar effect occurs when one “erases” article XI of the GATT. State “A” would 
be able to impose at the border a ban on imported goods “P” without further legal 
concerns of compliance with international law.  
The NT and article XI clauses come into play to curtail, at different moments 
(internally and at the border) the original regulatory autonomy of state “A.” Again, it is 
worth remembering that “restrained regulatory authority” equals “restrained regulatory 
jurisdiction.” In addition, restrained regulatory jurisdiction means that allocation of 
regulatory jurisdiction occurred. Originally, states had unrestricted discretion in relation 
to national treatment and quantitative restrictions. Now, governments have this power 
restrained, giving it away to the WTO regime (or, as one can envision, giving it away to 
the international system because of the reciprocal restrained behavior expected from 
other members).213  
                                                 
213 Though I above exemplified ARJ in the context of negative rules of trade in goods, trade in 
services bears similar analogies. In the area of educational services, for instance, this author researched the 
restraining effects of the GATS in relation to the Brazilian educational regulatory framework. Some of the 
alleged restraining effects of GATS referred to the impact on the ability of states to keep a publicly funded 
system only to national institutions in the light of foreign educational providers, since the GATS contains a 
national treatment obligation. However, in that context, because of particularities of the GATS, I concluded 
that the restraining effects were less worrisome. In that work, I did not explicitly used the ARJ terminology, 
but regulatory space concepts. See Gustavo F. Ribeiro, Please Enlighten Me: What Does the World Trade 
Organization Have to Do with the Liberalization of Higher Education? (Jan. 15, 2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096589 (“[o]ne government can conclude that (i) no level of liberalization is 
desirable for its higher education; or (ii) that a certain degree of liberalization can produce benefits; or (iii) 
that total liberalization can bolster one's higher education system. In each of these cases, the GATS 
accommodates the respective stands. This postulation does not mean that the legal flexibility of the 
Agreement is the only main factor to inform the debate. It only conveys that this flexibility exists. It also 
opens the space for other inputs from the education community about long-term concerns of the potential 
liberalization of higher education through positive GATS commitments.”). In the context of health services, 
see Lawrence O. Gastin & David P. Fidler, Biosecurity under the Rule of Law, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 
437, 453 (2006-2007) (acknowledging the difficult task of equitable distribution of authority and resources 
among nations. One of the reasons for such difficulty is the “abiding interest” of developed states to 
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2.2 Positive Rules 
Recall that positive rules are associated with the idea of constraining states to 
regulate in a certain way. The most obvious example in the context of the WTO is 
perhaps the TRIPS agreement. 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) became covered by international trade with the 
inclusion of the TRIPS during the Uruguay Round.214 The TRIPS creates minimum levels 
of protection that governments have to confer to IPR.215 Many of the members did not 
have those internal regulations before or provided less protective terms of IPR in their 
legislations. 
In the case of patents, for instance, the TRIPS demands that members make 
patents available for any inventions in all fields of technology.216 Moreover, the TRIPS 
requires member to protect IPR held by non-nationals, by means of a national treatment 
clause. It can be said that the TRIPS Agreement obligates, mandates, or compels 
members to adopt laws that conform to the international treaties on copyright, patents, 
and trademarks, and to enforce these laws to the same extent in relation to protection of 
foreigners.217  
                                                                                                                                                 
continue their economic vitality through free trade and investments agreements. On the other hand access 
of the poor and vulnerable to essential medicines is the concern put by developing countries). 
214 The GATT 1947 did not deal at all with IPRs. 
215 Including the enactment of legislation on copyrights and related rights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layouts-designs of integrated circuits, and protection 
of undisclosed information. 
216 Provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. 
See TRIPS art. 27.1. The term of protection is of at least twenty years. See TRIPS art. 33. 
217 The TRIPS provides differential timeframes of legislation implementation, with more 
flexibility for developing and LDCs. See TRIPS arts. 65-67. 
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This is again another way to see how the TRIPS constrains regulatory jurisdiction; 
consequently, the discretionary power of states to regulate are affected. By adopting 
minimum levels of IPR protection, the TRIPS allocates regulatory jurisdiction in a very 
specific way. Furthermore, it harmonizes minimum levels of IPR among the WTO 
members.  
The important thing at this point is to perceive the ARJ function of the covered 
agreements. Either by negative or positive obligations, the WTO is performing ARJ.  
3. The ARJ function of Human Rights Regimes 
The types of existing obligations in human rights regimes can also be understood 
as performing ARJ. To the same extent that the obligations, positive and negative, of the 
WTO regime can be thought of in terms of ARJ, the types of state obligations arising 
from human rights regimes can be understood as ARJ devices.218  
Some specific examples may prove useful. Let me begin with the right to vote 
found in ICCPR.219 The ‘obligation to respect’ derived from the right to vote means that 
states must abstain from interfering with this right. This corresponds to the idea that the 
regulatory autonomy of states to, for instance, prohibit voting cannot be exercised. The 
‘obligation to protect’ means that states will have to protect individuals from other 
individuals from interfering in this process. Moreover, the right to vote requires states to 
provide, or fulfill, the essential “machinery” to the realization of a fair electoral process. 
                                                 
218 At this point, I am just trying to show that these regimes contain the same ARJ functionality as 
the WTO regime. 
219 ICCPR art. 25. 
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This again is similar to the idea of a positive obligation by which states have to adopt 
legislation. 
The wording of those obligations does not always translate into specific 
obligations. Consider, for instance, the right to food, housing and health care found in the 
global regime.220 The parties to the ICESCR have the obligation to respect, protect, and 
fulfill this right. But the ICESCR prescribes that the parties “undertake[] to take steps . . . 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively . . . 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”221 In this sense, the type of 
legislation that should be enacted by states is not precisely specified.222 In spite of that, 
the regulatory jurisdiction of states is being constrained by the ICESCR norms, though 
with less precision. 
It would be less useful to repeat the idea that restraints and constraints are 
fundamentally ways to articulate that allocation of regulatory authority and ARJ is 
occurring. States are obliged to enact or apply law (through the enactment of domestic 
legislation, executive action, or judicial implementation) in accordance with the ARJ 
created by the regime. The next section analyzes the types of ARJ in terms of TCs. 
IV. STRATEGIES OF ARJ 
As already mentioned, ARJ is a function of TCs in the adopted L&E model. What 
does that exactly mean? The correlation is explained again by Trachtman. His point is to 
                                                 
220 ICESCR art. 11. 
221 ICESCR art. 2(1)(emphasis added). 
222 Domestic law implementing food stamps programmes, food subsidies, among others, can all 
serve to fulfill the obligation, and there is much discretion left to states on that task. 
94 
 
focus on the kind of TCs and circumstances involved in the adoption of a certain ARJ. 
Then, one could assess the extent to which certain allocations or transactions may result 
in greater efficiency.223 An efficient allocation would be an allocation in which authority 
is allocated to those who would derive the most value from the allocation at the lowest 
TC.224  
A. STRATEGIES OF ARJ 
In 2002, Trachtman elaborated on three strategies of ARJ that would achieve the 
goal of efficient allocation. They are as follows: 
 Strategy Name Initial TC Subsequent TC 
(1) Anticipating Transactions L H 
(2) Clear Allocation H L 
(3) Muddy/Organizational Allocation H H 
Table 7 – Three Types of Allocations225 
The table could actually be reproduced as having an extra column and an extra 
row. An extra column because Trachtman’s assertion goes to the point of suggesting what 
type of rule (territorial, effects etc…) is the prescribed efficient outcome of an 
                                                 
223 Issues of efficiency and equity may arise in this type of discussion. They have specific 
meanings. In economics, for instance, efficiency means the relationship between aggregated benefits and 
costs of a situation while equity refers to the distribution of income among individuals. As Polinsky 
simplifies, “efficiency corresponds to the ‘size of the pie,’ while equity has to do with how it is sliced.” 
Polinsky, supra note 186, at 7. 
224 Trachtman, supra note 202, at 645. The question of using efficiency or equity in allocation of 
rights appeared early on in the Calabresi and Melamed’s paper. The authors points out that when deciding 
on an initial allocation of entitlements, three reasons to substantiate the decision come up: (i) economic 
efficiency, (ii) distributional preferences, and (iii) other justice considerations. While economic efficiency 
corresponds to the bare notion of minimizing cost, they suggest that distributional goals involve situations 
in which a society wishes to maximize the chances that individuals will have at least a minimum 
endowment of particular goods – e.g., education, clothes or bodily integrity. Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 193, at 1100. They notice, however, that it is hard to know what content can be poured into that term 
[justice considerations], at least given the very broad definitions of economic efficiency and distributional 
goals that we have used. Is there, in other words, a reason which would influence a society's choice of 
initial entitlements that cannot be comprehended in terms of efficiency and distribution? Id. 
225 Joel Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . .”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 
83-84 (2002). See also, Trachtman, supra note 197, at 33. 
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allocation.226 An extra row because, in a later paper, Trachtman splits the third strategy 
into two distinguishable (but intertwined) strategies: “muddy or solomonic entitlements” 
and “organization solutions.”227 The split in a new form of strategy conveys the idea that 
an “organizational solution” is a distinguishable strategy itself, to the extent that a kind of 
shared ownership (such as the WTO or any other form of international cooperation) with 
a governance mechanism is now part of the allocation process. Thus, Trachtman’s final 
elaboration of ARJ strategies is depicted as follows: 
 Strategy 
Name 
Initial 
TC 
Subsequent 
TC 
(1) Anticipate 
Transactions 
L H 
(2) Clear 
Entitlements 
H L 
(3) Muddy or 
Solomonic 
Entitlements 
H H 
(4) Organizational 
Solutions 
H H 
Table 8 – Four Types of Allocations228 
Translated to the WTO context, for instance, Trachtman exemplifies the types of 
TCs in which a particular strategy of ARJ might best achieve the goal of efficient 
allocation. The allocation is given to those most greatly affected at the lowest transaction 
cost. The WTO anticipates transactions because it leaves authority over areas considered 
to be “sovereign” of states, presumably leaving authority in the hands of those who value 
it most. A clear entitlement, on the other hand, takes place when the WTO minimizes 
TCs by providing clear and complete property rights that are agreed to be transferrable. 
                                                 
226 See Trachtman, supra note 225, at 83, 84. I do not consider this point here and this is why I do 
not expand the column table.  
227 See Trachtman, supra note 202, at 645-46. 
228 Id. 
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For instance, every member has the right to set their schedule of tariffs, but the WTO 
creates a structure by which theses tariffs are negotiated and normally reduced.229 A 
muddy, or solomonic entitlement, corresponds to open questions such as whether states 
have the authority to block imports of goods based on the way that they are produced.230 
Finally, the WTO itself would represent an organizational solution to certain cooperation 
problems.  
The existence of different strategies of allocation as a function of variables has 
been also noted by Goldsmith and Posner. They explain that the elements of GATT/WTO 
that have flourished generally solve coordination problems. They use this assessment, 
however, to bring up a criticism about the fragility of international law: “when states are 
coordinating policies but do not know what the future will bring . . . they will not agree to 
specific rules;”231 and that “GATT/WTO rules are vague because states will not agree to 
anything more.”232 Arguably, what the authors call “coordination” would match strategies 
of anticipation or clear entitlements, whereas “agree not to agree” would go with a 
muddy or organizational entitlement. 
B. TRANSACTION COSTS (TCS) 
                                                 
229 See GATT art. II. See also sub-paragraph 7: “The Schedules annexed to this Agreement 
[negotiations of tariffs] are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement.” 
230 “Solomonic” solution here is an allusion to the biblical episode (Kings 3:16-28) about the 
quarrel of two women arguing as being the mother of a baby. When the contention was brought to King 
Solomon, Solomon threatened to cut the baby in half in order to reveal who was the true mother. The idea 
must be transposed to the international context to the extent that a muddy or solomonic solution may lead 
states to the negotiating table by causing them to reveal to one another their valuations of a certain 
allocation. See Trachtman, supra note 225, at 83-4. 
231 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Oxford 
2005). 
232 Id. at 161-62. 
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Another relevant concept in this methodology relates to the role of transactions 
costs (TC) influencing ARJ. Generally, TCs are defined as “costs other than the money 
price that are incurred in trading goods or services [the transactions].”233 The definition 
has to be understood in light of the adopted methodology. Recall that the transactions in 
my case are transactions in regulatory jurisdiction, not “goods or services.”  
Generally, in L&E, TCs are captured in terms of information costs, bargaining 
costs, decision costs, and enforcement costs.234 These costs also manifest in the 
international setting involving ARJ. As Trachtman recalls, the world is beset by TCs.235 
For instance, imagine the negotiation of a treaty and thus the creation of a new 
ARJ. States may underestimate the number of interested parties in the transaction 
(information costs); states may convene in diplomatic meetings or conferences that have 
costs (bargaining costs in forms of currency disbursements); there are costs originating 
from the ARJ itself since this means more or less power, and costs can attach to the 
enforcement of the transaction itself (enforcement/monitoring costs). 
                                                 
233 PAUL M. JOHNSON, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY TERMS (2005), online edition, 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/transaction_costs. 
234 Id (exemplifying costs in typical trading contexts. For a transaction to occur, there are a number 
of activities involving opportunity costs in terms of time, energy and money. If the transaction is 
technically complicated, negotiations for such a detailed contract may itself be prolonged and very costly in 
terms of time, travel expenses, lawyers' fees, and so on. After a trade has been agreed upon, there may also 
be significant costs involved in monitoring or policing the other party to make sure he is honoring the terms 
of the agreement). See also Polinsky, supra note 186, at 14 (illustrating TCs: costs of identifying the parties 
related to the transaction, costs of getting together, the costs of bargaining process, and the costs of 
enforcing the bargain itself). TCs are also generally categorized in “search and information costs,” 
“bargaining and contracting costs,” and “policing and enforcement costs.” 
235 Trachtman, supra note 197, at 24 (recognizing that because of those TCs, the Coase theorem - 
in a zero transaction cost world, allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction would have no effect on efficiency, 
although it would have distributive consequences – does not apply to the problem.) For the Coase theorem, 
see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For a summary, see Robert D. 
Cooter, The Coase Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 457 (1987). See also 
R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 4-5 (1990). 
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In addition, recall that the concerned issue, by definition, is “extraterritorial” ARJ 
and two regimes with different subject matters are involved (trade and human rights). It 
seems plausible to anticipate that any transaction of this sort will be inherently costly. 
The challenge, however, is to capture the nuances of these TCs and how they can be 
observed. 
V. HIGHLIGHTED TRANSACTION COSTS (TCS) 
There are two categories of TCs that I propose as leading ones to inform my 
analysis: (1) sovereignty costs; and (2) cognitive costs. Sovereignty costs are prominent 
in the type of ARJ involved in the extraterritorial jurisdiction. Cognitive costs attach to 
these transactions because of the different policy domains involved (trade and human 
rights regimes). 
A. SOVEREIGNTY COSTS 
 Sovereignty has a plurality of meanings and it is an evolving concept.236 A 
common articulation of the concept refers the exercise of power over a defined territory. 
                                                 
236 Krasner’s typology of four types of sovereignty translates accurate observations in terms of the 
existence of different types of sovereignty. See STEVEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED 
HYPOCRISY (1999). The Institute of International Studies of the University of California, Berkeley has 
made available an interview with Krasner exploring in detail the contents of the book. See Institute of 
International Studies, UC Berkeley, Conversation with History: System Change or More of the Same 
(2007), http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Krasner/krasner-con3.html. Krasner identifies: (1) 
international legal sovereignty, which is about rules to recognize an independent territorial entity; (2) 
interdependence sovereignty, which is the idea associated with globalization eroding sovereignty (the 
notion that states are losing their ability to control movements across their own borders). As Krasner 
explains, this definition is not a rule, it’s just a statement about empirical fact; (3) domestic sovereignty, 
which is the standard definition, refers to both domestic authority structures and how effective they are; and 
(4) Westphalian sovereignty, which refers to the notion that states have the right to autonomously 
determine their own domestic authority structures. Krasner claims that the four notions of sovereignty need 
not be connected. For instance, “Somalia today, it doesn’t have effective domestic sovereignty. It does have 
international legal sovereignty. It doesn’t have interdependence sovereignty. It doesn’t control much. But it 
actually has Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty, because people aren't bothering with it anymore.” The 
members of the European Union, in turn, are no longer a Westphalian or Vattelian-Westphalian sovereigns. 
They have voluntarily agreed to subject themselves to supranational institutions like the European Court 
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Michael Kelly tracks the historic definition of sovereignty in Bodin, explaining that, as 
embedded in the abstract political concept known as “state,” the end of the Thirty Years 
War changed the medieval notions of sovereignty derived from religious authority: 
[the end of the Thirty years War leading to] Westphalia created the political 
equilibrium that was “a necessary condition for the existence of the Law of 
Nations . . . Westphalia began the process of pulling the concept of sovereignty 
out of the person of the ruler . . . after Westphalia, a generalized “sovereignty 
package” can be said to have emerged, that each state enjoyed and which 
operated to form an interconnecting network of collectively shared expectations 
and presumptions.237  
The notion has been challenged throughout history.238 The Colonialism period, 
the League of Nations schemes of guardianship, the post-colonialism era, the 
establishment of the United Nations system, post Cold-War questions of humanitarian 
intervention, and, more recently, threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
have all been episodes prompting new theories of sovereignty.  
The question turns out to be: how the fluid concept of sovereignty can be thought 
of as TCs? As Kenneth Abbott explains, the term sovereignty costs is actually not new:  
sovereignty costs may arise for psychological or symbolic reasons, or they may 
have a material basis where supranational decisions could be detrimental to 
national interests . . . but thinking of limitations on sovereignty as a cost leads us 
to focus on situations in which the costs may vary, suggesting at least a partial 
                                                                                                                                                 
and to what they call “pooled sovereignty,” which is qualified majority voting. Krasner employs Vattelian-
Westphalian because he claims that the notion of nonintervention was actually developed by Emmerich de 
Vattel, a Swiss jurist. 
237 Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”― 
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOR. AFF. 361, 373-74 (2005)(suggesting, as well, that after Westphalia, a generalized “sovereignty 
package” can be said to have emerged. Each state enjoyed and operated to form an interconnecting network 
of collectively shared expectations and presumptions, where the notion of sovereignty included: equality of 
states within the international community; general prohibition on foreign interference with internal affairs; 
territorial integrity of the nation-state; inviolability of international borders; sovereign immunity of the state 
engaged in state action; and sovereign immunity of the head of state or government. Id. at 375-76. 
238 Though, as demonstrated in the first chapter, in terms of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction 
the concept seems to be well preserved. 
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explanation for the varieties of legalization [wide range of normative and 
institutional arrangements].239 
To focus on situations in which the costs may vary is precisely the distinction that 
I want to advance in this section. Arguably, transactions on extraterritorial jurisdiction 
carry, in a scale of sovereignty costs, higher costs.240 This is because the affected state 
(e.g., the exporter) is abdicating part of his regulatory authority to another state that can 
be interpreted as intervention in the internal affairs of another country. 
Most of the substantive norms of international law impose sovereignty costs on 
states. But states do transact regulatory jurisdiction by accepting constraints and restraints 
in their regulatory jurisdiction. This is observable in the trade and the human rights 
regimes (though the motivations to ratify these categories of conventions are probably 
different).241  
                                                 
239 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Many Faces of International Legalization, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 57, 62 (1998)(emphasis added). Abbott suggests two initial variables affecting sovereignty costs: (1) 
the subject issue and (2) – what I would call – the leverage of the concerned state involved. As to the 
subject issue, costs of sovereignty “are especially high in areas affecting national security . . ., moderate in 
areas such as economics and environmental protection, and low in technical areas where national interests 
of participating states are closely aligned.” As to the leverage of the concerned state, “[s]mall states would 
seem to have low sovereignty costs on average, since they already have less autonomy than large states . . . 
Large states would seem to have less need for legalization, though in fact they might seek it as an efficient 
way to structure governance where they can dictate the rules and exert political control over their 
implementation.” Laurence Helfer also makes use of sovereignty costs in the context of human rights. 
Helfer indicates that “[t]he substantive provisions of these treaties create sovereignty costs for their member 
states by restricting how they treat individuals and groups located in territories subject to their jurisdiction. 
See Laurence Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 86 (2008). 
240 I employ the notion of “scale of sovereignty” from private international law analysis. As 
Camara explains, “States’ settings of private international law can be placed along a scale of sovereignty 
stretching from complete abdication of adjudicative functions (an abandonment of any claim to the right to 
set the rules, regardless of whether state ends would thereby be advanced) to a complete assumption of 
legislative functions (a claim to the right to set the rules under all circumstances).” See K. A. D. Camara, 
Costs of Sovereignty, 107 WEST VA. L. REV. 385, 412 (2005). 
241 Joining the WTO means a trade-off between sovereignty (cost) and the formal enjoyment of 
guarantees of non-discriminatory trade imposed on all members (benefit). As to the motivations to join the 
human rights regimes, see Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in 4 
COLLECTED COURSES OF HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 208 (Hague Academy ed., 
1989)(asserting that even the human rights literature questions whether international human rights actions 
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It is a different thing, however, that states will accept that other states may 
directly and unilaterally interfere in one state’s regulatory jurisdiction. Voluntarily 
accepting such a transaction would be, perhaps, equivalent to accept, ex-ante, that one 
government is prone not to accomplish its own obligations. Therefore, extraterritorial 
transactions are said not to have a very “liquid market” per se and it is quite an 
extraordinary situation when states agree on matters of extraterritorial jurisdiction.242 
Heightened TCs, in form of sovereignty costs, inform these transactions. In other words, 
the extraterritorial nature of these allocations escalates concerns over sovereignty and 
undue intervention in internal affairs, making this type of allocation costly, and therefore, 
exceptional. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
were truly sensitized by altruistic human rights motivations. As noted by Henkin, one can see that the 
human rights idea of protection of foreigners abroad has a good deal to do with powerful states’ interests in 
protecting their “assets” abroad; the establishment of the ILO, grounded on the protection of international 
human right in labor, could be read as capitalism’s attempt to bar socialism.). Another interesting analysis, 
not concerning contemporary regimes but the abolition of slavery, is explored by Martinez. See Jenny S. 
Martinez, Anti-Slavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550 
(2008)(contending that the slavery abolition story can be seen through different lenses: realists and neo–
realists tend to focus on the material self-interest of Britain; institutionalism will likely see the treaties and 
the court system to abolishment as an utility-maximizing mechanisms for cooperation; constructivist would 
see in the way in which states interests were constructed and reconstructed by their interaction. She 
concludes that each of these theories have some truth.) 
242 And as components of power, Trachtman points out that, unsurprisingly, this market is not very 
“liquid.” See Trachtman, supra note 197, at 11-12. I understand that Trachtman is referring here to 
international law that specifically addresses jurisdiction to prescribe as the core element of the transaction. 
The concept of liquidity generally means how easy it is to buy and sell something. And this lack of 
liquidity on treaties with extraterritorial application is also noted by Bianchi. See commentaries from 
Andrea Bianchi in Harold G. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law in 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (Meessen ed. 1996)(criticizing the 
contention advanced by several authors that resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction should be pursued by 
means of international agreements. Maier recalls that “practice shows that is quite extraordinary that states 
reach agreement on the matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction.” But he also recognizes that international 
agreement may usefully serve to attract disputes into institutionalized mechanisms of dispute settlement 
agreed on by that treaty). 
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 B. COGNITIVE COSTS 
Generally, the very idea of regimes expresses distinguishable domains of 
knowledge, or of discrete communities with particular beliefs and lexicons.243 Keohane 
and Nye employ the term “club model” to describe the institutional origin of these 
distinct domains of regimes:  
[i]nternational institutions have facilitated cooperation by reducing the costs of 
making agreements, through established rules and practices, and by providing 
information, particularly about the extent to which governments were following 
these rules. Beginning with the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, key regimes 
for governance operated like “clubs.” Cabinet ministers or the equivalent, 
working in the same issue-area, initially from a relatively small number of 
relatively rich countries, got together to make rules. Trade ministers dominated 
GATT; finance ministers ran the IMF; defense and foreign ministers met at 
NATO; central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).244 
Consequently, these international regimes organized and developed themselves in 
terms of issue-areas, cluster-areas, operating without close links to other regimes in other 
issue-areas.245 They are sparsely connected, but not without costs. 
                                                 
243 Ruggie’s comparison of regimes and languages are indicative of this idea. For Ruggie, like any 
social institution, international regimes limit the discretion of their constituents units to decide and act on 
issue that fall within the regime’s domain. Regimes are akin to language and have their own generative 
grammar. John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 195, 196 (Stephen Krasner ed. 1983). 
244 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and 
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy (John Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper n. 4, 2001), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/visions/publication/keohane_nye.pdf. 
245 Surely, this is a generalization. Regimes are sparsely interconnected in different degrees. The 
case of the intellectual property regime is symptomatic. The WTO regime embraced the intellectual 
property regime through the TRIPS. And even a regional human rights regime (such as in Europe) has been 
faced with the protection of intellectual property under the human rights banner. As to the case of 
intellectual property, as Alvarez posits, “from one perspective, intellectual property protections were 
successfully linked to the trade regime because the United States and its allies refused to budge on their 
position that Uruguay Round agreements had to be accepted in their totality and that there could be no à la 
carte shopping as between trade agreements, which had occurred at the Tokyo Round. From a more 
practical standpoint, this effort at linkage worked because there was a draft TRIPS Agreement on the table, 
drawn up by an expert group, as the final package deal was being struck; the GATT Secretariat was able to 
use this draft to craft a composite text that was ultimately incorporated into the version offered by the 
GATT’s director-general as part of a final compromise (the “Dunkel Draft”). But the success of intellectual 
property linkage might be attributed to credible hegemonic threats: principally U.S. threats to initiate 
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Drawing from organizational theory, Lang explains that the current integration of 
these different domains of knowledge is potentially barred, among other things, by the 
cognitive and epistemological frameworks that can be deeply embedded and highly 
resistant to change.246 Sarfaty indicates similar patterns of obstacles that functionally-
oriented regimes create. Using an anthropological approach in a case study concerning 
the internalization of indigenous human rights in the World Bank policies, Sarfaty 
highlights how internal factors of an organization (such as powers relations within the 
institution, lack of technical expertise, and disciplinary departmentalization) are relevant 
factors affecting the circumstances of internalization of one regime in another.247 Finally, 
Haas, a “cognitive theorist,” draws from many disciplines to show that 
the combination of prior belief systems, operational codes, and cognitive maps 
shapes decision makers responses not only by influencing the ways in which they 
interpret the world but also by erecting barriers to the types of information that 
they consider valuable.248 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Special 301.” See Jose E. Alvarez, WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146-48 (2002). See 
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 73049 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). In this case, an American company 
(Anheuser-Busch) disputed with a Czech company the right to distribute beer under the brand of 
“Budweiser” and other variations. The case was adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). As Helfer posits, “one might reasonably ask what an international human rights court and the 
human rights treaty it interprets has to do with intellectual property. The answer is the right of property, 
which appears in the European Convention together with more widely recognized civil and political 
liberties such as the prohibitions of slavery and torture, due process rights, and freedom of expression. Yet 
the protection of “the peaceful enjoyment of . . . possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol 1 (Article “1”) has 
long been considered among the weakest rights in the Convention system, affording governments broad 
discretion to regulate private property in the public interest.” See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation 
Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49(1) HARV. INT’L L.J. (2008). 
246 Lang draws from organizational theory (Bo Hedberg’s work). See Lang, supra note 3, at 402, 
405. 
247 Galit A. Sarfaty, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms, 114 
YALE L. J. 1791, 1794, 1804 (2008). 
248 See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46(1) INT’L ORG. 1, 29 (1992). The term “cognitive theorist” is employed by Kenneth 
Abbott to indicate Ernst Haas as a leading “cognitive” theorist. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern 
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, n19 339 
(1989). It should be noted that Haas is credited elsewhere in the literature for the introduction of the role of 
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In addition to the above points, my research experience at the WTO suggested the 
existence of cognitive costs since, generally speaking, when WTO officers asked me 
about my dissertation topic, and I mentioned the words “human rights” as part of it, 
immediate barriers of communication were erected. This may be a generalization but 
seems to be also revealing of this particular type of TCs. 
Therefore, what I want to capture by cognitive costs refers to the obstacles 
identified above that seems to be created by the very specialization of regimes and the 
formation of cognitive communities.249 Though I have not found this particular source of 
                                                                                                                                                 
“epistemic communities” in international politics. Epistemic communities is “a network of professionals 
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area defined as are one possible provider of this sort of 
information and advice.” As demands for their specialized information arise, “networks or communities of 
specialists capable of producing and providing the information emerge and proliferate. The members of a 
prevailing community become strong actors at the national and transnational level as decision makers 
solicit their information and delegate responsibility to them. A community's advice, though, is informed by 
its own broader worldview. To the extent to which an epistemic community consolidates bureaucratic 
power within national administrations and international secretariats, it stands to institutionalize its influence 
and insinuate its views into broader international politics.” Id. at 3. See also Emanuel Adler & Peter M. 
Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research 
Program, 46(1) INT’L ORG. 367 (1992). 
249 Cognitive means “relating to, being, or involving cognition” and cognition is broadly defined 
as “the act or process of knowing.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 446 (1981). I guess I should 
distinguish the quality of being “cognitive” from two other terms that may cause some confusion: (1) 
cognizable; and (2) cognoscibility. The first one is used in the legal jargon in a very specific sense: for 
instance, to be capable of being known or recognized for purposes of establishing standing, a plaintiff must 
allege a judicially cognizable injury; American Indians qualify as a cognizable group for jury selection 
purposes because they are capable of being identified as a group with common characteristic or interest that 
cannot be represented by others; yet, to be cognizable means to be capable of being judicially tried or 
examined before a designated tribunal. Black’s Law Dictionary, at 276. The concept of cognoscibility, in 
turn, can be traced in Bentham in the context that the law should be capable of being understandable by 
people (it should be understood by everyone: “popular cognoscibility”). For those interested in that 
terminology, as one commentator affirms, the “Benthamite principle of achieving popular ‘cognoscibility’ 
disappeared. Not knowing the law is not an excuse to comply with it. See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of 
the Criminal Law: Wechslers Predecessors 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1126 (1978). Bentham’s notion of 
cognoscibility was also directly related with his insistence upon the necessity of codification of law, since 
judge made law was “dog-law.” See Dean Jr. Alfange, Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55, 65 
CORNELL L. REV. 55 (1969-1970). 
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cost expressed as “cognitive cost” under the legal or international relations literature, my 
case studies will try to disclose that these costs exist.  
Finally, it may be helpful to highlight other aspects related to cognitive costs. It 
appears that cognitive costs are a category of information costs. The latter is a more 
common usage of the “costs” language associated with searching, deciphering, and 
interpreting information. However, cognitive costs also transmit the idea that they are 
generated by this peculiar specialization of regimes in cognitive frameworks, making 
them somewhat different from purely information costs. 
This is a certain paradox because regimes are essentially a form of reducing 
information costs. This is an elementary aspect of institutionalism theory: 
[t]he value of regimes is the ability to reduce the uncertainty and transaction 
costs that inhibit effective cooperation. Once up and running, regimes narrow the 
range of anticipated behavior, thus encouraging compliance with common norms. 
In economic terms, once a regime has been established, the marginal costs of 
dealing with each additional issue will be lower that it would be without a 
regime.250  
Now, with the main aspects of the L&E approach devised, the next section 
explores some limitations of this framework. Mitigation factors are also presented. 
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE ADOPTED FRAMEWORK 
A. STATE-CENTRIC MODEL  
A potential critique to the L&E methodology is that it focuses on a classic model 
of international law: state and regulatory jurisdiction. One could ask where I take into 
                                                 
250 This passage is about Keohane making use of the transaction costs language, and the new 
institutional economics of Douglas North, as a rationale for cooperation. See Benjamin J. Cohen, 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 105 (2008). 
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account the increasing participation of non-state actors in international law, such as 
global initiatives dealing with the trade and human rights linkage.  
This point deserves at least two remarks. First, the analysis that I make about the 
state-centric model serves to reveal the heightened sovereignty and cognitive costs of that 
model. New global initiatives can be explained as not incurring the TCs identified in the 
public international law system. That is to say, the type of accountability that human 
rights actors are looking for in the trade and human rights linkage is finding expressions 
outside of that model because of lower sovereignty and cognitive costs. The same 
methodology that I employ to explain why trade sanctions are not supported by a 
palatable doctrine serves to explain why TNG initiatives are gaining ground, as Chapter 4 
will explore.  
 Second, non-state actors are undoubtedly participants of international law: in 
certain regimes, individuals are subjects of international law and they are granted rights, 
and sometimes locus standi to seek redress in international courts. Similarly, NGOs are 
granted different degrees of participation in government decision-making processes and 
courts (for instance, through amicus curiae). In addition, corporations are also core 
participants: their interests at the WTO have already led to the characterization of the 
WTO as a producer-driven organization, rather than a member-driven organization. 
Nonetheless, these participations are not sufficient to declare that non-state actors are, at 
the current state of affairs, “makers” of international law (in either treaty-making, CIL or 
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international courts).251 Accordingly, even though the participation of non-state actors is 
greatly acknowledged elsewhere in the process of making of international law, it does not 
follow that they are not technically “makers” of international law. Thus, the criticism 
does not invalidate the state-centric model adopted here. 
B. CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW V. NON-COMPLIANCE 
I assume that a fundamental function of international law is the performance of 
ARJ by restraining and constraining authority. But as one knows, in practice, compliance 
with the obligations established by those allocations does not always happen. 
Lawyers call it a breach, a violation of international law. International relations 
analysts often describe it as defection. Indeed, to assume that regimes allocate regulatory 
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that compliance occurs. Realism points to 
countless non-compliance situations.  
For me, this is equivalent to acknowledge that regimes suffer deviations of 
compliance just as as domestic law “regimes” does, but this does not surprise people 
most of the time. The discussion is classic and has been iconized very early by Henkin: 
“almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time.”252  
The point to make, though, is that non-compliance does not destroy the 
assumption that international law is a device of ARJ. The formation of a certain ARJ in 
terms of TCs and non-compliance with a certain ARJ are two different aspects of ARJ. 
                                                 
251 But see Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT. L. 
119, 182-84 (2007)(discussing, among other things, the potentiality of individuals as “makers” of 
international law). 
252 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 42 (1968). See also Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law? 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997). 
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Repeated non-compliance or recurrent defection can lead to new forms of allocation (or 
new international law). Yet, a theory would have to be established to understand the 
process of formation and modification of international law because of repeated non-
compliance. This is not explored here. 
VII. CASE STUDIES USING THE ARJ AND TCS METHODOLOGY 
 At this point, the ARJ and TCs framework have been delineated and entirely 
introduced. The following case studies concern the application of the framework: (i) the 
powers of the UN-SC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (ii) the WTO Diamond 
Waiver; and (iii) the trade-labor linkage discussion.  
A. UN-SC POWERS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 
In the first chapter, through legal analysis, I noted that the UN-SC powers under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was one of the few examples in which restrictive trade 
measures addressing human rights violations abroad was clearly a lawful entitlement. The 
first case study serves, therefore, to explain why this happens in terms of sovereignty 
costs. The case does not discuss cognitive costs since, arguably, that allocation does not 
involve potential cognitive costs arising from distinct policy domains or communities, 
(i.e., trade and human rights).  
The question deserving attention is why states agreed and transacted such an 
allocation in the case of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, since heightened sovereignty 
costs are presumably involved in any extraterritorial ARJ? 
The most obvious reason is that the ARJ contained in Chapter VII was transacted 
after World War II. Obstructing sovereignty costs were probably off-set in the very 
peculiar moment of the history by a combination of factors: meeting of the minds, since 
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the early 1940s, against the common enemy of Nazism; idealism towards the preservation 
of peace and the avoidance of the catastrophic events of the war; the possibilities of using 
the UN as a central instrument of foreign policy (by the WWII winners), among others. 
For instance, Thomas Franck highlights the strength of the wartime cooperation among 
allied powers in the following manner:  
The drafters of the Charter - those same allied powers - decided, in their planning 
for a new global system, not even to try to define what might constitute a “threat 
to, or breach of the peace” or act of aggression. Instead, they assumed that this 
could be left safely to future case-by-case interpretations by a willing and able 
Council.253 
In sum, the elaboration of Chapter VII does not disprove the idea of high TCs in 
extraterritorial ARJ. Rather, it corresponds to a very peculiar allocation in a time when 
these costs were lowered following such catastrophic events. 
Certainly, another piece of evidence for the high cost profile of the Chapter VII 
allocation is the innumerable reform proposals to change the UN-SC composition; i.e., to 
change or enlarge the permanent member composition or to alter the veto power today.254 
Yet, a question may arise: isn’t Chapter VII, instead of a clear entitlement, a 
muddy/organizational type of ARJ, since any action depends on the deliberation of the 
permanent members of the UN-SC? Arguably, the entitlement is clear to the extent that 
the law is precise. If the UN-SC authorizes action, states have the duty to act 
                                                 
253 Thomas Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security 
Council Authorization? 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 50, 51 (2001). The literature on the Security Council is 
huge (a point of departure for this literature is the link of UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/scbib.htm). For the historic context (the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the 
Yalta Conference, and the San Francisco Conference), see ANDREW BOYD, FIFTEEN MEN ON POWDER KEG: 
A HISTORY OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (1971). For an interesting discussion about the reforms of the 
Council, see David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 552 (1993). 
254 This point would deserve, as well, voluminous references to literature. But as this matter is not 
central to the dissertation, I do not develop it here. 
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extraterritoriality in accordance with the respective resolution. What is left to the UN-SC 
is not to define the possibility (or not) of an extraterritorial action, but to decide ex post 
the terms of, for instance, extraterritorial economic embargo, like the time, place, and 
means. The UN-SC has only to trigger the application of an existing rule and ARJ. 
B. DIAMOND WAIVER 
The second case study demonstrates that the WTO Diamond Waiver is not 
counterfactual in proving that it is an allocation that has overcome sovereignty and 
cognitive costs (though the waiver allows members to deviate from WTO obligations 
because of extraterritorial human rights violations). 
The complexity entailing “blood” diamonds and the waiver is enormous. For my 
purpose, it is sufficient to mention that in the 1990s, a mix of internal and cross-border 
wars occurred in Sierra Leone and Angola in which rebel forces used revenue from the 
trade of diamonds to acquire weapons, finance their military activities, and commit 
human rights violations.255 
                                                 
255 Later on, the government of Liberia and the Republic of Congo were also involved in different 
manners in the trade of conflict diamonds: in 2000, the UN alleged that Liberia supported the insurgency in 
Sierra Leone with weapons and training in exchange for diamonds; in 2004, the UN found that the 
Republic of Congo exported large quantities of diamonds without the required certification of origin. 
Besides the evidence that the trade of diamonds was linked with the financing of insurgencies and rebel 
groups, the most shocking aspect of the conflict diamonds is the horrendous human rights violations and 
the exploitation of poverty related to the diamond industry. In general, the circumstances surrounding the 
trade of diamonds and human rights violations were presented to the public in movies, such as Blood 
Diamonds (2006) and Bling (2007). Business magazines, such as Fortune, acknowledged the disparity 
between the long lasting exploration of diamond mining in Africa (130 years) and the low standards of life, 
for instance, in Sierra Leone: an average man earns USD 220 a year and dies at age of 39. See Vivienne 
Walt, Diamonds are Diamonds, Fortune (Dec. 11, 2006) at 50, 52. 
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Response to conflict diamonds occurred gradually and at many levels.256 From the 
1990s on, the UN-SC adopted resolutions under Chapter VII establishing trade sanctions 
to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.257 Second, the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme for Rough Diamonds (KPCS), an international mechanism of cooperation to 
tackle the human rights violations occurring in connection with trade in diamonds, was 
established in 2000.258 Finally, the WTO waived in 2003 certain member obligations for 
those participating in the diamonds embargo established by the KPCS. The waiver allows 
members to deviate from WTO obligations. The MFN obligation (article I of the GATT) 
and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions (article XI of the GATT) are, among 
others, waived. The extraterritoriality nature of the problem is clear, since the human 
rights issue is taking place in the territory of the diamond exporters.  
The decision of the WTO expressly recognized  
the extraordinary humanitarian nature of [the conflict diamonds] and the 
devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the 
                                                 
256 For instance, NGOs and the media raised consumer awareness and pressured governments and 
international organizations to act. 
257 In 1998, the SC adopted Resolution 1173, placing Angola under sanctions forbidding countries 
from buying diamonds. See S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3891st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 
(1998), ¶ 12(b): “All States shall take the necessary measures ... to prohibit the direct or indirect import 
from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin 
regime of the GURN.” In 2000, the SC adopted Resolution 1306, putting a ban on the direct or indirect 
importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone not controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone 
through a certificate of origin. See S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1306 (2000). Later on in 2001, the UN applied sanctions on the Liberian diamond trade. See 
Liberia: S.C. Res. 1343, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (2001). By 
Resolution 1643(2005), the SC imposed an embargo on the import of all rough diamonds from Côte 
d’Ivoire. S.C. Res. 1643, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5327th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1643 (2005), ¶ 6. 
(“Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the import of all rough diamonds from 
Côte d’Ivoire to their territory”). 
258 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme [hereinafter KPCS], 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (follow “Read the official KPCS document”). 
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peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the systematic and 
gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts.259  
As said, the reading of the waiver could suggest that the Diamond Waiver is 
counterfactual to the ARJ approach. How could the “waiver” transaction occur in light of 
alleged heightened TCs? Nonetheless, what appears to be counterfactual evidence 
actually reinforces the ARJ approach; the “waiver” transaction is not a clear entitlement 
but an example of no allocation, or at best, a muddy or organizational strategy. 
1. Sovereignty Costs 
The waiver expressly recalls the “relevant resolutions of the United Nations 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” It also specifically 
refers to “United Nations Security Council resolution S/RES/1459(2003) that supports 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.”260  
Therefore, the waiver does not overcome sovereignty costs. The waiver is just an 
act in conformity with a preexisting decision concerning extraterritorial measures taken 
by the UN-SC, under the powers of the UN Charter.261 As Pauwelyn criticizes, there is 
actually no need to reconfirm in the WTO what was already decided in other fora. 
Pauwelyn points out a certain “superiority complex” in vogue at the WTO.262 In other 
                                                 
259 General Council, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough 
Diamonds, WT/L/518 (May 27, 2003), pmbl (emphasis added)[hereinafter Diamond Waiver]. See also 
General Council, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, 
WT/L/676 (Dec. 15, 2006), ¶ 1 (extending the waiver until December 31, 2012). 
260 Diamond Waiver, pmbl. 
261 In the extreme, if the WTO actually “denied” a decision of those types of waiver, the WTO 
would be violating international law. At the same time, strictly speaking, the WTO did not have to produce 
any waiver in the referred case. 
262 See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO 
Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”, 24(4) MICH. J. INT’L L. 1177, 1198, 1205 (2003). 
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words, the waiver is a decision that merely reproduces these obligations (whose 
corresponding TCs were analyzed in the previous section). 
2. Cognitive Costs  
Is the waiver overcoming the allegedly high costs of recognizing human rights in 
the WTO when it mentions “gross violations of human rights”? Should human rights 
proponents welcome the waiver as evidence of the WTO’s seemingly openness to human 
rights? Once again, it appears that the human rights language of the waiver is misleading. 
The first thing to notice is the similarity (in italics) of the relevant provisions of 
the waiver mentioning “human rights” and the document explaining the KPCS, as 
follows: 
 KPCS WTO Diamond Waiver 
First 
Paragraph 
of the 
Preamble 
Recognizing that the trade in conflict diamonds is a 
matter of serious international concern, which can 
be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, 
the activities of rebel movements aimed at 
undermining or overthrowing legitimate 
governments, and the illicit traffic in, and 
proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms 
and light weapons. 
Recognizing that the trade in conflict diamonds is 
a matter of serious international concern, which 
can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed 
conflict, the activities of rebel movements aimed 
at undermining or overthrowing legitimate 
governments, and the illicit traffic in, and 
proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms 
and light weapons. 
Second 
Paragraph 
of the 
Preamble 
[r]ecognizing the extraordinary humanitarian nature 
of this issue and the devastating impact of conflicts 
fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the 
peace, safety and security of people in affected 
countries and the systematic and gross human 
rights violations that have been perpetrated in such 
conflicts 
Further recognizing the devastating impact of 
conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds 
on the peace, safety and security of people in 
affected countries and the systematic and gross 
human rights violations that have been 
perpetrated in such conflicts 
Table 9 – Comparison of the KPCS and Diamond Waiver Language 
This is a clear indication that the waiver is not an elaboration of the WTO bodies 
concerning any “human rights” analysis. Surely, there is not even mandate for that, but 
the point to make is that the waiver cannot be read as getting around the cognitive costs 
of “human rights” language in the WTO.  
One could even inquire whether the waiver was actually a low-cost decision 
expressing a collaborative approach of the WTO towards the human rights regime. This 
critique has been captured by the remarks of Krista Schefer, though not in terms of TCs. 
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Schefer affirms that the waiver is in reality “chilling” the progress on the trade and 
human rights dialogue.263 Since the waiver mentions “human rights,” it eliminates further 
need of discussing the problem. Schefer suggests that the basic tension between the 
measures used and WTO rules is no longer a reason to engage in exchanges of views 
between the trade and human rights communities.264 
The Diamond Waiver reflects a type of strategy that is simply mirrors the analysis 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the waiver can induce the reader to think 
that it overcame sovereignty and cognitive costs, the waiver, rather, confirms the 
hypothesis of heightened TCs. 
Finally, another interesting aspect of the case is its reference to the KPCS scheme. 
The KPCS regime is a regulatory scheme entailing working groups, committees, and 
annual plenary meetings convening governments, industry representatives and civil 
society members. As a TNG initiative, Chapter 4 will analyze it. 
C. TRADE AND LABOR LINKAGE 
The linkage between international trade and labor standards is far from a recent 
development.265 Aside from earlier developments of the linkage in the ILO context (see 
analysis under sovereignty costs), in the GATT context, it should be noted that the 
                                                 
263 See Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Chilling the Protection of Human Rights: What the 
Kimberley Process Waiver Can Tell Us About the WTO's Effect on International Law 1, 22-23 (NCCR 
Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 2007/03, Jan. 01, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094619. 
264 Id. at 22. 
265 Steve Charnovitz, The (Neglected) Employment Dimension of the World Trade Organization, 
in 125, 136 SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 157 (Leary & Warner eds., 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006)(noting that on a multilateral basis, action to regulate trade for social reasons began 
in the early twentieth century with conventions to restrict trade in sexual services of woman – 1904 – and 
trade in toxic phosphorus matches – 1906). 
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Havana Charter contained a provision on “fair labour standards”266 that could have 
provided an initial linkage, and formal allocation of regulatory jurisdiction, between the 
ILO regime and the GATT 1947. The linkage in the Havana Charter was never made 
concrete. 
Since then, other attempts to include labor rights in the trade regime have taken 
place, but the next “relevant” outcome of the “WTO and labour rights saga,” as suggested 
by Howse, came almost fifty years later with the 1996 Singapore Ministerial.267 Finally, 
the latest episode came with the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work.268 
Similar to the analysis developed aboce, all of these developments, despite 
appearing to be counterfactual evidence against the ARJ framework, are proof of the 
heightened sovereignty and cognitive costs as applied to the trade and labor linkage. 
1. Sovereignty Costs 
The first evidence of sovereignty costs can be inferred from the following passage 
by Laurence Helfer about the history of the ILO. He acknowledges that 
[t]he [ILO] Constitution of 1919 expressly authorized “measures of an economic 
character” in response to a state’s failure to implement a Commission’s findings. 
But the organization never exercised its power to impose trade sanctions, and the 
                                                 
266 Havana Charter art. 7. The official title of the ITO Charter is Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organization. The official text of the never-ratified instrument is found in U.N. Doc. 
E/Conf. 2/78 (March, 24 1948). For those interested in the GATT 1947 history and explanations of the 
political context that led to the failure of the ITO, see Jackson, supra note 142, at 31-43. See also DOUGLAS 
A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 98 (2008). 
267 Robert Howse et al., The World Trade Organization and Labour Rights: Man Bites Dog, in 157 
SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 157, 179 (Leary & Warner eds., 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006). 
268 ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work [hereinafter 1998 ILO 
Declaration], in 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCES 86TH SESSION RECORDED OF PROCEEDINGS 20 
(1998). 
116 
 
1946 revision of the constitution removed this language and substituted a more 
ambiguous mandate for the ILO Conference to take “such action as it may deem 
wise and expedient to secure compliance.” In practice, therefore, trade sanctions 
had remained politically and legally out of bounds since the ILO’s founding.269 
In the Havana Charter context, as Jackson notes, though that instrument was 
several times submitted to the U.S. Congress and extensive hearing were held, the 
Congress composition had shifted to a stance less liberal on trade matters and less 
internationally oriented.270 Arguably, what Helfer identifies as “political” (in the context 
of the ILO), and what Jackson identifies as “less liberal and less internationally oriented” 
can be associated with the idea of sovereignty costs so far developed.  
It should be acknowledged, however, that it is hard to tell exactly whether these 
are sovereignty costs or are also some sort of purely economic costs. A widely accepted 
account is that, in the view of developing countries, any attempt to restrict exports from 
low-wage countries was an attempt to repeal comparative advantage and protect domestic 
industries in developed countries. On the other hand, minimum-wage and payment of 
overtime work are only a few of the labor standards with direct impact on comparative 
advantage.271 The protection of labor rights is much more comprehensive. The 1998 ILO 
Declaration enumerates four universally accepted workplace human rights as core labor 
rights: 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and 
                                                 
269 Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and 
Innovation in the ILO, 59(3) VANDERBILT L. R. 649, 712 (2006)(emphasis added). 
270 Jackson et al, supra note 13, at 213. 
271 I make this assertion intuitively, without analyzing whether or not other core labor rights affect 
comparative advantage. 
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(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.272 
 Therefore, it seems plausible to assert that the costs attaching to the trade and 
labor linkage are a mix of sovereignty and economic costs. I also infer this “blend” of 
costs from Jackson’s assessment that “developing countries are adamantly opposed [to 
the linkage] because they fear . . . restrictive measures based on cultural and political 
consideration [sovereign concern] within the large industrial countries – to the detriment 
of developing low-wage countries [economic concern].”273 
 Though I focused on these initial developments to make sovereignty costs more 
explicit, I focus on the later developments of the linkage as evidence of cognitive costs. 
2. Cognitive Costs 
Are the Singapore Ministerial and the 1998 ILO Declaration evidence that 
cognitive costs have been overcome? I submit here that what appears to be a change is 
more of the same. 
Paragraph 4 of the Singapore Declaration posits that 
[w]e [states] renew our commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our 
support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and 
development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization 
contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour 
standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of 
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put 
into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will 
continue their existing collaboration.274 
 As Howse observes, 
                                                 
272 1998 ILO Declaration, ¶ 2. 
273 Jackson, supra note 142, at 245. 
274 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC 
[hereinafter Singapore Declaration], at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
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[t]he most important point of the Singapore Declarations rests on its insistence 
upon a segregation of competences between the ILO and the WTO . . . the 
Singapore Declaration at once established the trade and labour link, takes a 
strong stand on one aspect of it, but then denies and declines any competence 
regarding the issue it has just pronounced (if only in a one sided manner) upon, 
and closes the door (institutionally and legally speaking) to a possible WTO 
role.275 
 The 1998 ILO Declaration, in turn, asserts that 
[l]abour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes and that 
nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used 
for such purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any country should 
in no way be called in question by this Declaration and its follow-up.276 
As with the wording analysis developed in the Diamond Waiver context, one 
cannot abstain from comparing the above phrasing with the developments of the Doha 
Ministerial: 
Singapore Declaration 
(1996), ¶ 4 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal 
with these standards . . . We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist 
purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-
wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question. 
1998 ILO Declaration, ¶ 5 Whereas the ILO is the constitutionally mandated international organization and the 
competent body to set and deal with international labour standards . . . Labour 
standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes and that nothing in this 
Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in 
addition, the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called in 
question by this Declaration and its follow-up. 
Doha Declaration (2001), ¶ 8 We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding 
internationally recognized core labour standards. We take note of work under way in 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization . 
Table 10 – Comparison of the Declaration Referring to Trade and Labour Linkages 
As Howse asserts, “what we see in both [the Singapore Declaration and the ILO 
1998 Declaration] is an effort to establish a link in order to deny, wrongly, that is ever 
appropriate to notice or act upon it. That is deeply disturbing. . . It fails to recognize that 
                                                 
275 Howse, supra note 267, at 181 (emphasis added). 
276 It should be noted that paragraph 8 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration merely reproduces the 
Singapore Ministerial. That is to say, it recalls the commitment to comply with internationally recognized 
CLS and designates the ILO as the organization responsible for developing and promoting these standards. 
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the “comparative advantage” argument, regards as an absolute, can be overextended to 
justify violations of covered rights.277 
 In sum, Howse’s observations about the high degree of segregation between the 
WTO and other regimes, and the rigid dividing line between labor and human rights, in 
my understanding, are symptomatic of the high cognitive costs involved in trade and 
labor rights linkages. It should be observed, though, that further research is probably 
required to tell apart with more precision the delineation of cognitive, sovereignty and 
economic costs in relation to this case. 
                                                 
277 Id. at 188. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The task in this chapter was to investigate the reasons that one simply does not 
find much support that any of the relevant bodies of international law (general, trade and 
human rights) embrace any robust doctrine of restrictive trade measures addressing 
extraterritorial human rights violations. 
Drawing from a model of L&E that pairs property rights and regulatory 
jurisdiction, an analogy was devised to explain that the different regimes of international 
law (general and specialized) are devices of ARJ. In addition, ARJ occurs as a function of 
TCs. This means that the different categories of ARJ (anticipation, clear, muddy, and 
organizational allocations) depend on the TCs involved. The two categories of TCs to 
inform the examined transactions were sovereignty and cognitive costs because the first 
is expected to arise in extraterritorial allocations, and the second is expected to emerge 
when two distinct policy domain are involved. 
The case studies confirm the model of analysis. The clear entitlement concerning 
extraterritorial jurisdiction found in Chapter VII is an exceptional type of allocation that 
happened in the very peculiar moment of the history where sovereignty costs were 
lowered.  
The other two cases, though apparently serving as counterfactuals to the model, 
actually confirm it. Essentially, the efforts to establish linkages in the Diamond Waiver 
and the trade and labor linkages are less than real linkages. In the case of the Diamond 
Waiver, the real ARJ is a reproduction of the ARJ found in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Potential cognitive costs are not off-set, since the language of the waiver is 
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merely a reproduction of language found in other instruments. As to the trade and labor 
rights debate, it was also noted that, together with sovereignty and cognitive costs, 
economic costs (loss of comparative advantage) is a fundamental blocking factor for any 
ARJ. 
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Ch4 Transnational New Governance: Overcoming 
Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs 
INTRODUCTION 
Recall the earlier assessment: high TCs, in the form of sovereignty and cognitive 
costs, explain the lack of a vigorous doctrine to justify restrictive trade measures 
addressing human rights violations abroad. 
But human rights initiatives tackling problems associated with those violations 
have not decreased; just the opposite. In this chapter, the main proposition is that these 
initiatives have gone in a direction that involve lower or no significant amount of 
sovereignty and cognitive costs. 
First, I will introduce the abundance of initiatives and present an existing 
taxonomy to group them (i.e., Abbott and Snidal’s triangle). Second, by referring to some 
of these initiatives – the UN-GC (voluntary code), SA 8000 (social certification), 
fairtrade (social labeling), the KPCS, and other recent developments –, I aim at 
supporting the above proposition. The chapter also tries to expand the explanation to 
indicate that these initiatives bear their own costs, but not sovereignty and cognitive 
costs. Finally, based on the overall analysis, this chapter pinpoints a potential research 
agenda for the future. 
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I. THE PLETHORA OF TNG INITIATIVES 
A. A NOTE ON ACRONYMS 
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal identify the emergence of a new kind of 
international regulatory system that they name transnational new governance (TNG), as 
follows: 
TNG is emerging spontaneously, largely out of dissatisfaction with the failure of 
international “Old Governance” (OG) – acting through treaties and 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – to adequately regulate international 
business. NGOs, business firms and other actors, singly and in novel 
combinations, are creating a plethora of innovative institutions to apply 
transnational norms to business, especially on worker rights, environmental 
protection and human rights.278  
Abbott and Snidal name these initiatives regulatory standard setting (RSS) and 
explain that TNG demands a broader view of “regulation” and a more nuanced view of 
the state as regulator.279 It should be noted that RSS is just one of the many acronyms 
found in the literature to describe these initiatives. Bernstein and Hannah, for instance, 
point out that the proliferation of transnational non-state mechanisms – usually in the 
form of producer certification and product labeling systems – are a sub-set of the broader 
“corporate social responsibility” (CSR) category.280 Moreover, they indicate that scholars 
in law, political science, and business have also employed the labels “transnational 
                                                 
278 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
“Transnational New Governance” (2008), http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_abbott/1 (forthcoming). 
279 Id. at 3-4. 
280 Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy 
and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (2008). For a definition of CSR, see JENNIFER 
A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2006) (noting the difficulties in defining CSR, but proposing that CSR “refers 
to the notion that each business enterprise, as a member of the society, has a responsibility to operate 
ethically and in accordance with its legal obligation and to strive to minimise any adverse effects of its 
operations and activities on the environment, society and human health”). 
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regulatory systems,” “non-state market driven (NSMD) governance systems,” and “civil 
regulation.”281 Yet, other authors make use of “private governance system” to designate 
them.282 Putting aside the competition of acronyms, I will use TNG initiatives or 
initiatives (without any sort of prejudice concerning other nomenclature). 
B. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Abbott and Snidal identify four central elements of new governance, each 
reflecting a modification of the state’s traditional role. In the new paradigm, the state:  
1. incorporates a decentralized range of actors and institutions, 
public and private, into the regulatory system, for example by 
negotiating standards with regulatory targets, encouraging and 
supervising self-regulation, or sponsoring voluntary 
environmental management systems; 
2. relies on this range of actors for regulatory expertise; 
3. modifies its regulatory responsibilities to emphasize 
orchestration of diverse public and private actors and institutions 
rather than direct promulgation and enforcement of rules; and 
4. utilizes “soft law” to complement or substitute for mandatory 
“hard law.”283 
It should be noted that, along their work, Abbott and Snidal remind us that states 
are “jealous of their sovereignty and freedom of action” and are reluctant to delegate 
authority to international institutions.284 Mostly important, in their conclusions, they state 
that TNG “allows states to participate in international regulation and delegate limited 
                                                 
281 Bernstein & Erin Hannah, supra note 280, at 2. They also acknowledge that NSMD, although 
slightly awkward, has been widely cited and has generated the most detailed and distinct categorization of 
these mechanisms. Id. 
282 This last usage appears in the context of forest certification. See BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., 
GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE 
AUTHORITY 4 (2004)(calling these arrangements one of the most innovative and startling institutional 
designs of the past fifty years.). 
283 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 5. 
284 Id. at 24. 
125 
 
authority without incurring significant sovereignty costs.”285 Moreover, TNG allows 
“IGOs to pursue their regulatory goals with less resistance from states and greater 
collaboration with private actors.”286 
Yet, one cannot disregard the technological factors that made possible this 
transformation. Though Abbott and Snidal do not elaborate on this factor, David Fidler 
credits technological developments as one of the fundamental changes to explain the 
increasing role of non-state actors in international relations over the past two decades: 
technological developments concerning the means of transportation, production, 
weaponization, and communication [such as the internet] have allowed non-State 
actors . . . to increase their material capabilities for engaging in world affairs.287 
 These technological transformations significantly lowered the barriers to entry for 
non-state actors to access and affect directly and independently the condition of anarchy 
that characterizes international relations.288 Fidler observes, however, that the impact of 
this growth in material capabilities is not uniform across non-state actors. That is to say, 
increased participation and louder voices do not necessarily translate into greater impact 
on the outcome of decisions states make in international relations. However, the general 
                                                 
285 Id. at 61. See also Fidler, supra note 198, at 283 (2008)(assessing that “States, particularly the 
great powers, are notoriously reticent to consent to meaningful systems of international governance that 
crimp their sovereignty and freedom of action.”) 
286 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 61. 
287 Fidler, supra note 198, at 274.  
288 Id. at 275. It should be noted that Fidler employs this explanation in the context of a theoretical 
framework developed by him called “open-source” anarchy. In that framework, “the State-centric, 
Westphalian approach to anarchy [no hierarchical authority among states] resembles an oligopolistic 
market in which a small number of great powers determine supply and demand for power and ideas in 
anarchy. Great powers dominate in oligopolistic anarchy because they have achieved economies of scale in 
the production and use of material capabilities . . . To change oligopolistic anarchy to allow non-State 
actors to affect anarchy directly requires significantly altering the material conditions of competition among 
actors.” Fidler then credit the emergence of the United States after the Cold War as a hegemon that greatly 
reduced competition among States for power (i.e., the United States after the Cold War) and the 
technological transformations acknowledged above. Id. at 274. Anarchy is employed here in the technical 
sense of international relations. Id. at 262. 
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assessment about the increase of non-state influence in international relations as a 
function of the technological revolution remains a valid one.289 It seems sufficient to 
remember that the internet, particularly, makes possible massive campaigns and lobbying 
and has the power to mobilize the general public concerning international issues.  
C. CLASSIFICATION OF INITIATIVES BASED ON THE SHARE OF ACTORS’ PARTICIPATION 
As said, it is not my purpose to present a comprehensive list of TNG initiatives. 
Nonetheless, as a way of categorizing them, I will make use of the illuminating taxonomy 
that Abbott and Snidal portray in the shape of a “governance triangle.”290 The triangle 
works as follows: 
• The dots dispersed on the triangle represent individual initiatives. To clear the 
aspect of the triangle, I kept the original dots, but I left only the names of the few 
initiatives that will be developed (UN-GC, SAI, FLO, among others); 
• The division of the triangle in seven zones represents situations in which one 
(Zones 1-3), two (Zones 4-6) or three (Zone 7) actor groups dominate the 
initiative. That is to say, the dots are located in accordance with their relative 
“shares” that companies, NGOs, and states participate in the governance scheme. 
For instance, an initiative located in zone 6 means that NGOs and companies are 
the main actors. An initiative located in zone 7 suggests the participation of three 
                                                 
289 Fidler, supra note 198, at 277-78. Fidler also reminds that the increase of material capabilities 
of non-state actors is for good and for bad. Non-state actors that are not engaged in constructing better ways 
of governance, such as terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates, are also empowered by these 
technologies. Id. at 283. 
290 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 7, 63. 
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actors. The closer to the vertice of the triangle, the bigger the share of a single-
actor. 291  
 
Figure 2 – The New Governance Triangle (Simplified) 292 
D. TYPE OF MECHANISMS EMPLOYED BY THE INITIATIVES 
TNG initiatives are diverse and encompass the adoption of voluntary codes of 
conduct, certification strategies, or merely reporting requirements. These mechanisms can 
also be combined. Generally, the employment of the standards, accreditation, 
certification, and labeling terminology has been greatly associated with TNG initiatives. 
It should be noted that they have specific meaning, though their usage is not always made 
with much precision in the literature. 
For my purposes, standards are defined by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) as “documented agreements containing technical specifications or 
                                                 
291 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 8. 
292 This is a simplified version of the triangle found in Abbott and Snidal, with only some of the 
forty initiatives depicted. I also employed “companies” in the right lower vertices of the triangle, instead of 
“firms,” in the original triangle. 
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other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines or definitions, to ensure 
that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.”293  
Certification, in turn,  
is a procedure by which a third party gives written assurance that a product, 
process or service is in conformity with certain standards. Certification can be 
seen as a form of communication along the supply chain.294 
To ensure that the certification bodies have the capacity to carry out certification, 
they are evaluated and accredited by an authoritative body. Certification bodies may have 
to be accredited by a governmental or a “para-statal” institute.295 
Finally, labeling (or labelling) refers to initiatives to put distinctive logos on 
products produced in a manner that meets certain standards, informing consumers of 
these facts. While the certificate is a form of communication between seller and buyer, 
the label is a form of communication with the end consumer.296  
In the case studies that follow, I will indicate what type of mechanism the 
initiative involves. 
                                                 
293 International Organization for Standardization, ISO Guide 2 (1996). 
294 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Environmental And Social 
Standards, Certification And Labelling For Cash Crops 8 (2003)[hereinafter FAO Report](“The certificate 
demonstrates to the buyer that the supplier complies with certain standards, which might be more 
convincing than if the supplier itself provided the assurance.”) Id. at 8. It should be noted that an 
organization setting standards and a certification body (the organization performing the certification) are 
not necessarily the same. For instance, though the ISO sets standards, the ISO itself does not certify. 
295 Id. at 8. 
296 Id. at 8-9. 
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II. CASE STUDIES ON SELECTED TNG INITIATIVES 
This section elaborates on the case studies as follows: (i) a background on the 
initiative and the reason it was selected for scrutiny; (ii) why the concerned initiative does 
not incur sovereignty and cognitive costs; and (iii) criticisms about the initiatives. 
A. VOLUNTARY CODES OF CONDUCT: THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT 
1. Background 
The UN-GC corresponds to a TNG initiative first envisaged by former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999. The UN-GC describes itself as “the world's 
largest, global corporate citizenship initiative.”297 Corroborating this estimate, a report 
released in 2004 affirms that,  
[w]ith more than 1,100 companies formally committed to the Global Compact, 
the Global Compact is by far the world’s largest voluntary corporate citizenship 
network, dwarfing other similar, voluntary initiatives, such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (387 participants) and SA 8000 (353 participants).298 
The UN-GC provides a framework for businesses that are committed to aligning 
their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of 
                                                 
297 For general information on the initiative, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. 
298 McKinsey & Co., Assessing the Global Compact's Impact 1, 10 (May 11, 2004), 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2004_06_09/imp_ass.pdf. The 
report was released by the Global Compact Office – the coordination office - and was undertaken by 
McKinsey & Company. The governments of Brazil, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom funded the impact assessment. Id. As to McKinsey, it self-description affirms that: “We are the 
trusted advisor and counselor to many of the most influential businesses and institutions in the world. We 
serve more than 70 percent of Fortune magazine’s most admired list of companies.” See 
http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/whoweare/. It should be noted that recent accounts of these figures 
indicate significant increases. As of November of 2008, the UN-GC includes over 4,700 businesses 
(http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html). The SAI, in turn, as of mid 
2006, reports 1,038 participants. See 
http://www.isealalliance.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=513&parentID=486&grandpar
entID=486&nodeID=1. 
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human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption, thus mainstreaming these 
principles in business activities around the world. 
The UN-GC tackles the trade and human rights linkage by asking companies to 
embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the 
areas of human rights (principles 1-2) and labor standards (principles 3-6): 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
Principle 2:  make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Principle 3:  Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
Principle 4:  the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
Principle 5:  the effective abolition of child labour; and 
Principle 6:  the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.299 
Though it is true that the UN-GC was not meant to specifically address the trade 
and human rights linkage, if a company that trades in the international market adopts the 
code, the initiative ends up dealing with the linkage. Furthermore, because it is the largest 
initiative of voluntary codes, it is worth mentioning and analyzing. 
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? 
The UN-GC is situated in zone 4 of Abbott and Snidal’s triangle. This localization 
indicates that states and companies are the main actors of the initiative. However, as 
explained, the UN-GC is not a treaty (it does not involve an allocation of regulatory 
jurisdiction) but a set of principles that companies embrace.  
Sovereignty costs do not attach directly to states, as they do not have any legal 
obligation under the UN-GC (the principles are phrased as “businesses should do 
something”). As Hurd explains, one of the features of the initiative is the code of conduct 
                                                 
299 See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (follow “Principles”). 
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approach, borrowing the principle of voluntarism and generating the subsidiary effect of 
skipping all state-based authority.300 
Interestingly, the another feature mentioned by Hurd is useful to highlight, 
specifically, its lower cognitive costs. Hurd comments that  
from the WTO, [the UN-GC] borrows the notion that monitoring can or should 
be performed by those with an interest in finding violations. And from the ILO, it 
inherits the set of pre-established and (arguably) universal conventions which 
give it content. This amalgam is an interesting piece of constitutional design, 
particularly for the way that it takes advantage of the coincidence between the 
self-interests of the participants and the legitimacy of the UN.301 
Translated into the lexicon of this dissertation, by borrowing and inheriting 
principles from other IGOs, the UN-GC arguably circumvents the cognitive costs that 
would otherwise attach if the WTO straightforwardly adopted the ILO conventions or the 
ILO directly enforced trade sanctions.  
3. Criticisms 
One commentator, despite acknowledging that the initiative “paved the way for 
the United Nation’s engagement with key non-state actors to tackle pressing challenges 
of the twenty-first century,” notes that the UN-GC principles are general and vague.302 
Moreover, no monitoring and verification mechanisms exist except for dialogue with 
                                                 
300 Ian Hurd, Labor Standards through International Organizations: The Global Compact in 
Comparative Perspective 1, 17 (2001). 
301 Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). 
302 See Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.'s “Public-Private” Partnership for 
Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 111, 149-50 (2006). 
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business.303 Similarly, another commentator argues that the UN-GC is inadequate 
because it offers mere moral suasion to the business community.304  
Interestingly, by being totally out of the traditional forms of governance and 
making use of rhetoric suasion, the UN-GC reveals its weakness. At the same time, as 
will be further explored, the initiative has been engaged in dialogues with a new initiative 
(ISO 26000) that may offer new developments. 
B. SOCIAL CERTIFICATION: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL (SAI) AND SA 8000 
1. Background 
Social Accountability International (SAI) – a NGO based in New York - 
developed the SA 8000 standard in 1998.305 The SA 8000 is in its third edition and 
specifically focuses on the working conditions of employees in supply chains.306 SAI is 
under the umbrella of the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and 
                                                 
303 Id. at 146. 
304 Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N. Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 38 (2007). 
305 See Social Accountability International, Social Accountability 8000 (2008)[hereinafter SA 
8000], www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf. SAI describes itself as “a 
non-governmental, international, multi-stakeholder organization dedicated to improving workplaces and 
communities by developing and implementing socially responsible standards. SAI convenes key 
stakeholders to develop consensus-based voluntary standards, conducts cost-benefit research, accredits 
auditors, provides training and technical assistance, and assists corporations in improving social 
compliance in their supply chains.” For more information in the initiative, see http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=490&parentID=472. In accordance with the FAO 
Report “SAI was founded by the Council on Economic Priorities, a corporate social responsibility research 
institute based in the United States of America, that operated from 1969 to 2001. In 1996, SAI convened an 
international multi-stakeholder Advisory Board to develop the SA 8000 standard. The SAI Advisory Board 
includes experts from trade unions, businesses and NGOs. See FAO Report (2003), at 24. 
306 The third version of the SA 8000 has been released in 2008. The normative elements of this 
standard are based on national law, international human rights norms and the ILO conventions. See the 
standard at http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf 
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Labeling Alliance (ISEAL).307 The initiatives encompassed by the ISEAL have been 
described as the most relevant example of NSMD system.308 Currently, the initiative has 
more than one thousand certified companies. 
In relation to the distinction previously made (between standards, certification, 
accreditation, and labeling), it should be noted that: (i) SAI is a standard-setting body that 
draws its standards from the ILO conventions and human rights treaties; (ii) SAI’s 
accreditation services are managed by another organization called Social Accountability 
Accreditation Services (SAAS);309 and (iii) the SA 8000 label is not used on products; 
that is to say, the certification is given directly on companies, informing the supply chain 
of that fact. 
Most of the SA 8000 certified companies pertain to supply chains involved in 
international trade. SAI website refers to case studies regarding the implementation of the 
SA 8000 in companies in Vietnam (glass industry), Thailand (apparel industry), Central 
America (garment manufacturing), and China (in general), among others.310  
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? 
                                                 
307 ISEAL convenes eight members aiming to set social and environmental standards in sectors 
ranging from forestry and agriculture to fisheries, manufacturing, and textiles. For general information, see 
http://www.isealalliance.org/ . The ISEAL full members are: the Fairtrade Labeling Organization 
International (FLO), the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the International Organic Accreditation Service 
(IOAS), the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM), the Marine Aquarium 
Council (MAC), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), the Rainforest Alliance, and the Social 
Accountability International (SAI). 
308 Bernstein and Hannah, supra note 280, at 7. 
309 This is a recent development, since “SAAS began work in 1997 as an accreditation agency as 
part of Social Accountability International (SAI) and was formally established as its own independent, not-
for-profit affiliate in 2007. SAAS is now an independent decision-making agency, linked to SAI only 
through contractual arrangements.” See http://www.saasaccreditation.org/faqanswers.htm#saasrelationship. 
310 See in general, http://www.sa-intl.org. Companies as Dole (the largest producer and distributor 
of fresh fruit in the world) and Chiquita Banana are SA 8000 certified.  
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As a first remark, in Abbott and Snidal’s triangle, SAI is located in zone 6, which 
indicates that NGOs and companies are the main actors involved in the initiative. Second, 
it should be observed that SA 8000 requires that, besides the obligations of companies to 
comply with national and all other applicable laws where it operates, companies shall 
respect the enumerated principles of sixteen ILO conventions and six human rights 
conventions.311  
That language shows the way the initiative directly targets companies and refrains 
from using the regulatory framework of governments and international organizations, at 
least, directly. Clearly, sovereignty and cognitive costs are immediately circumvented by 
the modus operandi of the initiative. SA 8000 is neither about member “A” telling 
member “B” that the latter cannot export to member “A,” because member “B” does not 
comply with ILO conventions and human rights treaties that member “B” has ratified; 
nor is it about the WTO adopting, as a covered agreement or in a decision, ILO and 
human rights conventions. SA 8000 is a standard developed by a NGO. To be certified by 
SAI, companies in member “B” need to comply with prescriptions contained in ILO and 
human rights conventions. 
Finally, an interesting question that it is part of an open-ended debate refers to the 
extent that certification initiatives are indeed outside of the traditional state and IGOs 
governance structures and, thus, not incurring on sovereignty and cognitive costs. The 
discussion arises in connection with the TBT agreement, since that agreement covers not 
                                                 
311 SA 8000 (2008), at 2. 
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only technical regulations – mandatory regulations – but also voluntary standards (such 
as the SA 8000).312 
 Generally, as far as these initiatives are not characterized as technical regulations, 
they are outside the realm of states and WTO scrutiny. Yet, the TBT agreement imposes 
obligations on states regarding voluntary standards. This means that members have 
obligations to take reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that local 
government and non-governmental standardization bodies comply with a Code of Good 
Practice, contained in Annex 3 of the TBT agreement.313  
The Code of Good Practice contains, for instance, classic clauses of non-
discrimination similar to those found in the context of state-to-state relations.314 In 
addition, the Code of Good Practice obligates individual standard-setting bodies within a 
member to harmonize and coordinate their efforts to the extent possible and to use 
relevant international standards.315 
                                                 
312 The TBT defines standards as “document approved by a recognized body [which is not 
defined], that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling [sic] requirements as they 
apply to a product, process or production method.” TBT Annex 1, art. 2. 
313 TBT art. 4.1. 
314 TBT Annex 3, Code of Good Practice: “D. In respect of standards, the standardizing body shall 
accord treatment to products originating in the territory of any other Member of the WTO no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any 
other country [analogous to the NT and MFN obligation];” Id. “E. The standardizing body shall ensure that 
standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade.” Id. 
315 TBT Annex 3, Code of Good Practice: “F. Where international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for 
the standards it develops, except where such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective 
or inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of protection or fundamental climatic or 
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.” 
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Though the obligations above begins with hortatory language (“reasonable 
measures as may be available),” as Howse summarizes,  
[t]hese provisions have potentially quite important implications for non-
governmental social labeling initiatives – they appear to place some positive 
obligation on governments to oversee such initiatives with a view to ensuring 
their conformity with the Code of Conduct.316 
 Although the WTO and its members have not yet officially spoken on the 
relationship between its rules and voluntary initiatives,317 in light of these potential 
intersections, some commentators have suggested that the WTO should avoid any 
interference.318 Bernstein and Hannah remind us that “simple prudence suggests 
governments and the WTO secretariat should avoid allowing the institution to be thrust 
further into the position of having to adjudicate social regulation.”319 
3. Criticisms 
A criticism of accreditation procedures comes from NGOs. Though NGOs could 
be accredited by SAI to become auditors, up to 2004, only large commercial quality 
control and traditional financial auditing firms (e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers) perform 
SA 8000 audits.320 Therefore, civil society organizations have questioned the competence 
of commercial auditors to perform social audits and the final quality of the reports, which 
                                                 
316 Howse, supra note 267, at 212. 
317 See Susan A. Aaronson, A Match Made in the Corporate and Public Interest: Marrying 
Voluntary CSR Initiatives and the WTO, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 629, 641 (2007). 
318 Howse, supra note 267, at 229-31. See Bernstein & Hannah (2008)(generally calling for the 
need of “regulatory space”). 
319 Bernstein and Hannah, supra note 280, at 34. 
320 Irene Schipper, WE Europe: A Report on CSR Policy and SA 8000, 14 (2004), 
http://cleanclothes.org/ftp/WE_Profile_2004_NL.pdf  
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require different competences.321 This criticism is also important because it reminds us 
that social certification and labeling is itself a business niche (and a growing one) 
operating under the powerful language of human and labor rights. 
From the point of view of companies, because there is not an extensive network 
of local certification bodies in some countries, certifications can increase costs of 
production and not having a certain certification can mean to be out of the market. From 
the point of view of consumers, because the initiative deals with communication between 
the wholesale and buyer, they cannot always make conscious choices for these products. 
The certification attaches to companies, not products.322 
C. SOCIAL CERTIFICATION AND LABELING: FLO AND FAIR TRADE 
1. Background 
Fair trade are not one but many initiatives aiming at providing better market 
access and better trading conditions for small-scale farmers.323 This includes a price 
premium for producers to be invested in social and environmental improvements.324 For 
larger production units an additional aim is to improve the conditions of workers.325  
The Fairtrade Labeling Organization International (FLO) – also a member of the 
ISEAL – has developed standards encompassing labor; farmer associations and 
                                                 
321 Id. at 15. 
322 FAO Report, supra note 294, at 38. 
323 Id. at 23. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
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cooperatives; and trade standards, including minimum prices, for licensed traders. The 
FLO is the owner of the fairtrade certification mark.326  
In relation to the distinction previously made between standards, certification, 
accreditation, and labeling, it should be noted that: (i) the FLO is a standard-setting body; 
(ii) the certification is done by an independent international certification company, FLO-
CERT Gmbh;327 and (iii) though one normally associates fairtrade with labeling in 
products, the FLO-CERT certifies, essentially, producers. The use of the fairtrade label is 
governed by a license contract between the FLO and producers and the label is issued in 
accordance with specific procedures.328 
Similarly to the SAI, FLO standards follow certain internationally recognized 
standards and conventions, especially those of the ILO concerning labor standards. The 
Generic Fairtrade Standards for Small Farmers' Organizations, for instance, explicitly 
follows ILO Conventions 29, 105, 138 and 182 regarding child labor and forced labor.329 
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? 
 The analysis to be conducted here would essentially follow the points made on the 
previous section concerning the SAI-SA 800). Labeling, as explained, is just one of the 
                                                 
326 The FLO is also an umbrella organization convening twenty labeling initiatives in twenty one 
countries and producer networks representing Fairtrade Certified Producer Organizations in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia. For an overview of the FLO, see http://www.fairtrade.net/introduction.html. 
327 The certification body is based in Bonn, Germany. For an overview of the FLO-CERT, see 
http://www.flo-cert.net/flo-cert/index.php. 
328 For labeling products procedures, see http://www.fairtrade.net/ (than follow “Selling Labelled 
Products”). 
329 Fairtrade Labeling Organization, Generic Fairtrade Standards for Small Farmers’ Organizations 
(Dec. 17, 2007)[hereinafter Fairtrade Standards], art. 4.1, 
http://www.fairtrade.net/producer_standards.html. 
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many forms of certification attaching to the final traded product and informing the 
consumer about the certification. 
3. Criticisms 
Even when labeling is attached to products, Howse explains that 
[u]nless she [the consumer] can be sure that most other consumers will do 
likewise, the individual consumer may well not consider it rational to avoid 
buying the product in question.330 
Another key issue that appears in social-labeling refers to questions of credible 
monitoring to ensure that claims made in association with the label are not fraudulent.331 
Finally, economically speaking, the whole idea of fairtrade inherently bears an 
economic cost. In the case of the fairtrade label governed by the FLO, The Economist 
published an article criticizing the economic basis of fairtrade schemes. The British 
magazine, despite acknowledging that “such food [labeled fair] allows shoppers to 
express their political opinions, from concern for the environment to support for poor 
farmers,” pointed out that fair trade is in some respects deleterious.332 For instance, by 
encouraging a greater supply of coffee, fair trade contributes to a further decrease in the 
world price of coffee. Thus, maintaining artificially high prices may leave the majority of 
coffee producers worse off.333 
D. A HYBRID INITIATIVE: THE KPCS 
1. Background 
                                                 
330 Howse, supra note 110, at 20. 
331 Id. at 20. 
332 Special Report: Voting with your trolley - Food politics, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2006, at 81. 
333 For arguments from the FLO responding to The Economist, see Fairtrade, Response to The 
Economist (Dec. 15, 2008). 
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The contextualization of the diamond conflict has already been made. There, I 
called the attention to the Diamond Waiver and the KPCS. Here, I develop the analysis 
on the latter. 
As to its origins, a first meeting to discuss the certification was held at Kimberley, 
South Africa, in May 2000. In December 2000, the UN-GA adopted Resolution 55/56 
which expressed the concern over the problem of conflict diamonds fuelling conflicts in a 
number of countries and the devastating impact of these conflicts on peace, safety and 
security for people in affected countries, as rebel movements finance their military 
activities through the trade of diamonds. The resolution also supported the creation and 
implementation of a purportedly simple and workable international certification scheme 
for rough diamonds. In November 2002, these efforts led to the creation of the KPCS. 
Eventually, the KPCS was adopted in November 2002 and launched in January 2003.334  
In 2006, The KPCS counted at some forty-six participants, or seventy countries 
(the EU-25 being represented by the EC as a participant).335 The diamond trade is 
represented by the World Diamond Council and the civil society by NGOs (Global 
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada).336 A variety of international organizations 
participate on an ad hoc basis.337 
                                                 
334 Though I summarized a lot of the information found in the KPCS website, further details can 
be found at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
335 See The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Third Year Review, Submitted by the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Nov. 2006), at 64 
[hereinafter KPCS Third Year Review], 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/third_year_view_en.html. 
336 I do not consider criticisms that NGOs do not represent civil society interests. 
337 KPCS Third Year Review, supra note 330, at 64. 
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As to the classification of the KPCS as a voluntary code, certification or labeling, 
the initiative seems to be sui generis. It does not label or certify individual diamonds or 
companies as free from conflicts. Rather, it certifies an entire shipment of rough 
diamonds.338 Moreover, in parallel, KPCS relies on a self-regulation mechanism of the 
diamond industry.339 
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? 
The KPCS is located in zone 7 of Abbott and Snidal’s triangle. This localization 
suggests that the initiative is a sort of hybrid type of regulation, with states, NGOs and 
companies sharing governance. 
But like others TNG initiatives, KPCS is not a treaty, but soft law. Surely, among 
the TNG initiatives, KPCS is the only in which, to be a participant, a government must 
develop a certification process for diamonds. This certification process must follow 
minimum requirements contained in the KPCS and governments’ customs officials have 
to inspect these certifications. The requirements for participation are outlined in Sections 
II, V(a) and VI(8,9) of the KPCS. However, as Schefer reckons, the requirements 
surrounding the certificate are a balance between “maintaining effective control over 
diamond trading activities and not overburdening the participants (private and public) 
with either sovereignty-threatening international oversight or costly administrative 
paperwork requirements.”340 Cognitive costs, it is submitted here, are also low because, 
                                                 
338 KPCS §II(a). 
339 In October 2002, when the Kimberley Process was in its infancy, the International Diamond 
Manufacturers Association (IDMA) and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB) created a 
voluntary system of self-regulation which required its members to sign on to a System of Warranties and a 
Code of Conduct. See KPCS Third Year Review, supra note 330, at 72. 
340 Schefer, supra note 263, at 12. 
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as other TNG initiatives, the KPSC does not involve the elaboration of human rights 
normative linkages at the WTO. As showed before, the Diamond Waiver does not 
perform this linkage. 
3. Criticisms 
Despite the international and national efforts tackling the conflict diamond, NGOs 
and the media point out the weakness of the system. Amnesty International has been 
drawing attention to the lack of government monitoring and verification over the 
diamond industry as it is main flaw. In 2006, Amnesty reported that the system of 
internal controls is a patchy and uneven set of measures and controls that vary in their 
effectiveness from country to country.341 Equally, Schefer suggests that the main 
criticism over the process is the lack of regular, independent monitoring of the 
participants’ implementation of their certification schemes.342 
 Fortune reported a far grimmer assessment of the KPCS: if on one hand, 
diamond producers frequently promote Sierra Leone as a KPCS success story, since its 
official exports soared from near zero in 1999 to about USD 142 million in 2005 – 
suggesting that smuggling has plummeted, on the other hand, illegally mined diamonds 
are easily mixed in.343 Indeed, Oshionebo suggests that “once shipped out of Africa to 
diamond-cutting centers in Europe, Tel-Aviv and other places, the so-called ‘conflict 
diamonds’ are mixed with legitimate diamonds from around the world; and, because they 
                                                 
341 Amnesty International, Kimberley Process: An Amnesty International Position Paper 
Recommendations to the Kimberley Process (KP) participants in order to effectively strengthen the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) (June 21, 2006), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGPOL300242006.  
342 Schefer, supra note 263, at 13. 
343 Walt, supra note 250, at 54. 
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are unlabelled, it becomes difficult if not impossible for the consuming public to know 
their country of origin or their corporate producer.”344 
 E. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Government Procurement 
 As Christopher McCrudden indicates, there is actually a lengthy history of 
making public procurement a mechanism for the achievement of ‘non-economic’ goals, 
such as social policies, in what might be thought of as domestic human rights purposes.345 
McCrudden enumerates the United States (from where many prominent examples come), 
Canada, South Africa, and several European countries as making use of these types of 
mechanisms.346 
 But despite this historical record, I chose government procurement as latest 
development to highlight the increased popularity and new variations of these measures. 
As Aaronson notes, “[a] growing number of WTO Member States want to use the market 
power of government to promote globally responsible practices, but they are unsure 
whether their strategies distort trade.”347  
Indeed, government procurement appears to be mixing more and more with the 
TNG initiatives above described. Aaronson points out, for instance, that some provinces 
                                                 
344 Oshionebo, supra note 304, at 18-19. 
345 Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a 
Framework for Discussion of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement, 2 J. INT’L ECO. L. 1, 7-8 (1999)(emphasis in original)(enumerating some of these policies: 
tackling long term unemployment, promoting fair labor conditions, promoting the use of local labor in 
economically deprived areas, prohibiting discrimination against minority groups, encouraging equality of 
opportunity between men and women, and promoting the increased use of the disabled in employment, 
among others). 
346 Id. at 8. 
347 Aaronson, supra note 317, at 649. See also SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON & JAMIE M. ZIMMERMAN. 
TRADE IMBALANCE: THE STRUGGLE TO WEIGH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING (2007). 
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of Italy use the SA 8000 certification discussed before to award public procurement.348 
The UN-GC has set up a working group with other UN agencies and IGOs to examine 
how to integrate social and environmental sustainability into procurement practices on an 
international basis.349 Bernstein and Hannah affirm that initiatives under the ISEAL are 
beginning to target governments to adopt their standards in their procurement policies.350 
They explain that this move is especially notable given the ability of large states to affect 
markets through their buying power.351 They also reveal that, based on interviews with 
officials involved in TNG initiatives,  
once confident their standards could constitute “international” standards, 
[initiatives’ officials] plan to ramp up efforts to encourage market uptake. Some, 
for example, are planning advocacy campaigns to encourage governments to 
reference [TNG] NSMD standards when developing legislation, regulatory 
mechanisms, or procurement policies.352 
The entanglement of TNG and government procurement deserves at least two 
comments. First, as these initiatives become increasingly intertwined in governmental 
                                                 
348 Id. at 649. 
349 Id. 
350 Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 280, at 7. 
351 Id. at 7. See also Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the 
Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 529, 533, 535 (2007)(analyzing 
the size of the procurement market and how a variety of international organizations, such as the WTO, can 
work to promote free trade on government procurement). 
352 Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 280, at 23. Though I restricted my analysis to government 
procurement, as noted by Bernstein and Hannah, countries’ domestic legislation referencing TNG 
initiatives (not only in procurement cases) also offer interesting developments. An initiative called Fairfood 
announced that is drafting a transparency law proposal in the Netherlands (Fairfood is a NGO based in 
Amsterdam). This proposal would grant the consumer the right to know to what extent companies can 
guarantee the absence of certain human rights violations in their production chains. The proposal will be 
sent to the State Council mid-December, after whose advice it will be submitted to parliament. Next year, 
Fairfood International will establish a lobby coalition in Brussels aiming to introduce a similar proposal on 
the EU level. See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 8 On the Horizon: a Practical Bulletin on 
What is Ahead in the field of Business and Human Rights 4 (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.crsdd.uqam.ca/Pages/docs/pdfMedias/On%20the%20Horizon%20-%20Issue%208%20-
%20Dec%202008%5B1%5D.pdf.  
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measures (and have potential deleterious extraterritorial trade effects), affected members 
would have the choice to challenge these measures under the WTO covered agreements; 
especially in the cases involving the signatories of the Governmental Procurement 
Agreement (GPA).353 Second, and as a consequence of the first comment, it would be 
interesting to observe whether the willingness of human rights activism to intertwine 
TNG initiatives in more rigid forms of governmental regulation will backfire at some 
point.  
I have focused on explaining how sovereignty and cognitive costs substantially 
drove human rights activism out of the public international law system. This new surge of 
government procurement initiatives may reinvigorate governments as active actors. 
Depending on how individual members and the WTO handle it, questions of sovereignty 
and cognitive costs may blossom again, this time with different costs in both the 
sovereignty and cognitive areas, as a result of the TNG activities. 
2. ISO 26000 
Finally, it should be highlighted that the ISO will be for the first time dealing with 
social responsibility in an initiative named ISO 26000 (to be published in 2010). As 
Bernstein and Hannah indicate, while  
ISO’s principal activity and distinct expertise is the development of technical 
standards, market demand (the guiding principle of ISO’s work) has prompted it 
                                                 
353 The GPA is a plurilateral treaty; the GPA binds only Members who expressly adopt it, and 
Members can opt in or out. Currently, it is in force for thirty-nine members. For an updated list of the 
signatories of the GPA, see WTO – Government Procurement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm. Government procurement provisions were 
explicitly excluded from the GATT 1947 framework, and an agreement was possible only during the 
Tokyo Round, the 1979 GPA. For the historic context of the GPA, see Annet Blank & Gabrielle Marceau, 
A History of Multilateral Negotiations on Procurement: from ITO to WTO, in LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC 
PURCHASING: THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 31, 32-36 (Bernard M. Hoekman & 
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 1997).  
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to enter into new areas such as quality management principles (ISO 9000 series), 
environmental management systems (ISO 14000 series), and food safety 
management systems (ISO 2200 series). Most recently, ISO launched a “social 
responsibility” initiative, to be published in 2010 as ISO 26000, aimed at 
developing a series of guidelines and recommendations to help corporations 
streamline their response to pressures from ethical rating agencies.354 
Though the details of the ISO 26000 are still under development, an already 
observable feature of the standard is the multiplicity of stakeholders in its elaboration. 
ISO 26000 draws on best practices developed by existing public and private sector social 
responsibility initiatives. As to its normative basis,  
[i]t will be consistent with and complement relevant declarations and conventions 
by the United Nations and its constituents, notably the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), with whom ISO has established a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) to ensure consistency with ILO labour standards. ISO has 
also signed an MoU with the United Nations Global Compact Office (UNGCO) 
to enhance their cooperation on the development of ISO 26000 and with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to ensure 
consistency with OECD guidelines.355 
Representatives of six stakeholder groups participate in the working group 
drafting ISO 26000: industry; government; labor; consumers; nongovernmental 
organizations; and service, support, research and others. Two experts from each 
stakeholder category – one from a developed country and one from a developing country 
take part in the integrated drafting group.356 ISO 26000 drafting working group operates 
                                                 
354 Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 280, at 24. 
355 ISO, Executive Summary: ISO and Social Responsibility (SR) (2008), at 3, www.iso.org/sr 
(follow “Press and News,” then “Publications”). Though not developed in this work, the OECD revised and 
adopted new guidelines for the operation of multinational enterprises in 2000. The OECD Guidelines 
establish voluntary recommendations relating to human rights, responsible supply chain management, labor 
relations, environmental, consumer protection, and bribery issues. The OECD is an international 
organization established in 1961 and currently comprises a membership of thirty countries committed to 
democracy and the market economy from around the world. For more information on the organization, see 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/. 
356 Press Release, ISO, Stakeholder consensus enables ISO 26000 on social responsibility to move 
up in development status (Sep. 18, 2008), http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1158.  
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under the joint leadership of the ISO members for Brazil (Brazilian Association of 
Technical Norms - ABNT) and Sweden (Swedish Standards Institute - SIS).357 
In addition, one should stress the close relationship between ISO and the WTO. 
Reference to terms and definitions of ISO are found in Annex 1 of the TBT. References 
to notification procedures in relation to ISO are found in Annex 3 of the TBT (Code of 
Good Practice). In one WTO jurisprudence case, the definition of standards found in the 
TBT (and reflecting the ISO definition) was acknowledged and developed to some 
extent.358 
For all these relevant points, ISO 26000 seems to be very important as a future 
linkage between trade and human and labor rights among the TNG initiatives.  
III. POINTS FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA 
The advent of TNG initiatives is an implicit recognition that prior international 
and multilateral regulatory initiatives were inadequate because of the sovereignty and 
cognitive costs attached to them. Consequently a research agenda may encompass the 
following points:  
• How will TNG initiatives continue to develop? Will they entangle with the 
“old” governance model? The expansion of government procurement 
policies referencing private standards is illustrative of this latter point. Can 
this entanglement in reality backfire against the human rights impetus of 
enlarging these initiatives more and more? It is worth remembering that 
                                                 
357 Id. 
358 See EC-Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, ¶ 220, 224-225. 
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some authors, maybe predicting this outcome, have suggested that the 
WTO should just “get out of the way” in case this entanglement eventually 
happens. Thus, will the public international law system get out of the way 
or finally address the trade and human rights linkage? 
• Are the TNG initiatives already changing the calculation of costs that 
rational states make and thus, modifying the perception of sovereignty and 
cognitive costs? Constructivism theory, in particular, refers to the impact 
of non-state actors in the social construction of international relations. Is 
the proliferation of government procurement domestic laws making 
references to social standards and the elaboration of ISO 26000 evidence 
of this change?  
• Will ISO 26000 be “the” critical initiative in channeling a linkage? The 
setting of ISO 26000 gathers a vast mix of actors, including the leadership 
of developed and developing countries, IGOs, and non-state actors to deal 
with international social standards. Like SA 8000 and fairtrade, 
sovereignty costs are avoided to the extent that ISO 26000 does not 
establish any hard law of public international law. Cognitive costs are also 
passed since ISO 26000 does not represent a direct adoption of social and 
labor standards by the WTO. At the same time, a close normative 
connection between the WTO and the ISO exists through the TBT. 
• What other forms of linkages are being created? Though not explored 
here, bilateral and regional agreements have been used as alternative 
avenues of trade, human rights and labor rights linkages (e.g. NAFTA, the 
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FTA between the U.S. and Chile, Singapore, and Jordan; the pending 
agreements between the US and Colombia, Panama, and Korea). 
Naturally, because of the much smaller number of participants, an 
agreement can be easier to produce. But are the norms of these agreements 
real attempts to provide linkages or do they reflect, in reality, transactions 
with very little novelty, just like the analysis of the Diamond Waiver and 
the ILO-WTO linkages proved to be; 
• Will the current financial crisis re-orient the debate in any way? In time of 
economic strain, it has been historically observed that countries adopt 
protectionist policies.359 Will the disparities in human rights and labor 
standards be a “scapegoat” for protectionist policies in light of the world 
economic crisis? Or will it be just the opposite, a world crisis with major 
magnitude and effects that creates momentum to reform the international 
trade system? 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The proposition in this chapter requiring proof was that TNG initiatives incur 
different sovereignty and cognitive costs. The chapter began by actually presenting the 
                                                 
359 As Hoeckman and Kostecki call attention to, it can be that, economically speaking, such a 
decision is a mistake (it is more costly to the consumer after all), but nevertheless is “good politics” 
towards well-organized groups that would be hurt by competition. See BERNARD M. HOECKMAN & MICHEL 
M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 120 (2d, 2001). “Good politics” 
is a term borrowed from “public choice theory,” an interdisciplinary field of economics and political 
science. In public choice the values exchanged are political welfare of politicians, which are calculated, for 
instance, in terms of votes and campaign contributions. For the classic discussion, see JAMES M. 
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). 
150 
 
vast nomenclature by which these initiatives have been described (RSS, NSMD, among 
others) and, as well, by explaining a useful taxonomy developed by Abbott and Snidal. 
Then, I analyzed four of these initiatives: the UN-GC (voluntary code of conduct), 
SA 8000 (social certification), fairtrade (labeling), and the KPCS (hybrid initiative). All 
of these initiatives can be understood to deal with the trade and human rights linkage and 
the notion of extraterritoriality. In terms of sovereignty and cognitive costs, because they 
do not represent typical examples of allocation of rights and obligations found in 
international law, sovereignty costs are avoided. Moreover, because they do not represent 
attempts to mainstream human rights and labor at the WTO (or vice versa), cognitive 
costs appear not to significantly occur in these transactions. It should be noted that TNG 
initiatives are not without their own TCs and criticisms were noted for each of the 
analyzed initiatives. 
One way to interpret this analysis is that these initiatives overcome potential TCs 
found in the public international law system by simply moving away from it. However, it 
seems that this generalization falls short at some point, to the extent that some recent 
developments (e.g. government procurement and ISO 26000) have the potential to mix 
elements of the old and new governance. 
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Ch5 Conclusion: The Rational Structure of 
International Law in an Irrational World 
Is there a right (or a duty) in international law by which states are allowed (or 
obligated) to impose restrictive trade measures because of violations of human rights 
occurring outside their territory? While exploring this question, my argument has been 
divided into three distinct parts.  
First, using legal analysis, the overall conclusion (as developed in Chapter 2) is 
the lack of a vigorous doctrine supporting the lawful recourse to unilateral or collective 
trade sanctions addressing human rights violations. Is it an obvious assessment? Probably 
not; the assessment actually demystifies common sense perceptions about rights and 
duties that international law prescribes.  
For instance, some have argued that the protection of human rights, especially in 
case of gross violations of peremptory norms (jus cogens), would justify trade sanctions. 
Others have argued that such justification exists as provided by CIL. However, after 
analyzing some of the sources purportedly justifying those measures, the conclusion 
points in the opposite direction: general international law, trade law (i.e., WTO law), and 
human rights law simply do not embrace such a doctrine. 
The norms of these branches that allegedly support the legality of trade sanctions 
rely in weak sources: for instance, obiter dictum in Lotus, obiter dictum in Barcelona 
Traction, Restatement Third, which is not a formal source of international law and 
potentially reflects US aspirations, the DASR, which is unclear about the issue and is also 
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soft law, humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect, which is highly 
controversial and significantly refuted, US-Tuna II (unadopted report), US-Shrimps 
(circumvented the extraterritorial issue), among others. Perhaps the only case of lawful 
resort to trade sanctions is situations falling under the UN-SC powers of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, the classic and most well-known model of extraterritoriality. 
Since rules are pretty hostile to the exercise of extraterritorial legal powers in any 
context, the natural question demanding response is why that is the case. This explanation 
was the inquiry addressed in Chapter 3. 
Among the tools that one could employ for explanatory purposes, I found this 
possibility in terms of L&E theory and lexicon. As noted, L&E has been a recent and 
increasing tool as applied to international law. 
In the adopted L&E approach, preference was given to a positive approach; i.e., to 
explain the legal system as it is, rather than to recommend changes. I began with a pre-
question: what is the function of international law? In one strong sense, international law 
is law that allocates, shifts, and transfers authority. This means that international law 
performs ARJ; that international law is a device of ARJ; that international law is a 
mechanism of ARJ. In addition, in the L&E model, ARJ is a function of TCs. If TCs are 
high, allocations may not even occur and, when occurring, allocations are muddy or 
organizational solutions to decide something ex-post are provided. The main types of TCs 
involved were (i) sovereignty and (ii) cognitive costs.  
Sovereignty costs are a type of cost acknowledged in the literature. Purportedly, 
escalated sovereignty costs emerge in connection with extraterritorial jurisdiction 
concerns. Cognitive costs, in turn, relate partially from my own observations, in situs, as 
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a visiting researcher in IGOs, and also from literature remarks about the isolation, 
compartmentalization, and resistance to change of communities with different policy 
domains and expectations (in this case, trade and human rights). It should be noted that 
cognitive cost is probably a type of information cost and that the “cognitive costs” 
terminology is not acknowledged as such in the literature. 
After developing the framework, I proposed its application on three case studies. 
The common underlying hypothesis was the presence of escalated TCs in each of them 
(sovereignty, cognitive, or both). The first case was about the exceptional ARJ found in 
international law: Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The point was that, though one could 
argue that that Chapter VII is counterfactual to the model, Chapter VII emerged in a very 
peculiar moment of the world history when sovereignty costs were most likely lowered. 
The second case study concerned the so-called WTO Diamond Waiver. The point was 
that, while one could argue that the waiver refutes the model, the waiver is in reality not 
illustrative as overcoming sovereignty or cognitive costs. The waiver is, in fact, a mirror 
of the type of allocation found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the language 
of the waiver is simply a reproduction of language found elsewhere and not an 
elaboration of the WTO on human rights issues. The third case study dealt with trade and 
labor rights linkages. Similarly to the analysis of the waiver, alleged linkages, the 1919 
ILO constitution, the Havana Charter, the Singapore Declaration, and the 1998 ILO 
Declaration) were deemed again as “false” linkages that are not instructive in denying the 
hypothesis of heightened TCs. 
Chapter 4 focused on the exploration of how human rights advocates are 
attempting to advance the trade and human rights linkages through TNG initiatives. The 
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main proposition requiring proof in that chapter was the lower level (or absence) of 
sovereignty and cognitive costs. 
I began by recalling that TNG has been acknowledged in the literature with 
significant variations, though they all refer to the same phenomena. It was useful to rely 
on an existing taxonomy to identify the TNG initiatives in terms of a governance triangle 
in which TNG initiates are situated in accordance with the share of participation of three 
main actors: states, NGOs, and companies. Moreover, it was indispensable to note that 
these initiatives have been materially empowered and made operational by recent 
technological innovations. 
I chose four relevant examples of TNG initiatives to demonstrate the lower level 
of sovereignty and cognitive costs: (i) the UN-GC (a voluntary code of conduct), since it 
represents the largest initiative; (ii) the SA 8000 (a social certification), because it deals 
with supply chain and human rights; (iii) fairtrade (a social certification/labeling) as also 
dealing with supply chain and part of the ISEAL system; (iv) and the KPCS, as part of 
the broader discussion of conflict diamonds. As a common denominator, it was possible 
to envisage how states are basically accessory to them (providing general support or 
moral suasion), rather than being required to adhere to any formal obligation. The only 
exception to this “accessoriness” is perhaps the KPCS, in which states are responsible to 
develop a certification scheme, to certify and inspect shipments, and to monitor 
compliance (though disclaimers were made about the KPCS nature as soft law and 
criticisms were recalled over the different commitment of governments). 
Furthermore, by referring to international standards found in human rights and 
labor rights conventions that companies must adopt, these initiatives move away from the 
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WTO as a locus to formally enshrine human and labor standards, thereby avoiding 
cognitive costs; They also move away from the ILO to formally encompass trade 
sanction, avoiding cognitive and sovereignty costs. In addition to the above case studies, 
attention was given to very recent developments in the area of government procurement 
and the global social standard (ISO 26000) being developed under the auspices of ISO.  
As further research, the main points indicate the need: (i) to keep track on the 
evolution of TNG initiatives and potential manifestations of the WTO regime bodies in 
relation to it; (ii) to investigate the extent to which these initiatives are already altering 
the calculation of states’ interests; (iii) to analyze whether bilateral and regional dealing 
with social linkages are indeed linkages or merely false inducements (as the Diamond 
Waiver and the WTO-labor linkages proved to be); and (iv) to observe if the economic 
crisis will change anything in this debate; for instance, a potential outcome, in times of 
economic strain, is the use of human rights and labor rights languages to justify trade 
restrictive measures with real protectionism intent. This would be, however, a very 
unfortunate outcome since it is neither economically sound nor helps to shape a rational 
trade system more free of human rights and labor rights violations. 
In sum, the recognition that states are lawfully entitled to or have a duty to act by 
imposing restrictive trade measures based on extraterritorial human rights consideration 
is an unlikely type of ARJ because of the high TCs involved. This is not to say that 
powerful states will always refrain from resorting to them in practice. But in general, it is 
expected that future developments will be based on variations of TNG initiatives. These 
initiatives may also prompt new developments that may result in even more elaborate 
forms of trade and human rights linkages. 
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Finally, it should be reinforced that I do not stand against the basic premise that 
trade liberalization generates economic growth and better standards of living, a 
proposition widely supported by economic research. In an even broader perspective, it is 
a project about peace and stability that has been associated with the quotation credited to 
Frederic Bastiat, a French economist of the eighteenth century: “[i]f goods don’t cross 
borders, armies will.360”  
But I also recognize, while returning to remarks made in the introductory chapter, 
that collision and tension occur between the trade system and the protection of human 
rights and labor rights. The whole point, nevertheless, is how to handle eventual tension. 
As demonstrated, the public international law system (in any branch: general, trade, and 
human rights) reflects a rational correlation between lawfulness and sovereignty and 
cognitive costs. This legal design, so far, has blocked the “internalization” of allocations 
dealing with extraterritorial violations of human rights and labor rights in public 
international law. It has also redirected efforts of the human rights community towards 
new types of TNG initiatives. 
                                                 
360 As Dean Russell explains, that exact quotation does not appear in any of Bastiat’s writings, but 
the idea was clearly endorsed by Bastiat in several passages. See DEAN RUSSELL, FREDERIC BASTIAT: 
IDEAS AND INFLUENCE 7 (1965). 
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